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Abstract
The principal focus of this study is an exploration of the role and functioning of
the audit committee within the UK framework of corporate governance. It
contributes to the existing audit committee literature through
• the presentation of a qualitative examination of the role of the audit
committee in large UK public limited companies, which has not previously
been attempted
• the use of the analytical approach of actor-network theory which has not
previously been applied to the study of audit committees
• the demonstration that audit committees have a role beyond that envisaged
for them by the Cadbury Code, in enabling companies to acquire resources
by establishing legitimacy through a display of concern for reassuringly high
standards of corporate governance.
The importance to audit committee participants of consensus, independence and
comfort is identified within the data collected. The links between these concepts
are explored in the context of the ceremonial performance of the audit committee
meeting. Consensus, achieved through complex networks among participants, is
displayed at the meeting through a process of iterative questioning which
demonstrafes characteristics of independence among members, validating the
consensus reached. Consensus serves to generate comfort which is viewed as a
commodity produced by the audit committee and passed on to the main board.
Ultimately, the published financial statements, which include evidence of the
audit committee's existence and activity, provide comfort to external providers
of finance that the company is maintaining appropriate standards of corporate
governance.
According to Cadbury, audit committees contribute to high standards of
corporate governance: this study argues that this assertion remains unproven but
that audit committees enable companies to present an image of concern about
such standards which may be sufficient to establish legitimacy and permit access
to resources to secure their survival and expansion.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
'You want to know about our audit committee? Well, our deputy chairman says
it's a complete waste of time because none of the members know enough about
the company to make any useful contribution and they don't know what the audit
committee is meant to do anyway... no, I don't agree with him... well, come to
lunch and we'll tell you..'
The flurry of comment after the publication of the report of the Cadbury
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 1992 suggested
that research in this area might be of considerable interest. Since audit
committees appeared to play a significant role in the Cadbury prescription for
corporate governance improvement, I began to read about them. I accumulated a
pile of relevant books, pamphlets and papers but as the pile grew, the idea of
exploring it became less appealing. Much more interesting to find out about audit
committees from the people who sat on them... .A telephone call to a finance
director friend elicited the response quoted above. The lunch was good and the
contrast in views expressed about the value of audit committees was intriguing:
the first ideas for this study were born.
A sub-committee of the board of directors, the audit committee is charged with
matters relating to financial reporting and audit, the mechanisms through which
the board is held accountable to shareholders. Structures and processes to ensure
accountability have been examined in detail in corporate governance research but
scant attention has been paid to the people involved in the everyday practice of
corporate governance. This study explores the activities of the audit committee
from the perspectives of the individuals involved, highlighting the dynamics of
their relationships and offering different insights into the role which the audit
committee plays.
This chapter begins by outlining the corporate governance debate which frames
this study within a historical and international perspective. The audit committee
is identified as an important factor within this debate, and thus as a suitable topic
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for research, by virtue of its role in the recommendations of the various bodies
reporting on corporate governance issues. The structure of the study is described.
1.1 The Corporate Governance Debate
In 1776 Adam Smith wrote:
'The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court
of directors. This court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many
respects, to the control of a general court of proprietors. But the
greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand
anything of the business of the company, and when the spirit of
faction happens not to prevail among them, give themselves no
trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly
dividend as the directors think proper to make to them. This total
exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum,
encourages many people to become adventurers in joint stock
companies, who would, upon no account, hazard their fortunes in
any private copartnery. Such companies, therefore, commonly
draw to themselves much greater stocks than any private
copartnery can boast of. ......... The directors of such companies,
however, being the managers rather of other people's money than
of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in
a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small
matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give
themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the
management of the affairs of such a company.'
(Smith, 1976:741)
Concern about the governance of corporate entities, as articulated by Adam
Smith two centuries ago, remains topical today. As Deakin and Hughes (1997:1)
observed:
'The impact of corporate decision making on interests and
communities outside the firm has always been considerable. What
has changed is that a large part of the political and institutional
structure through which such corporate decisions were at one time
mediated, has been dismantled. As a result, attention has been
focused back on to the internal governance mechanisms of
companies. At a fundamental level, corporate governance is
concerned with the relationship between the internal governance
mechanisms of corporations, and society's conception of the
scope of corporate accountability.'
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Definitions of corporate governance abound: accountability is a key element.
Keasey and Wright (1997:2) commented:
'There is considerable debate about what actually constitutes
corporate governance but its key elements concern the
enhancement of corporate performance via the supervision, or
monitoring, of management performance and ensuring the
accountability of management to shareholders and other
stakeholders.'
Pimm (1994:69) offered a more comprehensive description:
'Corporate governance is about the way businesses are run. It is
about the processes by which enterprises are directed and
controlled in response to the rights and wishes of shareholders
and other stakeholders. Effective corporate governance therefore
matters to boards of directors, to shareholders and to other parties
with a legitimate interest in a company's success. Effective
governance provides safeguards against both accidental and
deliberate diversion of resources away from the company's
objectives; it ensures that business risks are properly addressed
and managed; most of all it provides the framework within which
a successful business strategy can be pursued.'
The issues encompassed by this description have been brought into sharp focus
by instances of financial scandal where 'the rights and wishes of shareholders
and other stakeholders' are perceived to have been ignored by company
management with the consequence of 'both accidental and deliberate diversion
of resources away from the company's objectives'. Such instances have been
cited as failures of the corporate governance framework and have fuelled the
search for more appropriate structures of accountability. As Tricker (1993:2)
noted:
`Today's economically advanced societies owe a great deal to a
notion of the mid-nineteenth century - the concept of the joint
stock, limited liability company. Elegantly simple and superbly
successful, the idea of incorporating a legal business entity,
separate from the owners whose liability for the corporate debts
was then limited, has provided vast employment, fuelled huge
economic growth and created untold wealth. But the original
model of the company, in which ownership was the basis of
power, no longer adequately reflects the reality of the modern
corporation.'
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The history of the modern corporation rests squarely on the concept of limited
liability. The consequent separation of ownership from control and all the
associated problems of accountability have made necessary the regulatory
apparatus that surrounds corporate activity. Within this apparatus, financial
reporting and the audit function were developed as methods of ensuring effective
stewardship l . The stewardship model, which underlies the UK system of
financial reporting, gives primacy to the interests of owners and of creditors. The
modem challenge to this model has been expressed by critics such as Kay (1996)
and is clearly illustrated in the continuing debate about the objectives of financial
reporting. Within a financial reporting framework designed to meet a narrower
stewardship perspective, attempts to provide information relevant for decision
making to an extended group of stakeholders have resulted in financial reports
which appear to confuse and mislead. Despite radical proposals for reform
(ICAS, 1988), consensus on the way forward has yet to be reached (Page,
1991,1992, and Whittington, 1991, illustrate this debate).
Systems of corporate governance vary internationally, reflecting the differing
cultural contexts of the development of business enterprise. However, across the
world throughout the last decade, groups of business and professional leaders
have assembled to discuss the issues of accountability highlighted both by
financial scandal and by the rapidly changing multi-national corporate
environment. Chaired by eminent and respected members of the business
community - Treadway in the United States, Macdonald in Canada, Cadbury,
Greenbury and Hampel in the United Kingdom, Vienot in France, Hilmer in
Australia - these groups have deliberated and reported. The changes proposed by
these bodies focus on achieving improvements in the quality of financial
reporting: they include the formation of audit committees and an increase in
numbers of non-executive directors. Empirical evidence to support the value of
such measures in protecting shareholders and other stakeholders is, however,
limited and inconclusive. Their recommendations have met with varying
1 A summary of these developments may be found in Lee, 1982, chapter 4
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responses and the examination of their effects on corporate governance practice
is in its infancy. Mayer (1997:152) noted:
'Despite the intense debate, evidence on the effects of different
governance systems is still sparse. Corporate governance has become
a subject on which opinion has drowned fact.'
1.2 The Audit Committee
This study focuses on one part of the internal governance mechanism of a
company — the audit committee. Its importance has been emphasised in the
recommendations of all the reporting bodies mentioned above. Following their
pronouncements, audit committees have been widely established and the
consequences are thus an important subject for research.
What is an audit committee? Definitions may be found in a range of reports,
surveys and research studies (see, for example, Peat Marwick McLintock, 1987;
Marrian, 1988; Arthur Andersen,1992; Collier, 1993; Keasey and Wright, 1993;
PRONED, 1993) These definitions tend to be framed in terms of the membership
and responsibilities of such a committee, from the broad:
'An audit committee is a committee of directors who are charged not
with the running of the business but with overseeing how the
business is controlled, reported on and conducted.' (Arthur Andersen,
1992:2)
to the detailed:
`..a committee of directors of a corporation whose specific
responsibility is to review the annual financial statements.. The
committee generally acts as a liaison between the auditor and the
board of directors and its activities may include the review of the
nomination of the auditors, overall scope of the audit, results of the
audit, internal financial controls and financial information for
publication.' (AISG, 1977, quoted in Collier, 1992:2)
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Although the detail and emphasis may vary, such definitions concur that the
audit committee is a board sub-committee of (predominantly) non-executive
directors concerned with audit, internal control and financial reporting matters.
How does an audit committee help to improve the quality of financial reporting?
The Cadbury Committee (Cadbury Committee, 1992) was unequivocal in its
view of their value:
'The Committee therefore regards the appointment of properly
constituted audit committees as an important step in raising standards
of corporate governance.' (1992:30)
The assumptions underpinning this approach may be illustrated thus:
HIGHER STANDARDS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Will be achieved by
IMPROVED FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY
Which will be achieved by
IMPROVED AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Which will be achieved by
AUDIT COMMITTEES COMPOSED OF INDEPENDENT NON-
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
The report of the Cadbury Committee asserted that:
'Experience in the United States has shown that, even where audit
committees might have been set up mainly to meet listing
requirements, they have proved their worth and developed into
essential committees of the board. Similarly, recently published
research in the United Kingdom concludes that a majority of
companies with audit committees are enthusiastic about their value to
their businesses. They offer added assurance to the shareholders that
the auditors, who act on their behalf, are in a position to safeguard
' their interests.' (1992:27)
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Commentators in the US, however, do not necessarily share this view:
`.. a corporation having an audit committee as part of its governance
structure and having an effective audit committee are, of course,
different matters. While there are no reliable figures available to
indicate the number of audit committees that operate effectively,
there is considerable anecdotal evidence that many, if not most, audit
committees fall short of doing what are generally perceived as their
duties. .they do not appear to be asking the hard questions or
fulfilling the full range of what is expected of them.' (Sommer,
1991:91)
Similar criticism has been voiced in the UK:
'I rather suspect that, as now, the major thrust of audit discussion will
take place with the finance director, chairman and chief executive,
who possess a detailed and comprehensive knowledge of events. This
is not a criticism of audit committee members: it is just that their
perception of events and issues is, by comparison, shallow and, in
reality, discussions with them will be little more than a diplomatic
side-show' (Corrin, 1993:81)
Examples of problematic financial reporting have been noted even where audit
committees exist (Verschoor, 1990a, 1990b) and these continue to appear2.
Collier and Gregory (1996:180) commented that this debate appears to rest on
assertion and anecdotal information rather than objective evidence and Collier
(1996) asked a crucial question: why, in the face of very limited evidence to
support the public assertions, have so many companies established audit
committees?
This study examines the gap between these views about the value of audit
committees - between the formal public assertion of the Cadbury Committee
about their benefits, and the scepticism expressed by commentators and those
directly involved with audit committees, as indicated in the quotations noted
above. The approach used recognises that such gaps may exist because of the
differing understandings of those involved. It draws on the interactionist research
2 See for example, 'Lessons at Wickes', Financial Times, 1 July 1996; `Sketchley finance
director ousted', Daily Telegraph, 24 May 1997
7
tradition to explore these understandings through the stories of audit committee
activity provided by those closely involved, defined as audit committee
'participants'. Using the actor-network theory concept of 'translation', the
'micro' level of audit committee activity is explored and, through a
consideration of the dynamics of the relationships within and around the
committee, it is demonstrated that the audit committee performs a ceremonial
role in addition to its practical operation. The intention of the study is not the
derivation of further prescriptions relating to audit committee activity in the
search for the ideal model, but the enrichment of existing understanding through
consideration of the complex interrelationships underpinning audit committee
activity, which are largely ignored in the existing literature.
In chapter 2 a review of the relevant literature demonstrates the purpose of the
study in its broader context. The design, data collection and analysis process is
described in chapter 3. The analytical tools of actor network theory are explained
in chapter 4 and in chapters 5 and 6 the ceremonial importance of the audit
committee meeting is examined, using these tools. Three concepts of importance
to audit committee participants are identified within the data - consensus,
independence and comfort and the links between them are explored in chapters 7
to 9. In conclusion, it is proposed that an important function of the audit
committee is the generation of comfort in order to secure the legitimacy of the
company within the wider community and thus gain access to resources.
R
Chapter 2: The Audit Committee in Context
This chapter reviews the literature on corporate governance, boards of directors
and audit committees, placing this study in context. The limitations of the
literature in identifying an explicit purpose for the audit committee are
demonstrated: in consequence, studies which focus on audit committee
effectiveness are seen to be contradictory and inconclusive. Insights offered by
research into committees are also explored. The contribution of this study to the
existing literature is explained.
2.1 Corporate governance: a literature review
2.1.1 An overview of the literature
This study focuses on the operation of a single mechanism within the corporate
governance framework — the audit committee. Discussion of the broader
literature on corporate governance is therefore confined to those issues which are
most directly relevant to audit committee operations, and this review does not
aim to be comprehensive.
Cochran and Wartick (1988) reviewed the corporate governance literature in
detail but, since that date, the literature has developed extensively, and research
under this broad heading may be found in a wide variety of disciplines, as
illustrated by the range of journals which have devoted special issues to the
subject which include Accounting and Business Research (Corporate
Governance Special Issue, 91A, 1993) Managerial Auditing  (vol 8, no 3, 1993),
Human Relations (August 1995) and  Journal of Law and Society (March 1997)
Surrounding the activities of the reporting bodies mentioned in chapter 1, studies
of corporate governance have been undertaken across the world, reflecting an
international concern with accountability issues. International surveys such as
those by Kochan and Syrett (1991) and Oxford Analytica (1992) extend our
understanding but comparability, and thus the possibility of common approaches
to accountability issues, remains problematic. For example, the hypothesis that
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the different systems of corporate governance in Germany and Japan have
contributed to the industrial success of those countries in recent years has not
been fully explored, although Charkham (1995) offered a detailed comparative
analysis of governance systems in the UK, US, France, Germany and Japan.
Some commentators have argued that, even within the broadly similar
governance structures of the US, the UK and Australia, different institutional
arrangements make it less likely that a remedial measure in one country will be
equally effective in another (for example, Guthrie and Turnbull, 1995). This
difference in approach is further underlined by the Hilmer report (Hilmer, 1993),
the Australian equivalent of the reports of Cadbury Committee (1992) and the
Treadway Commission (1987): Hilmer identified the primary role of the board as
creating value for shareholders, a different emphasis from the focus on protection
of shareholders' interests which underlies Cadbury and Treadway. This implies
that prescriptions for improved corporate governance may vary in effectiveness
internationally, which has important consequences for expectations about the
effectiveness of audit committees, since audit committees have been adopted in
the UK largely as a result of US influence.
2.1.2 Corporate governance theories
Issues of accountability arising from the separation of ownership from control
have been discussed in the economics literature for many years', from the
seminal work of Berle and Means (1933) through to the development of the
agency model (e.g. Jensen and Meclding, 1976). While agency theory forms the
dominant approach in corporate governance studies, it is not without its critics,
who have challenged both its basic assumptions and its methodological
approach (e.g. Donaldson ,1990; Muth and Donaldson, 1998).
Keasey et al (1997) 2 outlined four views of the corporation which lead to
different models of corporate governance and different prescriptions for
successful governance arrangements. They summarised the agency or 'principal-
agent, or finance, model' thus:
1 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provided a comprehensive review of this literature
2
Hawley and Williams (1996) have also provided an overview of this theoretical debate.
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'It rests on the premise that markets.., provide the most effective
restraints on managerial discretion, and that the residual voting
rights of shareholders should ultimately commit corporate
resources to value-maximizing ends,' (1997:3)
- and noted that supporters of this approach would 'tend to be suspicious of
legislative changes which impose costs or obligations upon either the firms
themselves or their major shareholders' although they might 'endorse the
introduction of a voluntary code such as Cadbury' (1997:5). The second
approach, the 'myopic market model', differs from the agency model in that it
suggests that a focus on short term rather than longer term factors in the market
hinders successful corporate governance and is best remedied by interventions
that lead to strengthened longer term investing relationships. Shareholder 'voice'
and 'loyalty' are emphasised and the possibilities of 'exit' — an important
discipline under in the agency approach — should be limited. A third approach is
identified as 'the abuse of executive power': those holding this perspective on the
corporation argue that corporate governance can only be effective if supported by
increased legislative intervention to prevent abuse such as excessive director
remuneration. Finally, Keasey et al discuss the stakeholder approach which
identifies the purpose of the corporation as broader than the maximization of
shareholder wealth only, giving recognition to the interests of other groups of
stakeholders such as employees, suppliers and customers.
Davis and Thompson (1994) challenged the agency theory approach from a
political/sociological perspective, arguing that:
`.. the structure of large corporations is not strictly determined by
capital market pressures but results from political struggles that
implicate managers and owners as well as social structures
extending beyond the firm.'(1994:169)
Pound (1992,1993) identified the re-emergence of a political model of corporate
governance in which democratic political mechanisms have replaced the
takeover and other market-based corporate controls.
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Kay's trusteeship approach also offers a challenge to the agency perspective:
..much of the concern with corporate governance - a concern
which is largely Anglo-American - arises from the tension
between the Anglo-American model and the practical reality of
how large corporations operate everywhere.., it is quite clear that
the organic model of corporate behaviour - which gives to the
corporation life independent from its shareholders or stakeholders
- describes the actual behaviour of large companies and their
managers far better than does the principal-agent perspective. Yet
the near unanimous view of those who criticise the present
structure of corporate governance is that reality should be made to
conform to the model. The principal-agent structure should be
made more effective, through closer shareholder involvement and
supervision. All experience suggests that this is not very likely to
happen, and would not improve the functioning of corporations if
it did. The alternative approach - of adapting the model to reality
rather than reality to the model - deserves equal consideration.
After all, no one disputes that the German and Japanese models
produce many successful companies.' (Kay, 1996:108)
Despite these challenges, agency theory remains the most frequently deployed
theoretical approach in corporate governance research.
2.1.3 Methodologies of corporate governance studies
The extensive review of the literature on boards and directors by Zahra and
Pearce (1989) concluded with an 'inventory' of future areas for research. They
observed:
'There are countless lists of what boards should do. Yet, evidence
on what boards actually do is not well documented.'(1989:326)
Many studies in this area, while extending understanding of the relationships
between board structure and company performance, tend to be inconclusive and
usually repeat this call for further research to be done. They have focused on
linking performance outcomes with factors such as board size (Pfeffer, 1972),
member characteristics such as qualifications (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994a) and
gender balance (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994b), to produce tentatively prescriptive
proposals. Research methods employed have been predominantly quantitative,
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using survey methods or based on statistical manipulation of information culled
from published financial reports. Johnson et al (1996), surveying the literature
since Zahra and Pearce, made the following comments:
'A review of the corporate governance research... illustrates that
there is no consensus on what constitute appropriate measures of
corporate financial performance... The lack of consensus on
choice and operationalization of dependent variables severely
limits the generalizability of governance research findings.'
(1996:430)
They concluded that:
`.. given the heterogeneity of typical independent variables (e.g.,
the multiple operationalizations of board composition) and the
dependent variables (any number of operationalizations of
financial performance), it may be unrealistic to reasonably
compare and summarize this body of work..' (1996:433)
Herzel (1990) offered a further methodological critique. Commenting on a
collection of agency theory studies, he observed:
'I question the fruitfulness of an exclusively statistical approach to
corporate governance research 	 Despite an enormous amount of
apparently sophisticated hypothesis making and skilful statistical
analysis, the exciting new information in these papers is quite
modest..' (1990:581-2)
`... a high degree of insight, ingenuity and skill has unearthed little
really important surprising information..., supplemental close
examinations of individual cases or small samples would help in
understanding what is really going on.' (1990: 593)
However, descriptive and qualitative studies are rare, possibly because of access
difficulties and the dominant research paradigm (Tricker,1994). Important
examples are studies of US boards by Mace (1971) and Lorsch and MacIver
(1989) Lorsch has argued strongly for a methodological shift. At a seminar in
1997,3  he 'emphasised the limitations of research studies that relied principally
on data in the public domain as the basis for seeking relationships between
variables in the governance field' and urged researchers to undertake interviews
3 Reported in Corporate Governance: an International Review, October 1997, 5(4), 258.
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'which give directors opportunities to discuss their experiences and beliefs in
detail' and provide 'far richer insights into the reality of power in and around the
board.' UK studies of boards and directors using qualitative methodologies have
been undertaken by Pahl and Winkler (1974), Spencer (1983), Mangham (1986,
1988), Mangham and Pye (1991), Pettigrew (1992), and Pettigrew and McNulty
(1995) but this remains an approach that is rarely used.
The ongoing work since the 1970s of Tricker — one of the earliest UK writers to
differentiate between the governance and the management of the corporation -
has been of fundamental importance in the development of corporate governance
as a specific area of academic study. Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) noted that
Tricker's 1978 observation that 'the work of the director, in and out of the
boardroom, is rated as the most under-researched management topic' is 'still
ringingly true in 1995.' (1995:848)
Tricker (1994,1996) argued that the three theoretical constructs he identified as
underpinning corporate governance research - stewardship theory, agency theory
and stakeholder theory - offer very limited insights into the practical workings of
corporate governance mechanisms. Traditional stewardship theory relies on 'the
belief that directors can be trusted' (1996:47) and provides the foundation for the
existing regulatory and legislative framework but:
'Stewardship theory, by assuming rational and legal behaviours,
ignores the dynamics of boards, inter-personal perceptions of
roles and the effects of board leadership.' (1994:56)
Agency theory is similarly constrained:
'Agency theory, by assuming that governance can be captured as
a principal/agent relationship, ignores group interactions,
corporate and ethnic cultures and the entire panoply of inter-
personal relationships and power. Life at board level needs more
to explain it than cause and effect relationships.' (1994:56)
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Tricker suggested that stakeholder theory was born from:
`..a fear at the societal level that the large, particularly
multinational, corporation had become too large and powerful to
be held accountable solely through the classical stewardship
mode. '(1996:48)
- but was no more helpful in a practical sense than the other theoretical
approaches. Tricker urged that all these theoretical approaches should be re-
evaluated in the light of evidence of corporate governance practice in Asia,
presenting case histories designed to explore 'the reality of the governance
process: that is..what governing bodies actually do.' (1996:50) While urging this
approach, he observed that:
'Two particular difficulties with board level research are (i)
obtaining the necessary degree of access and (ii) interpreting the
data given the rich contextual milieu from which it is derived. A
further challenge to publication is the frequent call for
confidentiality, with much of the hard data being commercially
and financially sensitive, and the softer, judgmental data
interpersonally sensitive.' (1996:50)
These issues are discussed further in the context of this study in chapter 3.
2.1.4 The practitioner literature
Tricker's analysis demonstrates a gap between the approach of academic
research and the requirements of those who are engaged in corporate governance
practice — boards of directors. A second strand of corporate governance literature
— the 'practitioner' literature — focuses on the provision of practical guidance and
advice for directors and their advisers. It comprises manuals designed to assist
directors, guidance published by organisations such as the Institute of Directors,
articles in professional accountancy, finance and management journals, and
advice for clients produced by professional accountancy firms (e.g. ICAEW,
1994; Deloitte and Touche, 1996; ICAEW, 1996). It is less tentative in its
proposals than the academic literature but its assertions are largely based on
anecdotal report and surveys deemed to reveal 'best practice', and no attempt is
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made to identify any theoretical framework for board operations. There is little
evidence of either literature informing the other.
The literature on corporate governance is thus characterised as: being scattered in
numerous disciplines, having a strongly quantitative methodological focus and
split between 'academic' and 'practitioner' strands with little evidence of
connection between the two.
2.2 The audit committee literature
As a subset of the corporate governance literature discussed above, the literature
on audit committees shares similar features. It too may be divided into academic
and practitioner strands. It is largely based in the United States since the history
of audit committees in the United States is longer than elsewhere, although audit
committee studies have also been undertaken in the UK (e.g. Collier, 1992), New
Zealand (e.g. Bradbury,1990) and Malaysia (Teoh and Lim, 1996).
An important focus of this literature is "effectiveness", discussed further in
section 2.3.2 below. However, without a clear understanding of purpose,
discussion of effectiveness becomes meaningless. What, then, is an audit
committee for? Why is it necessary to establish such a committee at all? Clearly,
in jurisdictions where there is a statutory requirement for public companies to
establish audit committees, such as Canada and Singapore, legislative
compliance is of prime importance. In countries such as the UK where audit
committee formation is voluntary, this is a more difficult question to answer —
Collier (1996) has suggested that the existence of audit committees under such
circumstances is a 'curious phenomenon'. The following discussion reveals the
limitations of the existing literature in regard to establishing the purpose of audit
committees.
2.2.1 The purpose of audit committees
Audit committee development in both the United Kingdom and the United States
has been driven by concerns about the credibility of financial reporting,
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particularly in relation to the issue of auditor independence, but clear statements
of audit committee purpose, aims or objectives, are difficult to find.
Marrian (1988), in surveying the development of audit committees in the UK,
enquired into the reasons why companies had set up audit committees, observing
that:
'Audit committees are generally set up as the result of one person's
commitment to the idea, often because of exposure to it in another
company.' (1988:4)
Responses to his questions about reasons for formation included examples of
specific events such as imminent financial collapse, as well as a reason not
explicitly identified in later studies - the following of fashion, stimulated by
articles in the professional press. Marrian noted that 'in many cases the reason
[for formation] dictated the style' but did not explain the meaning of 'style' or
explore this connection in any detail. He added an important caveat to his
discussion:
'Due to time and budget constraints the answers received are
accepted at face value for the purposes of this particular study
although on occasions we were given hints that the reasons for set up
were not always as clear cut as stated.' (1988:6)
A more detailed survey of the state of the UK audit committee (Collier, 1992)
asked respondents to rank a list of reasons for audit committee establishment and
to give details of any further reasons not included in that list. Reasons were
ranked in the following order (the most frequently cited items ranked highest):
1. Good corporate practice
2. Strengthens the role and effectiveness of non executive directors
3. Assists directors in discharging their statutory responsibilities as regards
financial reporting
4. Preserves and enhances the independence of internal auditors
5. Assists the auditors in the reporting of serious deficiencies in the control
environment or management weaknesses
6. Improves communications between the board and internal auditors
7. Improves communications between the board and external auditors
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8. Increases the confidence of the public in the credibility and objectivity of
financial statements
9. Assists management to discharge its responsibilities for the prevention of
fraud, other irregularities and errors
10.Increases the confidence of investment analysts in the credibility and
objectivity of financial statements
11 .Provides a forum for arbitration between management and auditors
12.Possibility of legislative pressure
Additional motives cited by Collier's questionnaire respondents included:
• US influence ( to comply with NYSE requirements or the influence of
multinational group membership)
• corporate governance issues (improvements in the efficiency of board
meetings, a discipline on executive directors, a forum for non-executive
directors)
• auditing benefits (improvement of communication and collaboration between
internal and external auditors, enhancement of standing of internal auditors,
control of external auditors with regard to fee and scope of audit)
• ethical issues (provision of a forum for reviewing the content and
implementation of corporate code of practice)
• support for the finance director in disputes.
Unlike Marrian, Collier made a distinction between reasons for establishment
and catalysts leading to establishment. Catalysts include:
• company financial difficulties (leading to review of financial controls and
pressure for change from bankers, auditors and other interested parties)
• influence from newly acquired companies
• influence from non executive directors with audit committee experience
elsewhere
• general evolution of board structure.
However, Collier did not provide any information as to who completed the
questionnaires in the companies surveyed and did not address the possibility of
differing perceptions of reasons for establishment emanating from those holding
different positions within a company.
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The report of the Cadbury Committee (Cadbury Committee, 1992) provided an
outline of audit committee structure and membership, terms of reference and a
range of duties for the audit committee, but offered no explicit statement as to its
purpose. As Ezzamel and Watson (1997) observed:
`..the Cadbury Report does not spell out precisely what the new
subcommittees are meant to achieve.., and how, other than by
simply attending meetings, the non-executives are to hold
executives more accountable through these new committees. This
vagueness regarding purposes and means is most obvious with
respect to the audit committee.' (1997:69)
Given the nature of the recommendations, from the Cadbury perspective the
audit committee would appear to represent the means by which the conformance
role of the board (Tricker, 1994) might be more effectively achieved: the purpose
of the audit committee is thus to focus on issues of control and accountability.
This view of the audit committee role is confirmed by commentators such as
Demb and Neubauer (1992) who described the audit committee as 'the
personification of the board's stewardship responsibility'(1992:93)
Audit committees have a longer history in the United States with greater
opportunity for exploration of the reasons for their establishment. A study by
Cobb (1993) found some disagreement between commentators during the 1980s
on the purposes of the audit committee, although she identified four main
functions: reduction of board liability, establishing a link between the external
auditor and the board, the reduction of illegal activity and the prevention of
fraudulent financial reporting. The Treadway Report (Treadway Commisssion,
1987) firmly emphasised the primary role of the audit committee as oversight of
financial reporting, giving priority to the latter two functions. Subsequent
research by Spangler and Braiotta (1990) confirmed that audit committee
members and those working with them shared the Treadway view of their
purpose.
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Pomeranz (1997) observed that:
`..audit committees and their perceived role can be seen as
vaguely unsuccessful, yet meritorious, endeavours to create a
more level playing field for external and internal auditors vis-d -
vis operating management. Few can quarrel with the objective,
even if it has remained elusive.' (1997:281)
Bradbury's study of audit committee formation in New Zealand (Bradbury,
1990) suggested that audit committees are established for three reasons: to
increase the credibility of audited financial statements, to help boards of directors
in meeting their responsibilities and to enhance auditor independence. His
analysis of the extent of voluntary audit committee formation in New Zealand
indicated that, in a purely voluntary environment, very few firms form audit
committees - a finding which, as Bradbury noted, contradicts some US
observations (1990:33) and highlights the difference between explicitly declared
reasons for audit committee formation and implicit reasons which may be
deduced from observation of environmental conditions and institutional
arrangements. Bradbury (1990: 33) speculated that voluntary formation of audit
committees in the US could be a means of 'forestalling regulation and quieting
the press', unnecessary in New Zealand where 'there are no regulations or
professional requirements that prescribe or recommend audit committees'.
Bradbury also suggested that the low-litigation environment of New Zealand
makes the use of audit committees as an insurance against potential directors'
liability less likely.
Porter and Gendall (1993) discussed audit committee development in Canada,
the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, identifying
corporate failure as the primary stimulus in their development and tracing their
changing role and duties over time, concluding with a warning that too much
may be expected of them, leading to 'unfulfilled expectations and in undermining
confidence in audit committees.' (1993:23) Teoh and Lim (1996) also explained
the establishment of audit committees in Malaysia as a response to corporate
scandals. However, in considering the purpose for which audit committees are
established, Bradbury's cautionary remarks on the impact of institutional
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arrangements which vary between countries are important, as confirmed by
Guthrie and Turnbull (1995) who suggested that in Australia audit committees as
currently conceived are unable to meet their objectives defined as follows:
'Although many currently believe that audit committees (ACs) were
developed to protect investors...ACs, in fact, were developed to
protect non-executive directors ... from being misled by
management.' (1995:78)
- a rather different perspective from those discussed above and a reason unlikely
to be explicitly stated by survey respondents. Turnbull (1994) explained this
view in more detail:
'All hierarchical management systems must condense
information. It is not in the self-interest of subordinates to provide
information about short-comings for which they are accountable.
The result is that boards with outside directors, and even those
with executive directors, are at risk of being kept in the dark.
Historically, this is why outside directors developed audit
committees... Investor interests are incidental to the purpose of
audit committees in protecting directors as becomes evident from
reading the publications of the leading audit firms on this topic.'
(1994: 84)
Some commentators have observed (e.g. Marrian, quoted above) that less explicit
reasons for audit committee establishment may exist. Eichenseher and Shields
(1985) linked the incidence of audit committee formation in the US to the
appointment of leading (`Big-Eight') auditing firms, suggesting that this was a
response to increased directors' liability: their study did not identify this as an
explicitly articulated reason for audit committee formation but inferred it from
company behaviour. The importance of implicit reasons for audit committee
establishment is further emphasised by Harrison's discussion of the strategic use
of board committees to enhance and maintain corporate legitimacy (Harrison,
1987).
Collier (1996) offered a detailed analysis of the rise of the audit committee in
the United Kingdom, examining the literature on audit committee effectiveness
and Concluding that evidence of their effectiveness was very limited and
certainly insufficient to support their rapid increase in popularity. He concluded:
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`..the widespread adoption of audit committees in the UK might
well reflect no more than an attempt to avoid legislative solutions
to deficiencies in corporate governance.' (1996:135)
The study reported in this thesis significantly expands Collier's conclusion
through an investigation of the understandings of the audit committee role of
those involved in their activities.
The academic literature on audit committees is thus inconclusive on the matter of
their purpose. Nevertheless, the most extensive focus in this literature is on
effectiveness and how it may be achieved.
2.2.2 Audit committee effectiveness
Despite the apparent lack of connection between the academic and practitioner
literatures, they share a prescriptive thrust. The academic literature is certainly
more tentative in its conclusions, while the practitioner advice is hortatory and
apparently unconcerned with the provision of detailed evidence to support
assertions, but there is a distinct indication of common purpose. This centres on
the use of the word 'effective'. A major concern of those writing about audit
committees is to identify the characteristics of an effective audit committee in
order to provide a model or models for practical emulation. However, such
exemplars remain elusive, largely because of difficulties associated with
understandings of the concept of 'effectiveness'. The Hampel Committee,
successor to the Cadbury Committee, observed that:
'The word 'effectiveness' has proved difficult both for directors
and auditors in the context of public reporting. It can imply that
controls can offer absolute assurance against misstatement or loss;
in fact no system of control is proof against human error or
deliberate override.' (Hampel Committee, 1998:52)
- and suggested that the word 'effectiveness' should be removed from paragraph
4.5 of the Cadbury Code in consequence.4
4 However, the Hampel Committee, while identifying difficulties in the use of the word, did not
relinquish its use in its own report: the next paragraph comments that 'We believe that
auditors... can contribute more effectively by reporting to directors privately. This would enable a
more effective dialogue to take place.. (Hatnpe1,1998:53)
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Within the 'practitioner' literature in both the US and the UK, advice is offered
on terms of reference, desirable characteristics of audit committee members and
practical detail relating to the timing and conduct of meetings (e.g. Lindsell,
1992). More recently, such literature has included advice on assessing
effectiveness (e.g. Price Waterhouse/IIARF, 1993; ICAEW, 1997a). However,
such material makes no reference to the academic literature and the selection of
characteristics cited as contributing to effectiveness is not supported by evidence.
The approach in the practitioner literature has been to present examples of best
practice for emulation (ICAEW,1997a) but neither the source of such
illustrations is disclosed, nor the criteria by which they may be judged 'best
practice.'
The importance of effectiveness within the academic literature is emphasised by
the frequency of reference to the concept in the titles of papers (e.g. Ecton and
Reinstein, 1982; Spangler and Braiotta, 1990; Verschoor, 1990a, 1990b; Kalbers
and Fogarty, 1993; Collier and Gregory, 1996) but an examination of these
studies reveals that characteristics contributing to effectiveness are not always
simple to define or operationalise and research into their impact is equivocal in
its conclusions. Similar limitations were identified by Cameron (1986) in
surveying studies of organisational effectiveness, in which he noted that
evaluations of effectiveness are problematic with regard to arbitrary selection of
criteria and confusion between determinants and indicators.
Within the academic literature, the earliest studies of audit committees were
surveys identifying their existence and characteristics (eg Mautz and Neumann,
1970; Marrian, 1988), followed by studies which attempted to identify influential
characteristics of audit committees which contributed to effectiveness, defined in
a variety of ways. Surveys of this literature may be found in Kalbers and Fogarty
(1993), Collier (1996) and Collier and Gregory (1996): all conclude that the
evidence collected on audit committee effectiveness is limited.
Doubt about audit committee effectiveness is expressed in both the practitioner
and academic literatures. Birkett (1986) surveyed the history of audit committees
23
in the US, analysing the effects of actions by the SEC, the NYSE, the AICPA5
and Congress but noting that despite the manifest encouragement for audit
committee formation by all these bodies, without clear and consistent guidelines
for audit committee operations 'the goals for which these bodies support
corporate audit committees may not be achieved.' (1986:123)
Lindsell (1992) commented:
`...it seems that the increasing incidence of audit committees has
not yet brought about any significant improvement in perceptions
of corporate accountability and has not restored confidence in
financial reporting. While the newness of many audit committees
may help to explain this, it may be that their effectiveness will not
increase simply through the passage of time. More radical action
by companies may be required if audit committees are to be the
agent of real improvement in standards of corporate governance.'
(1992:104)
The Cadbury Report itself included caveats relating to effectiveness:
'The effectiveness of audit committees will be reduced, however, if
they act as a barrier between the auditors and the executive directors
on the main board, or if they encourage the main board to abdicate its
responsibilities in the audit area, so weakening the board's collective
responsibility for reviewing and approving the financial statements.
They will also fall short of their potential if they lack the
understanding to deal adequately with the auditing or accounting
matters that they are likely to face, if they remain under the influence
of any dominant personality on the main board, or if they simply get
in the way and obstruct executive management, and stifle
entrepreneurial skills.' (Cadbury Committee, 1992:69)
'Audit committees will be as good as the people on them:
effectiveness depends crucially on a strong, independent chairman
who has the confidence of the board and of the auditors, and on the
quality of the non-executive directors. Structure is also important.'
(Cadbury Committee, 1992:69)
5 SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission; NYSE: New York Stock Exchange; AICPA:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
24
Clarke et al (1997) observed:
`..the [Cadbury] code amounts to little more than a series of
motherhood statements regarding the virtues directors must
display and be seen to display, plus the recommendation for audit
committees to be mandatory for all public companies ......
Significantly, nowhere does the code explain how the
appointment of audit committees will ensure that the financial
information disclosed by companies will be indicative of their
wealth and progress.'(1997:239)
Although it is easier to observe instances where mismanagement and fraud have
occurred despite the existence of an audit committee (Verschoor, 1990a), it is
possible that the very existence of an audit committee and the chance of detailed
enquiry by its members may be sufficient to deter potential mismanagement of
resources or fraud6. Schneider and Wilner (1990) attempted to establish the
deterrent effect of audit but did not extend their study to encompass audit
committees. The academic literature, while suggesting that the mere
establishment of an audit committee is not a sufficient guarantee of effectively
securing sound corporate governance, does not explore this further. Menon and
Williams (1994) used frequency of meeting as an indicator of effectiveness.
They observed that: 'The formation of an audit committee does not mean that the
board actually relies on the audit committee to enhance its monitoring
ability.'(1994:121) They examined this reliance by using meeting frequency and
committee composition as indicators thereof: although acknowledging that
meeting frequency is a crude measure of activity, they asserted that infrequent
meetings are likely to indicate less effective monitoring. They concluded that:
`..the tendency for many companies in our sample to maintain ACs
[sic] which were structurally weak (ie with a low proportion of non
executive directors) or inactive indicates that merely requiring ACs
may not achieve the intended purpose. Although the structure of ACs
can be mandated, their vigilance cannot.' (1994:138)
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) studied audit committee effectiveness from the
perspective of power. Their literature review provides a comprehensive survey of
studies of audit committee effectiveness. They noted that the comparison of
characteristics of organisations with audit committees and those without them
6 This possibility is explored further in chapter 5.
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'provides limited insight for understanding audit committee effectiveness.'
(1993:25) They observed that 'effectiveness is not captured adequately by
conformity to procedural requirements' since this 'fails to measure the level of
quality with which they are performed.'(1993:25) Kalbers and Fogarty claimed
that their approach was 'more comprehensive and theory-driven'.(1993:27) They
defined effectiveness as 'the competency with which the audit committee carries
out its specific oversight responsibilities' and used the concept of power to
examine 'both the capabilities and the resolve required to perform
effectively.'(1993:27) They concluded that effective audit committee
performance requires power based on institutional support, actual authority and
diligence — 'factors especially difficult to evaluate with any traditional means of
regulation. '(1993:45)
Other characteristics of audit committee members have been considered for their
influence on effective operation. Length of tenure was examined by Ecton and
Reinstein (1982) who suggested that rotation of membership would achieve
greater effectiveness because new committee members ask the 'best' questions
(they did not define 'best'). However, Spangler and Braiotta (1990) suggested
that membership continuity achieved by long tenure was necessary to develop
effective audit committee operation.
The influence of the employment background of audit committee members has
been explored by several writers. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) linked knowledge
of the firm or industry to the power balance in the relationship between audit
committee member and chief executive officer and suggested that such
knowledge can lead to an effective audit committee. Other studies have
suggested that general business background and accounting knowledge are more
important in assisting audit committee members to perform effectively than
detailed industry knowledge (e.g. Knapp, 1987). Bilimoria and Piderit (1994b)
investigated the effect of gender balance on audit committee performance. Lee
and Stone (1997) provided evidence drawn from published reports to suggest a
misalignment between audit committee responsibilities and members' potential
capabilities that could undermine the effectiveness of audit committees. They did
not define effectiveness but noted that:
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'Actual audit committee effectiveness is impossible to observe
externally except ex post in situations of corporate failure..'
(1997:101)
Their research findings:
`..indicate that publicly-disclosed experience backgrounds of
audit committee members appeared to be inconsistent with
disclosed responsibilities..' (1997:104)
and they argued that this could lead to external misperceptions of audit
committee effectiveness. Their work was extended by Dezoort (1998) who
examined the effect of audit committee members' prior work experience on their
oversight judgements.
Where effectiveness is defined as improved financial reporting quality, results
have also been inconclusive. Cobb's 1993 study specified the purpose of audit
committee formation as the reduction of fraudulent financial reporting and
investigated the effects on this of a variety of audit committee characteristics
including independence, tenure, private access to auditor, stock ownership and
attendance at meetings, concluding that independence and tenure were the most
important. Forker (1992), studying share option disclosure in a sample of UK
firms reporting in 1987-88 did not find a strong association between the
existence of monitoring devices, such as audit committees, and improved
disclosure. However, Wild (1994,1996) investigated the impact of audit
committee formation on the quality of reported accounting earnings, using a
sample of US companies which established an audit committee before 1981, and
concluded that audit committee formation leads to more informative reports and
enhanced managerial accountability. McMullen (1996) reported tentative
evidence that audit committees are associated with fewer detected and reported
instances of error, irregularity and other indicators of unreliable financial
reporting. Such differences in conclusion merit investigation but little
comparative research has been undertaken.
Although these studies focus on important areas affecting audit committee
performance, measures of effectiveness are difficult to establish and criteria tend
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to be confined to those factors which can be quantified. Cameron's observations
(Cameron, 1986) about the confusion of determinants with indicators in
discussions of effectiveness are amply illustrated by these studies. Definitions of
audit committee goals are not clearly articulated: benefits and purposes are
treated as synonymous. The purpose of audit committee activity is not always
clearly outlined and the evaluation of effectiveness therefore rests on unstated
assumptions which are not always consistent. The model of audit committee
effectiveness presented within this literature is based on the identification of
structural and procedural inputs with minimal analysis of their links to desired
outputs. As Power commented in the context of audit:
`..if one does not know what audits are for or what they produce,
one does not really know whether they fail either.' (1997:30)
Under cover of this vagueness, different concepts of effectiveness are developed
and influence the behaviour of audit committee participants, as subsequent
chapters of this study demonstrate.
As with the general literature on corporate governance discussed above, there is a
dearth of studies which explore the perceptions of those involved in audit
committee activity, through the use of qualitative research methodologies. As
Kalbers and Fogarty (1996) noted:
`..it appears that publicly available information may be of limited
use in understanding actions that exist at the core of corporate
governance. Research that is limited to these sources may provide
unsatisfactory closure on the key issues.'(1996:28)
A strand of literature has developed which examines the relationships among
those involved with audit committees. This focuses predominantly on the
interactions between the internal auditor and the audit committee (e.g. Apostolou
and Strawser, 1990; Rezaee and Lander, 1993: Raghunandan and McHugh,
1994) but also addresses the relationship between the external auditor and the
audit committee (Kalbers, 1992) and that between the finance director and the
external auditor (Hussey and Jack, 1995). These studies certainly enrich our
understanding of how these relationships are managed but they are exclusively
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based on data derived from published reports and questionnaire surveys. Collier
(1997) broke new ground in this area by using both questionnaires and interviews
to explore the role of audit committees in smaller listed companies.
The literature on audit committees may therefore be characterised as : largely US
based, with separate academic and practitioner strands, theoretically dominated
by the agency approach, methodologically quantitative/statistical, focused
principally on effectiveness and variables relating to committee structure and
composition which are posited to affect this.
2.3 Committees: a limited literature
As well as examining existing research on boards of directors, a wider search on
committees in general was undertaken, with the intention of identifying more
developed theoretical frameworks relating to committee behaviour. Although the
literature on management and organisational behaviour contains extensive
discussion of groups and their operation, there has been very little research into
the committee as a specific type of group. The major disciplinary sources proved
to be those of public administration and anthropology.
Cohen and Mackenzie addressed committee effectiveness in the pages of Public
Administration in the early 1950s. Cohen (1952) noted the important relationship
between a session or meeting which is a 'clear-cut event', and the background to
this event, which comprises the series of meetings of which it forms a part,
together with the 'bodies or interests represented, the personal relationships and
ambitions of participants, and the socio-economic nature of the terms of
reference.' (1952:361) - a perspective which is developed in the discussion of
actor network theory in chapter 4.
Within this framework, he suggested that criteria for the assessment of
committee effectiveness should be linked closely to the purpose of the
committee, distinguishing two types of assessment criteria - external and internal.
The former assesses the effect of the committee on 'the world outside' while the
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latter 'evaluates a meeting by determining the effects on the participants
themselves'. Cohen noted that these two types of criteria are interdependent, in
that positive external effects are unlikely to be achieved unless participants
individually experience the committee's activities in a positive way. He
discussed various factors which may impede effective committee performance,
including the compulsion to agree, receptivity to new ideas, homogeneity of
members and the role of the chairman and relationships among members. Cohen
suggested that, from his personal observation, committees comprising members
of homogenous background tend to spend much time on 'professional and
technical minutiae' whereas heterogeneous groups tend to 'ignore fine points of
detail and seek agreement on broad issues in which members are not so much
involved personally'. Cohen's approach is very much that of a psychologise and
several of his observations have subsequently been developed in research into
decision-making and other group activities: for example, his description of the
phases through which committees pass in developing cohesiveness has much in
common with Tuckman's analysis of group development (Tuclanan, 1965).
Mackenzie (1953) criticised Cohen from a pedagogical perspective. 8 In seeking
an analysis of the operation of committees which could assist the student of
public administration, he observed that Cohen's approach was speculative and
suggested that it was of limited practical use since experimental studies of
committee behaviour would be extremely difficult to conduct (an observation
subsequently belied by Barber, 1966, discussed below). He nevertheless
attempted to develop an analytical framework to assist in the study of
committees, noting that his own observations were not based on 'planned
research' but limited personal experience.
Mackenzie began by framing a definition of a committee:
'A committee is a body of people meeting round a table, to take
decisions for joint action on behalf of some other (generally
larger) body of which it is the committee.' (1953:238)
7 The paper was originally published in Occupational Psychology (April 1952,vol. XX'VI, no 2)
8 He also expressed some sharp criticism of Cohen's use of psychological 'jargon': 'References
to anal eroticism and out-groups do tend to put people off, unless they are predisposed to favour
this sort of language' (Mackenzie, 1953:239)
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In developing this definition he discussed at some length the appropriate size of a
committee, its impact on the seating arrangement adopted and consequently on
committee behaviour. He then proposed a classification of committees based on
external relationships, internal structure and the form of decision which the
committee is required to reach.
He observed that the external relationships of committee members may range
across a spectrum, from a closely involved grouping where the committee
meeting may constitute ratification of agreements reached outside the formal
structure, to a committee where members may never have met previously and
will not have knowledge of any common characteristics other than the task in
hand. Although Mackenzie commented that most committees would normally
fall within this range, he ignored the possibility that committees may develop
across this spectrum over time: it seems likely that within a specific time frame,
most committees will move from the situation where member relationships have
yet to develop to one in which they may be developed to an extent that removes a
substantial amount of interaction from the formal meeting arena. This idea of
development over time is suggested by Barber (1966) and Bailey (1983),
discussed below and is explored further in Spira (1998).
Mackenzie concluded by observing that each of these three areas of classification
offers a continuous scale on which a particular committee may be sited but
cannot be usefully refined any further in terms of developing a taxonomy of
committees. Indeed, he appeared to believe that a study of committees may yield
no useful insight.
However, some years later the pages of the same journal carried a detailed study
by Maddick and Pritchard (1958, 1959) which focused on the importance of
conventions of behaviour as well as formal rules in the operation of committees.
The conventions of audit committee behaviour as described by those involved
are explored in chapter 6.
31
Wheare (1955) studied British central government committees, classifying them
by purpose into committees to advise, inquire, negotiate, legislate, administrate,
scrutinise and control. His study used selected 'characters' - chairman,
secretary, official, expert, layman, party man and interested party - and observed
their roles in each type of committee. Wheare discussed criteria for assessing
effectiveness, noting that it is a committee's job to decide and thus it is necessary
to assess if the committee has made good decisions and if the committee itself is
making the decisions, rather than some other group elsewhere. Wheare observed
that if committees are to work effectively they must be 'wisely led and wisely
fed', emphasising the role of the chairman in providing leadership and the
importance of adequate, relevant and timely provision of information.
Wheare's 'layman' is of particular interest, bearing a close resemblance to the
role of the non executive director:
'He is to check the excesses of bureaucratic and expert nonsense
by the application of his own common sense...He must approach
his committee work with an original and critical mind. He must
animate or galvanise. It is difficult to get one word to describe this
quality of a good layman. It is rather like saying that he must have
all the virtues of the reasonable man and also all the virtues of the
unreasonable woman. Indeed, some of the best laymen are women
and unreasonable women at that.' (1955:23) 9
An audit committee most closely approximates to Wheare's definition of a
committee to scrutinise and control:
'They are entrusted with the task of seeing whether or how a
process is being performed, and by the conduct of this task they
serve to provide the means of some sort of control over the
carrying out of the process.' (1955:205)
He observed: 'It is not easy to know how the usefulness of these committees
may best be judged' but suggested that assessment of effectiveness could be
achieved by asking: 'Do these committees do something or enable something to
be done which, if they did not exist, would not or could not be done by
officials..?' (1955:231)
32
Barber (1966) explored power relationships within committees, using data
derived from twelve US boards of finance meeting under experimental
conditions at Yale in 1962. He identified five 'dimensions' of committee
decision making:
• calculation - the need to reduce uncertainty by the use of techniques to
simplify and focus on specific information
• cultural - the extent to which committee operations are influenced by the
values and perceptions of members and the variation of interpretation of these
cultural factors
• personality and interpersonal power - the influence of personal relationships
between members
• role - in particular, the variation in definition of the chairman's role and the
variation of performance of different incumbents
• integration - the relationship between participation and reward for members
From the perspective of this study, Barber's observations with regard to
integration are probably the most relevant: 'The time dimension, the stage of the
committee's development, may be of key significance. The critical problem of
integration may shift over time from a major emphasis on interpersonal affective
relations to a major emphasis on developing specialized relations to the group's
substantive tasks. '(Barber's italics - 1966:162). This approach has similarities to
Bailey's analysis, discussed below. More recent studies of governmental
committees in the US have centred on the exploration of decision-making
processes using mathematical techniques of game theory.
The literature on committees within public administration thus offers limited
insight applicable to audit committees, since the context is so specific and
historically grounded. It does, however, point to themes which surface within this
study as being of significance to committee operations in general, in particular
the development of committee behaviour and conventions over time and the
9	 •
Some of Wheare's comments are couched in language which echoes the famous work of
Parkinson (1957). The committee as a source of humour seems to be a peculiarly British
preoccupation of the post Second World War period: see also Old (1947).
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performance of roles by the individual members. Neither theme is addressed in
the literature on boards or audit committees.
Bailey has written extensively about committees (Bailey, 1965, 1977, 1983),
using university committees and Indian village councils as the sites for his
analysis of methods of decision-making and the uses of 'reason' and 'passion' in
the exercise of power through persuasion. His arguments will be examined in
more detail in subsequent chapters, but his work is particularly relevant for its
emphasis on the development of committees over time (echoing Barber, quoted
above) and on the role of communicative devices in establishing, maintaining
and developing committee relationships, factors which have not informed
discussion within the existing audit committee literature.
The literature on committees is thus seen to be grounded in very specific contexts
- national and local government, university administration and Indian villages -
offering limited scope for broader generalisation or theoretical development.
However, it offers an important sense of the individual people involved in
committee activity which is missing from the other work discussed in this
chapter.
2.4 Summary
This review has demonstrated that the literature on corporate governance is
founded on theoretical and methodological approaches which ignore the insights
into the behaviour of boards of directors that might be offered by qualitative
studies using a wider variety of methodologies. Writers such as Lorsch, Herzel
and Pettigrew, as quoted above, have argued for development in this area. This
limitation is also identified within the specific strand of corporate governance
literature relating to audit committees. The dominant focus has been on the
establishment of criteria which determine the effectiveness of audit committees
but since the purpose of audit committees has not been explored in detail, this
has proved problematic. The potential for differing and possibly conflicting
concepts of effectiveness among audit committee participants has not been
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recognised. The very limited nature of the existing literature on committees has
also been identified.
This study thus aims to contribute to the literature by extending the existing
understanding of audit committee operation through the use of qualitative
methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation within a theoretical
framework derived from actor-network theory (explained in chapter 4). Through
an exploration of the understandings of the role of the audit committee held by
audit committee participants, it offers a potential answer to the question : why
have audit committees become so popular when there appear to be widely
divergent views on their effectiveness? - the 'curious phenomenon' identified by
Collier (1996). The next chapter describes the design and implementation of the
empirical investigation which forms the basis of this study.
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Chapter 3: A story about collecting stories
The literature review in chapter 2 identified audit committee activity as an under-
researched area, demonstrated that qualitative methodologies have been used
very little in corporate governance studies and suggested that they could offer
insights not previously revealed. This chapter outlines the qualitative approach
used in this study in an attempt to extend understanding of audit committees. The
process of data collection and reflection thereon is initially presented in the form
of a story to provide a contextual framework for the descriptive details of the
project which follow. The limitations of the approach employed, with respect to
data collection and data interpretation, are recognised and discussed.
3.1 A story
The entrance to the building is glass-fronted, imposing. A woman passes through
the doors and speaks briefly to a uniformed security guard. He directs her to a
receptionist, perched behind a massive desk, who hands her a form to complete
and makes a telephone call. In exchange for the completed form, the woman is
given a plastic badge. She sits on an uncomfortable sofa and waits.
Her first preoccupation is the plastic badge, which identifies her as a visitor to
the building. A notice on the receptionist's desk warns: 'Security: identity passes
must be displayed at all times'. The badge is designed with a stiff clip to attach to
a jacket lapel but the woman is not wearing a jacket. The waiting area is busy:
staff frequently enter and leave the building and are required to show their passes
to the security guard. Most of the men wear their badges and the guard glances at
them as they pass: most of the women carry their passes in a pocket or bag and
produce them as they approach the guard. The woman waiting pockets her badge.
The walls of the reception area are lined with large abstract paintings. A nearby
table is covered with copies of that day's broadsheet newspapers and tidily
arranged literature about the organisation which is housed in the building. Apart
from this, there is no indication of the name of the organisation or its activities.
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A phone rings and the receptionist calls the woman's name. She is directed to the
lift and, emerging on an upper floor, is greeted by a young woman who leads her
into a large office, with wide windows offering an impressive view over the city.
A man welcomes her and shakes her hand. She is seated at a round table and the
man sits next to her. She declines the offer of coffee and produces a tape recorder
and various papers. A conversation begins.
The atmosphere is one of affability, the participants smile and laugh, but there is
also a sense of close concentration. The man leans forward sometimes to
emphasise a point he is making: the woman nods in response. There is an
occasional pause: the woman rephrases a question, the man considers his answer.
The woman listens, writes intermittently and adjusts the tape. There are no
interruptions. After an hour, the conversation winds down, the woman packs
away the recorder and the man escorts her to the lift.
As the woman leaves the building, she pats her bag protectively: the data is
captured. Much later, she finds the badge in her pocket.
What exactly has the woman taken away in her bag and in her pocket?
The plastic badge is a symbol. It gives its wearer legitimacy in the eyes of the
doorkeeper and the members of the organisation, and allows the wearer access to
certain organisational spaces - part of its building, office space and locations of
its work, the site of many of the organisation's resources. Access is restricted to
minimise the chance of damage to organisational assets. (Some organisations
visited by the woman have received threats from terrorist groups who object to
some part of the organisations' activities. Others are engaged in sensitive
research work which must be kept secret for reasons of state security as well as
commercial advantage.) The woman has gained physical access to the
organisation by direct request which was swiftly granted in this case. The reasons
for this interest her as such access is not always easily attained: some companies
approached have declined to co-operate in the research project. (This has been
expressed in a variety of ways, from a bald and unembellished chairman's note to
the fegretful and detailed explanation from a financial director: the former makes
clear that any future approach would be a waste of everyone's time, while the
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latter leaves the door open for possible future contact and implies that there
might be mutual benefit to be gained.) The woman has speculated about the
reasons for her unexpected success here. Her research project is topical and of
interest to people in this organisation, who apparently wish to demonstrate a
public concern about the issues raised — the man she has interviewed has publicly
spoken and written on related subjects. Her background and training have much
in common with the man she has interviewed but there are relatively few women
of her age with similar qualifications - her age and gender therefore make her the
object of some curiosity.
One of the organisation's assets is information, not just about products but about
its working processes. This is what the woman is seeking to access, but physical
access does not necessarily facilitate access to this knowledge since the
gatekeepers may not have the knowledge which she seeks and/or may not wish to
grant her access to that knowledge. Allowing physical access, they may appear to
grant access to this knowledge, while in fact denying access through limits
imposed within their conversations. So, access to the organisation, as symbolised
by the badge, may not increase the woman's understanding in ways that she has
planned.
She also has a tape recording of a conversation and some notes that she has made
during that conversation. Later she will make more notes about the organisation
and her impression of it. She is particularly interested in just one aspect of how
the organisation works - the activities of a small group of people charged with a
specific area of monitoring and control. But she needs to be able to set the
activity of this group within the framework of the organisation in order to
understand the particular need for this activity, so her general observations of the
organisation are important.
What has the man told her? He has told her about how the group meet and carry
out their work; he has told her who they are, when they meet, where they meet,
how they conduct their meetings. He has told her his story of the group, not the
group's story. Is there such a thing as the group's story? If there is not, how can
the group work? The woman has spoken in the same way to other members of
3R
the group and other people associated with the group: she has their stories on
tape. The stories are not complete: they are partial, anecdotal, skewed by the
personal perception of the teller. The teller considers what members of the group
would want the woman to hear, and what he (or, on one occasion only, she) as an
individual would want the woman to hear. The woman hears through a filter of
her own understanding and expectations. What do the stories mean?
The woman would like to meet the whole group together, to watch them at work,
but the confidential nature of their activities means that outsiders are not
permitted to observe. The woman therefore relies for insight into the group's
activities on the individual accounts of members, together with formal minutes
recording their meetings. Sometimes the stories match remarkably closely:
different participants describe particular incidents in very similar ways and
confirm common understandings and ways of thinking. At other times, the
stories diverge and participants express widely differing accounts. Transcribing
and analysing her data reveals patterns: the woman's descriptions of these
patterns adds a further perspective on the group's activities.
The woman began by trying to assess whether the activities of the group are
effective. To do this, it was necessary to determine the purpose of the group's
activities. The publicly stated purpose is clear but it is not clear how it can be
attained, operationalised, implemented. The woman begins to doubt that there is
a direct link between the desired outcome and the activity of the group - that this
public purpose is indeed unattainable. However, the group's activities do have
other outcomes, revealed by the members stories. Each member's perspective on
the value of the group to him/her can be explored. While asserting the
effectiveness of the overt purpose of the group, members also reveal their own
concerns and these become the focus of interest for the study.
The woman bases her interpretation on the individual members' stories and her
own observations. The woman's analysis is yet another story about the group.
Her purpose has changed: she is now trying to draw together the stories to reflect
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the conflicting views, tensions and negotiations that surround the activities of the
group. What seemed a comparatively straightforward task of describing and
assessing the effectiveness of the group's activities has now become messy,
fragmented and unbalanced, and neat conclusions are impossible.
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This story provides a sense of how the stories which form the basis of this study
were collected, with some reflections on the process as it was undertaken. The
following sections provide more detail to answer the questions: Why were stories
sought? Whose stories were sought? How were the stories accessed? How are the
stories to be understood? But first: an introduction to the companies and
individuals who feature principally in this study. Names have been changed and
company details are restricted to essential contextual details in order to preserve
confidentiality.
3.2 Dramatis Personae
Runic plc
This company has a long history - its name is a household word across the world.
Its life to date may be divided into three 'ages': the first age ended with a series
of critical events leading to effective collapse, the second began with a rescue
enabled by a change of ownership and of structure, the third began with a further
change of ownership and has seen considerable growth through acquisition and
joint venture. The people I met in this company have been associated with the
second and third ages only. Their stories displayed little reference to the
company's earlier history: their concerns about accounting policy and its
disclosure, and about internal control appear to be driven more by the nature of
the company's activities and the markets in which it operates than by any
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lingering memory of the company's historic crisis. I interviewed the finance
director, Max Tinker, the head of internal audit, Bernard Seaton, the external
audit partner, Ronald Roberts, and the audit committee chair, Henry Morton.
They appeared to be remarkably frank and open with me about all aspects of
their relationships with the audit committee and with each other. Copies of audit
committee minutes were also supplied.
Henry Morton had joined the board of Runic more than ten years previously at
the invitation of the company chairman at that time: the two had met as members
of the board of another company, Tiffin. Henry also chaired the audit committee
of Tiffin at the time of the interview (he retired some months later). XYZ, the
auditors of Tiffin, had subsequently won the tender for the audit of Runic, and
Henry had a close working relationship with the audit team - the same team for
both companies. The chief executive of Runic joined the board of Tiffin as a non
executive director shortly after the interviews at Runic took place. Runic and
Tiffin are both in the same industry sector.
Glengarry plc
This company also has a long history and its name is of significance
internationally. It too has experienced a crisis - more recent than Runic, and very
much in the minds of those interviewed. Since the crisis had demonstrated
significant shortcomings in the company's corporate governance mechanisms,
the company board is keen to be seen as conforming to the highest standards in
this area. This was very strongly emphasised in their stories.
I met with the finance director, Alex Anderson, the audit committee chair, Martin
Johnson and the head of internal audit, Simon Middleton. Their stories were
more guarded and carefully told than those at Runic, although Simon Middleton
(who was about to take up another position within the Glengarry group) offered
very revealing descriptions of meetings and thumbnail character sketches of
participants. Their stories offered a strong sense of the operation of dominant
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personalities. With some reluctance, I was allowed to read audit committee
minutes under supervision.
Alex Anderson had previously been a partner in the company's external auditors.
Martin Johnson had previously been finance director of the company, joining the
board immediately after the company's crisis period and being closely involved
in the 'rehabilitation' of the company.
Scrimshaw plc
Scrimshaw was in a process of transition at the time of interviews with the
finance director, Chris Tracker, and the head of internal audit, Robin Dunston.
The interviews were conducted at what transpired to be the end of a lengthy
period during which the company had dominated its sector and the beginning of
a period where the company's performance declined and it became the target of
some public criticism. The company had been the industry leader for many years
but had recently expanded by taking over subsidiary companies at home and
abroad, while its main rival had recently been more innovative in core areas and
had taken a commanding lead. The company had been the focus of press
criticism because it did not fully comply with the Cadbury Code requirements,
although the board's probity was in no doubt — the historical background of the
company's ownership had led to a particular board structure which the directors
had seen no need to change and up to this point the role of chairman and chief
executive had been filled by one individual. The current incumbent was the focus
of criticism related to the company's apparent decline. The NEDs had also been
criticised for having very little business experience, coming from civil service,
academic and NHS backgrounds. Retirement had led to recent changes and two
new NEDs had been appointed — one who had been an executive director about
15 years previously and another who was recognised as a 'high flying' and
particularly competent individual who chaired a very successful company in
another industry sector. The external auditors had also recently changed from a
long standing association with a medium sized firm to a Big Six firm. The first
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audit committee meeting with the new NEDs and auditors had just taken place
and changes had already been instituted.
Harrier plc
Harrier plc is a smaller public company than the preceding three which, while
manufacturing for and supplying other very well known companies and owning
many popular brands, is not itself a well known organisation. It was formed
through the entrepreneurial activity and acquisition policy initiated by a dynamic
chairman who had recently (and apparently with some reluctance) handed over to
a successor and had remained on the board (and audit committee) as a NED. An
initial meeting with the finance director, Roy Milford, and the deputy chairman,
Jeremy James, was followed by a longer interview with Roy Milford alone. He
had previously been a partner in the firm which conducted the company's audit. I
was allowed to read audit committee minutes under supervision. An internal
audit department did not exist at the time of the interview but has subsequently
been established.
Hobson plc
At Hobson plc, a major international conglomerate, a meeting was arranged
through a personal introduction to the public relations director who was clearly
very keen for the deputy chairman, Michael Turnbull, to use an opportunity to
publicise the positive aspects of a company often subject to unfavourable press
comment. This proved to be a very unsatisfactory interview: Michael Turnbull
was distant, claimed not to understand some questions, delivered what might be
called 'the party line' on corporate governance and would not be drawn on any
detailed account of audit committee practice within the company. Oddly, he
claimed to have been a member of the Cadbury Committee but his name does not
appear in the report.
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Max Tinker, finance director
Henry Morton, audit committee chair
Bernard Seaton, head of internal audit
Ronald Roberts, audit partner, XYZ
Alex Anderson, finance director
Martin Johnson, audit committee chair
Simon Middleton, head of internal audit
Runic plc
Glengarry plc
Scrimshaw plc	 Chris Tracker, finance director
Robin Dunston, head of internal audit
Harrier plc	 Roy Milford, finance director
Jeremy James, deputy chairman
Hobson plc	 Michael Turnbull, deputy chairman
Bob Cunningham, non-executive director
Ken Palmer, audit partner
NB: These are the individuals most frequently quoted/mentioned within this study: the full list of
interviewees may be found in table 2, section 3.4 below.
Table 1: Principal characters
3.3 Why collect stories?
What gives a committee its existence? How do we know that it exists? Its
meetings, even if private, may be seen as a public demonstration of its existence
— a closed door, a distant murmur of conversation: "the committee is meeting".
In this study, the doors were very firmly closed: requests to attend audit
committee meetings were invariably referred to the company chairman who
invariably refused.
Henry Morton, the audit committee chair at Runic, tried to explain this
reluctance:
'I think I can understand him [the company chairman] not wanting
that - we have very delicate issues around that table. In every
audit committee a different collection of people will come to a
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different view on certain grey areas - if you've been at XYZ/
you'll know your audit comment - how it's a borderline case and
you have to exercise discretion, you have to be consistent and
sometimes you look back and you think 'Well I made the wrong
decision' and then you try and put it right as soon as you can but
all you can do is exercise those sort of common sense standards -
I'm sure I haven't been right all the time, far from it, and there are
some issues, I look back and I think 'Why didn't I realise what
was going on there?', not that anybody had hidden them but that
this potential problem was there, you know, or I didn't realise the
dimensions of the problem... so sometimes you can be in that
situation but you are only human you know...'
This comment displays a rationale for confidentiality based on a lack of
confidence, a fear of being judged to have made a bad decision by an external
observer. It conjures up a picture of a group of men around a table behind closed
doors, grappling seriously with 'grey areas', trying their best to 'exercise
discretion' and 'be consistent' in the face of considerable difficulty: any
interference in this process would clearly be detrimental to those on whose behalf
this group is working. They would not feel comfortable in the presence of the
interviewer, an outside observer and their comfort2 is important to the
achievement of their task. At the same time, Henry's rationale for denial of
access offers comfort to the denied: the reference to common experience - '... if
you've been at XYZ, you'll know your audit comment..'- partially draws the
interviewer into the group on the basis of a common understanding, and the
confession of human fallibility is disarming. This image of a dedicated group,
working valiantly to discharge its responsibilities, forms part of the audit
committee rhetoric and is explored further in the discussion of the role of
consensus in chapter 7.
In discussing the denial of access to audit committee meetings, Robin Dunston,
the head of internal audit at Scrimshaw, indicated that attendance at such
'Henry Morton had enquired about my training and experience and thus knew that I had worked
at XYZ.
2 The notion of comfort provision through audit committee activity is developed more fully in
chapter 9.
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meetings would not be helpful to the research as the jargon-laden nature of the
interactions would be impenetrable to an outsider.3
Further evidence of a committee's existence is provided by the documentation
associated with committee meetings: the agenda, information provided for
members and the minutes. However, documentation relating to audit committees
is normally only available to the audit committee members and participants, and
to the remaining members of the board. Runic, unusually, provided copies of
minutes: at Glengarry and Harrier I was allowed to examine minutes briefly
under supervision. Elsewhere access was not permitted and most interviewees
expressed some surprise at the thought that minutes could be of interest.
The lack of access to meetings appeared initially to be a major constraint on the
study. Subsequent reflection has indicated the limits of a non-participant
observational approach within a study that could not be pursued through
intensive field work over a long time period: difficulties include the problem of
understanding the language used (e.g.acronyms), the infrequency of meetings,
changes in committee membership which fragment understanding of
relationships and other subjective factors identified by Brannen (1987).
However, the seeking of understanding of the role and conduct of audit
committee meetings remained central to the study. Perhaps comparison of
different accounts of the same meeting would offer equivalent insight?
Silverman (1993:157-8) criticised the use of the technique of triangulation
because it ignores the situated character of accounts by attempting to bring them
together to arrive at an ultimate 'truth'. Seeking consistency in accounts of the
same meeting certainly proved elusive: for example, the apparently simple
question 'Do people always sit in the same places at audit committee meetings?'
elicited quite different responses from those who attended the same meetings.
This is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.
3 Brannen (1987) discussed this in the context of his experience as a non-participant observer at
committee meetings.
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A further illustration of differing perceptions of meeting events was supplied at
Runic where Bernard Seaton, the internal auditor, expressed considerable
unhappiness about the activities of the audit committee in relation to his work.
He complained that members did not understand what he did and took no interest
in it because they had no operational understanding of the business. For him, this
was exemplified by the low position of internal audit items on the audit
committee agenda and lack of discussion about issues he raised. However, a
reading of the audit committee minutes indicated that internal audit issues
dominated the discussions. This contradiction served as an indicator to other
factors surrounding Bernard's relationship with other audit committee
participants and usefully illuminated other network formations 4. This example
highlights the importance of considering accounts of meetings in the context of
the role and status of the interviewee (both within and outside the meeting), the
length of time over which they may have attended such meetings and their
relationships with other attendees. These insights would not have been apparent
from meeting observation and the use of triangulation as a confirmatory device
would not have focussed on the divergences and contradictions which steered
analysis and interpretation in other directions.
Intuitively one would seek to understand how a committee works by observing
the manifestations of its existence — its meetings and the associated
documentation. However, since access to meetings proved to be impossible to
negotiate and access to documentation was also very limited, the principal
method of data collection for the study was therefore a series of individual
interviews, supplemented by the study of documentation where available.
3.4 Whose stories?
To obtain a picture of audit committee activity, accounts were sought from
individuals performing particular roles in relation to the audit committee. These
people are described as 'audit committee participants' in this study. They
4 Explored in more detail in chapters 7 and 9.
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comprise: audit committee chairmen5, finance directors, external auditors and
internal auditors.
Because of the range of experience of each interviewee, audit committee
experience could be explored in a wide range of different types of company and
over a lengthy time span. Respondents reflected on this experience and drew
comparisons based on their varying roles and perspectives. This offered a picture
of audit committee development over time as well as a sense of the wide
variation of audit committee practice. 6 The complete schedule of interviews is
shown in table 2 below.
Access to these people on an individual basis proved less problematic than access
to meetings, although the sample could best be described as 'opportunistic' since
it was anticipated that access would not be easy. A target list of companies was
prepared where access could be assured through personal contact. Direct
approaches were also made to individuals who had spoken or written publicly
about audit committees and other corporate governance issues. Several
interviewees offered to provide further introductions elsewhere. It is difficult to
decline to follow up such introductions (particularly if calls are made during the
interview!) and the number of interviews undertaken could have been extended
considerably if all such contacts had been pursued. However, this would have
been impractical in terms of completing the study within an appropriate time
period: in addition, ongoing data analysis suggested that little benefit in terms of
further insight would be gained from a larger sample within the same group i.e.
large UK public limited companies. Further contextual understanding was
afforded by attendance at three practitioner meetings where corporate
governance issues were discussed: one was a commercially organised
conference/workshop on the implementation of the Cadbury Code, another was a
conference on corporate governance issues organised by the Fabian Society and a
third was a discussion on audit committees organised by the Board for Chartered
5 One female audit committee chair was identified in this study but it was not possible to
interview her as she lives in the US and her visits to the UK are infrequent and extremely busy.
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Accountants in Business (BCAB) of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales (ICAEW). These occasions also offered the opportunity to
contact further participants.
Table 2 gives full details of all interviews undertaken. Between February 1994
and October 1996, 21 respondents were interviewed. 12 were associated with 5
companies as indicated; the remaining 9 had no specific company connection at
the time of the interviews but had broad ranging experience of audit committee
participant roles. Respondents gave accounts of audit committee participant
experiences at a further 29 different companies mentioned individually during
interviews (column 4). All audit committee chairs were non executive directors
(NEDs). All NEDs were audit committee members. The specific job titles of
individuals sometimes varied between companies but discussion of duties — both
in relation to audit committee activities and more generally - confirmed that roles
were equivalent. The corporate governance manager was employed by an
institutional investor to liaise with companies in which investments were held.
The external auditor interviewed in each case was the engagement partner. The
hierarchical status within the accountancy firms involved was described thus:
'I am the group engagement partner .. we have two group
partners - one's the lead partner, the senior partner with grey hair
and then there's the engagement partner who runs the group
which is my role..' (Ronald Roberts, XYZ)
`....if you're a [engagement] partner, you have to come [to the
audit committee meeting]. You can't come on your own because
you know nothing so the senior manager has to come.. .and the
senior partner, who has no role at all unless he came, has to come
too. ..I believe it's not enough, because the person who actually
knows what goes on is the manager on the spot and she doesn't
come.. '(Roy Milford, Harrier plc)
These comments indicate the possibility that some members of the external
auditor group present at audit committee meetings may attend in a purely
symbolic status: symbolic and ceremonial aspects of audit committee activity are
discussed further in chapters 5 and 6.
6 There are considerable differences between audit committees in large and smaller companies
and between audit committees in companies and other organisations, such as universities and
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Table 2: Schedule of Interviews Undertaken
Company Main role of
interviewee (initials)
Other audit committee
roles experienced
Number of other
companies referred to
in interview
Runic plc Finance director, MT Audit committee chair 2
Audit committee
chair, HM
Finance director 6
External auditor, RR 1
Internal auditor, RS
Glengarry Finance director, AA External auditor (same 1
plc Audit committee company)
chair, MJ Finance director (same
company)
6
Internal auditor, SM
Scrimshaw
plc
Finance director, CT
Internal auditor, RD
1
2
Harrier plc Finance director, RM External auditor (same
company)
Deputy chairman
of company
Hobson plc NED, MT Audit committee chair 2
Various
companies
NED Audit committee chair 4
NED Audit committee chair 4
External auditor
External auditor
External auditor
Corporate
governance manager
External auditor
University audit
committee member
Internal auditor
Company chairman
NHS Trusts. This study examines large UK public companies only.
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Access appeared to be facilitated by three main factors: the timing of the study,
the opportunity for a public relations exercise (although all participants were
assured of confidentiality) and curiosity about the researcher.
At the commencement of the study corporate governance issues were of
considerable importance to those preparing company accounts, in the wake of the
publication of the report of the Cadbury Committee. There was much public
discussion and many large companies (including some covered by the study)
were keen to demonstrate that they welcomed Cadbury and were already at the
'leading edge' of developments in this area. The subsequent publication of the
less popular Greenbury report (Greenbury,1995) on directors' remuneration
appeared to dampen this initial enthusiasm to discuss corporate governance
issues. The fortuitously advantageous timing of the interview programme and the
value of personal introductions were emphasised by a subsequent unsuccessful
attempt to establish contact with six companies identified as the leaders in
reporting on corporate governance issues in a report on corporate governance
disclosure in FT-SE 100 companies published by Deloitte and Touche
(Jones, 1996) An approach was made to the chairmen of these companies. Two
did not respond at all. Two responded that company policy was to refuse access
to all such approaches (one of these was a very curt note from the chairman,
while the other was a much longer and apologetic letter from the company
secretary, accompanied by a copy of the most recent annual report). One
responded, through the finance director, that the study sounded very interesting
and that the company would have been very happy to help but was currently
engaged in a demerger process which made it impossible for his department to
take on any other commitments. The final response regretfully informed me that
the company was assisting in three other similar studies at present and was thus
fully committed.
Issues of access in the study of elite groups have been discussed with specific
reference to boards of directors by Winkler (1987) and Brannen (1987). Winkler
described the background to a study of company directors (Pahl and Winkler,
1974) where observational methods were used and the negotiation of access took
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a full year with a refusal rate of over 85 per cent. Winkler commented on the
paucity of studies of what directors do and, while acknowledging the obvious
difficulties in gaining access, argued that 'the observation of elites in action is
both technically feasible and substantially valuable' (1974:146): the importance
of such observational studies lies in the contrast that is revealed with prevailing
ideologies about the behaviour of directors. Brannen's observational study was
based on attendance at board meetings and his account stressed the inherent
problems of observing such meetings:
'While observation of what was said and done was not too
difficult, there was rather more difficulty in understanding the
ethos of the boardroom, the degree of formality and the basis of
the formality, the degree of ritual and the basis of ritual.'
(Brannen,1987:172)
These accounts emphasise the problems of researching elite groups even after
access has been negotiated.
In this study, each interviewee was sent an introductory letter before the
interview, explaining the project and introducing the researcher (see appendix
A). Conversation before and after interviews indicated in several cases that
curiosity about the researcher had been of some influence in the interviewee's
decision to participate in the study. I qualified as a chartered accountant at a time
when women entrants to the profession were still unusual: interviewees who
shared my age, education and training profile were interested in my subsequent
career pattern and, although my gender makes me unusual within this context, I
was treated as by most interviewees as 'one of them'. This was demonstrated in
assumptions made about my understanding of technical issues discussed, of the
ways in which accountancy firms operate and the general business environment
in which interviewees operated. In some instances, these assumptions were
unfounded and I had to ask apparently naïve questions or undertake some
subsequent research to fill in gaps in my knowledge. Issues relating to the role
and status of the female researcher in elite studies in regard to the experience of
interviewing have been discussed by Neal (1995) in the context of educational
research and by Puwar (1997) in a study of women MPs. Spencer, in her study of
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NEDs, described being treated as a 'reasonably unintelligent schoolgirl doing a
project' (Spencer, 1983:10). However, in this study age and status differentials
between researcher and interviewees were not wide and the gender difference
was an apparent advantage in gaining access.
3.5 How were stories accessed?
Before each interview, the respondent was asked to complete and return a
questionnaire, designed to capture some basic data about the respondent and the
audit committee concerned, as well as to explore the respondent's views on the
role of the audit committee. Following the emphasis in the audit committee
literature, the questionnaire focused on respondents' understandings of the
characteristics that make audit committees effective: respondents were asked to
rank characteristics derived from Collier (1992). To reflect different respondent
roles, questionnaires differed slightly between categories of respondent.
Responses were then used as the basis of discussion in the formal interview. The
questionnaires were not designed as formal survey instruments and the data has
not been statistically analysed: it has been used to amplify understandings
obtained from the analysis of the data collected in the subsequent interviews.
Copies of the questionnaires may be found in appendix B.
Six interviewees returned the questionnaires as requested, a further four
completed the questionnaire during the interview while the remainder chose not
to complete the questionnaire at all. However, in every interview the
questionnaire formed the initial focus of discussion. The questionnaires that had
been completed prior to interview were heavily annotated. In particular, the
questions involving ranking of characteristics7 aroused considerable comment
such as:
'These are very fine judgements: on another occasion I could rank
them very differently.' (Max Tinker, Runic)
'I don't think that these can be ranked — almost all are essential.'
(Michael Turnbull, Hobson)
7 Audit committee chairs: 17,18; external auditors: 4,5; finance directors: 18,19
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'I find these rankings pointless. Clearly they are all important but
I would not guarantee that I would make the same order of
ranking on consecutive days!' (Henry Morton, Runic)
All interviewees were eager to expand on their answers to the questionnaire,
offering anecdotes from their experience to contextualise their answers. This
emphasises the usefulness of a qualitative approach in amplifying surveys, such
as that conducted by Collier (1992), by highlighting the complexities which lie
behind questionnaire responses.
Interviews were tape recorded. Notes were made before, during and immediately
after all interviews - a record of observations about the interview site and its
conduct, to provide a context for subsequent interpretation. A diary was also kept
in which initial impressions of the interview and interviewee were recorded,
together with tentative notes on particular points of interest to consider in
analysis. Interviews were unstructured and open ended but the scene had been set
by the introductory letter and questionnaire. As noted above, interviewees were
initially encouraged to comment on the questionnaire, to amplify and clarify
responses and to give specific examples and illustrations of points made.
The methodological status of the interview account has been extensively
discussed in the literature on sociological method. May (1997) summarised some
of these arguments, observing that 'Interviews are used as a resource for
understanding how individuals make sense of their social world and act within
it.' (1997:129) but stressing the need to analyse interview data with a sensitivity
to motivations, reasons and social identities. Interview accounts may be
inaccurate (accidentally or deliberately). They may be incomplete: while
genuinely reflecting the experience of the interviewee, there may be aspects of
the phenomena under discussion of which the interviewee was not aware.
Harre and Secord (1972) proposed that:
'The things that people say about themselves should be taken
seriously as reports of data relevant to phenomena that really exist
. and which are relevant to the explanation of behaviour... It is
through reports of feelings, plans, intentions, beliefs, reasons and
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so on that the meanings of social behaviour and the rules
underlying social acts can be discovered. '(1972:7)
- but also noted:
.'..the feeling, mood or emotion, opinion, belief or intention
avowed may not exist; or the feeling ascribed may not really be
felt; or the opinion reported may not really be held... How can we
tell which reports are of genuine states of mind which really did
exist, and which reports pseudo-memories generated by the
. demand for commentary in a justificatory context?'(1972:107)
They suggested that `..there are many cases in which a certain sort of remark is
not just a sign of, or a report of state of mind, but is a manifestation of that state
of mind itself' (1972:107), using the example of expressions of complaint being
intimately associated with a state of discontent since such a state is manifested by
complaint: the verbal complaint may therefore be taken as an indication of the
complainer's actual state. This recognition of the situated nature of interview
accounts and their vocabulary is similar to the arguments of Mills (1940) who
proposed that the quest for a 'reality' underlying expressed motives for action
was fruitless: 'There is no way to plumb behind verbalization into an
individual..' (1940:910). Mills suggested that the examination of the
'vocabularies of motive' associated with particular situated actions was of
sociological interest as these 'stabilize and guide behaviour and expectation of
the reactions of others' (1940:911).8
Czarniawska-Joerges (1992) noted that 'the interview can be seen as the most
accessible technique for research in organizations' (1992:199) and observed that
language is a particular difficulty as the interviewer does not share the common
understandings which underlie the use of language in specific settings and may
not recognise this: she suggested that 'continuous comparative analysis' is a
technique that can be used to reveal gaps in understanding and decode meanings.
She reiterated the question posed by Harrá and Secord:
8	 . •
Th is perspective links to Bailey's analysis of communication within committees discussed in
section 6.3
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'..even if we know that what we reach are only representations,
how do we know that these are the representations that guide the
action and not just the representations produced for our benefit
during the interview?' (1992:201)
Her answer is that we do not and cannot. She also noted:
'..analysts do not have to choose one version of reality as correct
or introduce their own version as the right one: instead, one learns
to deal with diversity by trying to understand its roots.'(1992:206)
Holstein and Gubrium (1997) observed that texts offering advice on interviewing
perpetuate the picture of the interviewee as a 'vessel-of-answers' and urged a
style of active interviewing that recognises that:
'..the validity of answers derives not from their correspondence
to meanings held within the respondent, but from their ability to
convey situated experiential realities in terms that are locally
comprehensible. '(1997:117)
These discussions argue for an analytic and interpretive approach to the use of
interview data, recognising their situated nature and taking into account
contextual and motivational factors: this is the approach adopted in this study,
which demonstrates the range of differing understandings of audit committee
activity, in order to explore the gap between the 'public' rhetoric and individual
experience.
3.6 How are stories to be understood? The process of analysis and
interpretation
The methodology used has been informed by the grounded theory approach as
developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) and
explicated in the context of accounting research by Parker and Roffey (1997).
Analysis and preliminary interpretation of the data proceeded simultaneously
with data collection. 9 Transcription of tapes, while time consuming, allowed the
9 Wolcott has commented on the difficulty of separating the processes of description, analysis and
interpretation of data (Wolcott,1994)
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opportunity to search for important categories on an ongoing basis through
immersion in the interview data. Transcripts were read and reread in conjunction
with observational notes and minutes. Frequent rereading of transcripts, notes
and listening to tapes generated more notes of an analytic nature, leading to the
development of categories. The importance of categories was identified by
consideration of the following inter-connected factors:
• frequency of mention by interviewees: both high and low frequency were
considered as indicators
• context: expectations of both interviewer and interviewee about the context
of the discussion, inevitably framed by the questionnaire and/or the source of
the original contact
• approach — for example, did the interviewee introduce the topic, wish to
exclude it or return to it?
As further interviews were undertaken, particular categories and areas of interest
developing from the analysis could be pursued more specifically. In some cases
developing ideas were discussed with subsequent interviewees ( although this
was problematic because of confidentiality). Preliminary ideas were discussed
with colleagues and presented in conference papers (Spira, 1995, 1997a, 1997b,
1998)
The initial research question derived from the audit committee literature was
broadly framed: what makes an audit committee effective? However, as
demonstrated in chapter 2, a critical reading of the literature indicated the
problematic nature of arriving at a definition of effectiveness and interviewees
highlighted this both in their questionnaire responses and in subsequent
discussion (see section 3.5 above). This led to a closer focus in the interviews on
what effectiveness meant to the individuals concerned in an attempt to explore
Collier's question: why have audit committees been established so widely when
their effectiveness remains unproven? (Collier, 1996)
While supporting the intention of the Cadbury Code, interviewees shared a
degree of scepticism about the capacity of the audit committee to achieve the
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Cadbury objectives. This was expressed strongly with regard to fraud and
frequent reference was made to Robert Maxwell: 'Maxwell would be Maxwell
whatever'(Chris Tracker, Scrimshaw plc); 'I don't believe that internal control
reporting will ever catch a Maxwell' ( Robin Dunston, Scrimshaw plc); 'You
know all this will not catch the crooks like Maxwell' (Alex Anderson, Glengarry
plc); 'I should think that with Maxwell an audit committee was desirable — it may
even have existed but ... it must have been ineffectual because of the dominance of
one man' (Henry Morton, Runic plc). However, there was some support for the
potential of the audit committee to inhibit and deter. 1 ° A gap was thus perceived
between the public assertions of the value of audit committees as expressed in
Cadbury and the private beliefs of the individuals involved in their activities. This
gives a different spin to Collier's question: how do participants make audit
committees `wofk' if they do not believe that they can be effective? The refraining
of the question from a causal 'why?' to 'how?' emphasises the use of an
interpretive approach in the study.
As the ongoing analysis revealed increasingly complex and dynamic
interrelationships among audit committee participants, a theoretical perspective
which would suitably frame these networks was sought. The next chapter explains
the analytic approach of actor-network theory and its appropriateness for this
task.
10 The 'prophylactic' effect of the audit committee is explored in more detail in chapter 5.
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Chapter 4: Notes on the theory of actor-networks
This chapter outlines the main concepts and analytical tools employed in actor-
network theory through a discussion of studies which have developed and used
the idea of 'moments of translation.' The relevance of this concept to the
analysis of audit committee activity is demonstrated. The selected studies
discussed in this section explain, illustrate and apply ANT concepts and
demonstrate the variety of areas in which tools of ANT may be appropriately
used. This study makes particular use of the concept and vocabulary of
translation to analyse the engagement of audit committee participants in
corporate governance issues.
4.1. What is actor-network theory?
The ideas underlying actor-network theory (ANT) - also described as the
sociology of translation - were initially developed and applied by a group of
sociologists studying the sociology of science at the Centre de Sociologie de
l'Innovation at the Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines de Paris. Concepts of
ANT have been developed in a series of papers', including Callon's account of
the scallop beds in St Brieuc Bay (Callon, 1986), discussed in detail below: they
have also been applied in a variety of studies, including an examination of the
role of the GP in the UK cervical screening programme (Singleton and Michael,
1993), an analysis of the historical development of schools of thought in
economics (Yonay, 1994), an account of the introduction of new accounting
systems in three Australian hospitals ( Chua, 1995) and an account of an attempt
to introduce a new budgeting system in a university (Ezzamel 1994).
In using these concepts to illuminate the role and activities of the audit
committee, an outline of ANT tools is offered, rather than a full critical analysis
'An extensive bibliography may be found at <http://www.keele.ac.ulddepts/stt/home.htm >
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of the theory. However, it should be noted that the theory is not without its critics
(Collins and Yearley,1992). A sympathetic account of the philosophical
approach underlying ANT is offered by Lee and Brown (1994).
The study does not purport to be a complete ANT analysis since this would be
particularly difficult to write up under the condition of confidentiality under
which data was collected. Neither does the use of ANT concepts in this study
imply a full acceptance of all substantive tenets proposed by actor-network
theorists: this point is elaborated in section 4.2 below. However, the analytical
framework offered by the actor-network perspective allows an interpretation of
audit committee activities which highlights the dynamics of the relationships
among participants and their influence on audit committee behaviour.
This chapter outlines the concepts of ANT through a discussion of several
studies which have introduced and employed these concepts. The
appropriateness of these concepts to the analysis of audit committee operations is
indicated.
4. 2 Punctualisation: networks of networks
Law (1992) outlined the key points of actor-network theory, describing it as a
form of sociological analysis concerned with 'the mechanics of power'. The
theory uses the 'metaphor of the heterogeneous network' to suggest that 'society,
organisations, agents and machines are all effects generated in patterned
networks of diverse (not simply human) materials.' (1992: 380) This reflects the
development of the theory within the sociology of science, in that it emphasises
that the 'networks of the social' that generate these effects include non-human
actors.
Law observed that our interactions with other people are mediated through
objects which influence these interactions and relationships e.g. text, computers:
the argument of actor-network theory is that the 'social order' depends as much
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on the influence of these materials as on human influence. Thus, if the materials
disappeared, so would social order, so objects and people may be equally
important in the maintenance of social order. Law emphasised that this does not
imply 'an ethical stance': to treat people and machines as equally important in
this analysis is not the same as suggesting that people should be treated as
machines. What it does imply is that people 'are who they are because they are a
patterned network of heterogeneous materials.'(1992:381) The theory argues that
although the inner skills of individuals are important, 'social agents are never
located in bodies and bodies alone'. Thus:
'thinking, acting, writing, loving, earning - all the attributes that
we normally ascribe to human beings, are generated in networks
that pass through and ramify both within and beyond the body.'
(1992:384)
However, this view of non-human actors has not necessarily been fully endorsed
by others employing an ANT approach. Chua (1995) observes that to:
`..present inanimate objects such as computer software or
hardware as actors which are identical to human agents... reifies
machines and technologies in a way which detracts from the
purposive activities of their designers. It is people who make up
accounting numbers in specific ways to try and achieve certain
objectives. Software, by contrast, has neither interest nor agency.'
(1995:117)
The analysis in this study follows Chua in that it does not grant full actor status
to objects. This is not to underestimate the power of, for example, a document
such as a Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) in strengthening a network, but in
this study such power is viewed as resulting from the use of the document by
human actors.
Law then discussed why these networks are not always visible or of overt
concern in social interaction and suggested that, in order to avoid dealing with
the complexity that the network view opens up before us, 'network patterns that
are widely performed are often those that can be punctualised' . (Law's italics -
1992:385) Punctualisation is a simplifying assumption: if a network acts as a
single block, it is replaced by the action itself and the 'seemingly simple author
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of that action'. 2 The resources of the network may then be used without dealing
with the underlying complexities. However, Law emphasised that
`punctualisation is always precarious': it is a process or effect, not a permanent
state:
'Another way of saying this is to note that the bits and pieces
assembled pro tern into an order are constantly liable to break
down, or make off on their own. Thus, analysis of ordering
struggle is central to actor-network theory.'(1992:386)
The process which generates the ordering effects - 'devices, agents, institutions
or organizations' - is known as translation, implying that one thing — e.g. an
actor - may stand for another — e.g. a network. The process of translation renders
the network into a single punctualized actor and is concealed, along with the
network, behind the actor.
How is translation effected? The actors comprising networks all offer innate
resistance to ordering - how is this resistance overcome in the process of
translation? Law noted that the exercise of power in this regard contains 'more
than hint of Machiavelli'. 3 The process of translation is best understood through
an illustrative example.
4.3. How networks form and re-form: the concept and process of
'translation'
Callon (1986) provided a detailed illustration of the process of translation, in an
account which illustrated that:
`..the capacity of certain actors to get other actors - whether they
be human beings, institutions or natural entities - to comply with
them depends on a complex web of interrelations in which
Society and Nature are intertwined.'(1986:201)
2 Indeed, Callon (1987) uses the term 'simplification' rather than punctualintion.
3 It is important to understand that actor-network theory views power as an effect (part of the
translation process) rather than a cause. Latour (1986) observed that 'Power over something or
someone is a composition made by many people' but 'attributed to one of them' (1986:265) with
the amount of power exercised varying with the number of people in the composition. Thus power
is what has to be explained by the actions of the people obeying.
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His story centred on the decline of the scallop population of St Brieuc Bay, the
consequent threat to the livelihoods of the local fishermen, and the proposal of a
group of researchers of a method to deal with this problem. Callon identified
four stages or 'moments of translation' during the process by which these
researchers developed their influence over this situation.
The researchers had visited Japan where a mechanism for intense cultivation of
scallops had been developed, using towlines with netted bags which protect
scallop larvae and allow them to establish themselves. They wished to
investigate the possibility of using this method in St Brieuc but the French
scallops were of a different species to those bred in Japan and the lack of
detailed knowledge about the development of scallops in general meant that
answers to questions about the viability of a project to restock St Brieuc Bay
could not be presented with any authority. The central question was: would the
French scallops anchor themselves to the netted bags in the same way as the
Japanese species?
Callon argued that the initial formulation of the problem by the researchers gave
them power over those they defined as actors in this situation ( the fishermen,
scientific colleagues and the scallops). The statement of the problem through a
single question 'is enough to involve a whole series of actors by establishing
their identities and the links between them.' (1986:205) The researchers then
consolidated that power by defining themselves as an 'obligatory passage point',
siting themselves at a controlling point within network processes. They
demonstrated that the interests of the actors lay in the proposed research
programme and that the actors needed to work together to achieve this. Callon
defined this overall process as ' problematisation' - the first 'moment of
translation'.
The next significant stage involves locking the actors into place through a
process of ' interessemene . The actors may choose or refuse to participate in the
61
programme: how can the researchers ensure their co-operation? It is important to
recognise that each actor is also part of other networks, other problematisations,
which will influence their desire to participate. Interessement implies the
interposition of an actor between such other links in order to gain influence: thus
A interests B by destroying or weakening links between B and C, D etc., and also
by redefining B in the context of the relationship between A and B - a further
dissociation from C, D etc.
Tor all the groups involved, the interessement helps corner the
entities to be enrolled. In addition, it attempts to interrupt all
potential competing associations and to construct a system of
alliances.' (1986:211)
In Callon's example, the devices of interessement are the towlines ( for the
scallops), texts (scientific papers) and conversations with the scientific
colleagues and the fishermen.
The third stage is described as 'enrolment' - 'the group of multilateral
negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany the interessements and
enable them to succeed.'(1986:211) Enrolment of the scallops involved dealing
with currents, predatory parasites and other technical issues. Enrolment of
scientific colleagues was based on evidence from the research and the enrolment
of the scallops. The fishermen were not directly involved in any negotiations,
being prepared to wait for the outcome of the scientific process: their enrolment
was not resisted. As Callon observed:
'This example illustrates the different possible ways in which
actors are enrolled: physical violence (against the predators),
seduction, transaction, and consent without discussion.'
(1986:214)
The fourth stage is described as 'mobilisation' and focuses on issues of
representation. If some scallop larvae anchor, will all do so? If some scientific
colleagues are convinced of the worth of the research programme, will all be? If
some fishermen support the project of restocking the bay, will all do so? Callon
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argued that in each case the general community is 'constructed by interposed
spokesmen' and that chains of intermediaries - the counting of larvae and
conversion into graphs in reports, the election of fishermen delegates, the
discussion at conferences of scientific papers - result in these spokesmen. The
process enables previously dispersed groups - scallops, fishermen and scientists -
to mobilise and come together to resolve a problem. However, Callon
emphasised that this structure cannot be viewed as permanent in any way: `..this
consensus and the alliances which it implies can be contested at any moment.'
(1986:218) To demonstrate this, he traced the disintegration of the network: in
subsequent years the scallop larvae did not attach and grow - they were swept
away by 'a crowd of other actors' - the predators, currents and water
temperatures from which the researchers initially managed to detach them
through the process of interessement. Scientific colleagues became sceptical. A
group of impatient fishermen chose to fish a newly established group of scallops,
betraying their representatives who had agreed to restraint so that the long term
programme would assure future supplies.
Callon emphasised the link between translation and displacement: the story of St
Brieuc Bay illustrates displacement at every stage of translation. During
problematisation, the fishermen were influenced to move from a preoccupation
with short term interests to share the view of the researchers about a long term
project. During interessement and enrolment, the larvae were captured within the
nets, against the force of the currents. During mobilisation, the groups which
were represented by the smaller groups were all displaced and brought to a
scientific conference where the researchers claim to be their spokesmen.
Subsequent unpredictable displacements led to the actors changing and
bypassing the researchers - the obligatory passage point of the research project -
thus leading to the network's disintegration.
Translation is also 'to express in one's own language what others say and want'
(1986:223) - to establish oneself as a spokesman - thus 'the researchers translated
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the fishermen, the scallops and the scientific community'.(1986:223) Callon
concluded:
'Translation is the mechanism by which the social and natural
worlds progressively take form. The result is a situation in which
certain entities control others. Understanding what sociologists
generally call power relationships means describing the way in
which actors are defined, associated and simultaneously obliged
to remain faithful to their alliances. The repertoire of translation
is not only designed to give a symmetrical and tolerant description
of a complex process which constantly mixes together a variety of
social and natural entities. It also permits an explanation of how a
few obtain the right to express and to represent the many silent
actors of the social and natural worlds they have mobilized.'
(1986:224)
4.4. Other ANT concepts: micro and macro perspectives, black boxes and
wars
One important argument of ANT theorists is that ANT allows the same tools to
be used for analysis at micro and macro level (Callon and Latour, 1981), thus
collapsing what they view as an artificial distinction based on size which
obscures and oversimplifies the nature of power and influence proposed by the
theory. Networks are formed and strengthened through links forged by processes
of problematisation, interessement and enrolment but a chain is only as strong as
its weakest link and the fragility of these networks is always acknowledged. The
size of a network is immaterial - its strength is founded elsewhere.
Callon and Law (1989) returned to the story of the scallops of St Brieuc Bay and
examined how the researchers enrolled their sponsoring government
organisation, French consumers of scallops, the scientific community and local
government organisation to create the context and the negotiation space for the
subsequent creation of the network in which the fishermen and scallops were
enrolled. This macro-level enrolment involved manipulating networks which
already existed: scallop consumers, for example, had already been effectively
simplified by the production of statistics relating to their consumption of this
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delicacy and the researchers re-defined this network, focusing solely on their
demand for the product for the purposes of the study. Callon and Law described
this process as preforming a network: 'such allies [existing networks] are
mobilized without undue effort, but the fact that they are mobilized in turn leads
them to change.'(1989:61) This process takes place within a 'centre of
translation' where resources are drawn from existing networks to create a new
one, usually on the basis of some type of reciprocal return between networks.
Law and Callon (1992) illustrated this in their analysis of the TSR2 development,
a large British aerospace project. This defined the existence of a global network
which provided resources to generate a negotiation space for the development of
a local network to generate intermediaries - particularly an aircraft - which
would be returned to the global network. Law and Callon argued that the project
failed because actors in both networks were able to avoid the obligatory passage
point between the two networks and thus subvert control by the managers of the
project.
Callon and Latour (1981) explained how micro actors become macro actors,
using the concept of the black box:
'An actor grows with the number of relations he or she can put, as
we say, in black boxes. A black box contains that which no longer
needs to be reconsidered. The more elements one can place in
black boxes - modes of thought, habits, forces and objects - the
broader the construction one can raise. Of course, black boxes
never remain fully closed or properly fastened... .but macro-actors
can do as if they were closed and dark.' (1981:285)
Yonay (1994) used this concept in his analysis of competing schools of economic
thought. Accepted ideas become black boxes and contribute to the development
of scientific paradigms or schools of thought which Yonay viewed as actor-
networks. He observed that:
'The process of making a black box does not require consensus
of opinion... .new knowledge does not have to be accepted by all
(or by a large majority) in order to be considered as a black box. It
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is a sufficient condition that it is a constituent in any ongoing
network.' (1994:42)
Thus acceptance within a small group may be enough to give such ideas power
which can then be grasped by actors through enrolment in their networks.
Singleton and Michael (1993) used a complex metaphor of film cameras
mounted on scaffolding to contrast their own approach to ANT, which focuses
on the flux and instability of networks, with that of Callon and Latour which,
they imply, offers a more starkly determined approach to networks:
`..problems arise when the singularity of the entities within the
analytic narrative threatens to occlude the indeterminacy and the
ambivalence of those entities and of the associations into which
they are tied. Perhaps this is linked to the recurrent metaphor of
war that runs through actor-network theory: certainly, it often
seems as if these accounts are structured by magnificent victories
and disastrous defeats.. .An alternative metaphor might be that of
permanent reform; the world we wish to examine is one of
inherent instability and incessant skirmishes.' (1993:232)
Ezzamel (1994) used Foucault's model of power and the concept of translation to
examine an attempt by central management within a university to effect changes
in resource allocation which was successfully opposed by other groups. He
described translation as:
`.. the process through which an agency enrols other agencies in
order to forge alliances in situations of organisational struggle and
conflict. The process of 'translation' specifically refers to how
agents transform phenomena into resources and resources into
networks of power which seek to form alliances and coalitions, to
engineer antagonism and to constitute interests.' (1994:218)
- and uses Callon's articulation of the translation process to analyse the dynamics
of power within the institution.
Callon's version of translation process will be used in the subsequent analysis
and may be summarised thus:
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1. PROBLEMATISATION: an actor seeking to develop influence in order to
solve a problem establishes the nature of the problem and its own position. A
'centre of translation' takes form within a space between existing networks.
2. INTERESSEMENT: the actor interposes itself between the actors it seeks to
enrol and the rival associations of these actors in other networks; the process
also involves redefining these actors in terms of the newly developing
network. Interessement devices may be expressed in verbs such as 'corner',
'lure', 'trap'.
3. ENROLMENT: the outcome of successful interessement, described by
Callon (1987:211) as `..the group of multilateral negotiations, trials of
strength and tricks that accompany the interessements and enable them to
succeed'. 'Chains of intermediaries' are created through the use of a variety
of methods which may include physical violence, seduction, and transaction.
The process may also involve the 'stacking' of 'black boxes', representing
accepted facts. An 'obligatory passage point' may be established which
allows control of actors intermediaries moving between networks.
4. MOBILISATION (also simplification, punctualisation): the original actor can
now represent its new network in the area of desired influence to solve the
problem. Callon (1987:94) noted that: 'Behind each associated entity there
hides another set of entities that it more or less effectively draws together'.
5. DISINTEGRATION: competing interessement devices enrol actors in other
networks where they are redefined.
Thus, through the process of translation, A defines B's identity for the purpose of
As network: this redefinition of identity is the core process in the creation of
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networks. Michael (1996:54) expressed the process in terms of the following
statements:
'This is what you want to be' (interessement)
'We are the ones who can help you become that' (translation)
'Grant your obedience by your own consent' (enrolment)
Michael observed that this process takes place within the 'geography' of
'obligatory points of passage' which represent 'unavoidable conduits' and
'narrative bottlenecks' through which entities must pass 'in order to articulate
both their identity and their raison d'etre.' (1996:54)
4.5. Audit committees from an ANT perspective
Chua (1995) argued that ANT concepts are useful in accounting research
because they enable us to study:
`..how a certain notion of reality came to be socially constructed
and how and why a fact-building network emerged and survived
Machiavellian-like - what are the human and non-human
resources, stratagems, ploys and persuasive strategies used by
actors with divergent interests to initiate, maintain or, in certain
cases, destroy knowledge networks? Who are the allies
who which are mobilized, how are competitors cut down and
conquered, which authorities are used to stack particular
arguments, how are stronger software or formulae built to cover
as many contexts as possible? In what ways are appeals to truth
and truthfulness mobilized by fact-builders and to what effect?
Such questions are useful because they focus analysis on the
processes of fact-fabrication and socio-political ties that hold
together to form truth.'(1995:115)
ANT studies, originally developed in the area of scientific development and
practice, often require lengthy description and explication of complex technical
detail. It is a method of analysis particularly suited to the examination of large
technical projects where development over a lengthy time period may be traced
ana where considerable documentation exists and is accessible. This approach
would be suitable for undertaking an analysis of the development of audit
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committees over a lengthy time frame and in an international context, which
would extend and develop the ideas introduced in this more limited study. The
networks examined in this study link into this wider network: the perspective
would change if one selected as a network node 'The Cadbury Report' rather
than 'the finance director of X plc' but the links may still be traced using the
same tools of analysis. Thus ANT may be used to analyse networks at both
macro and micro levels and to trace the interconnections between the two.
This study focuses on the negotiation space created by actors in individual
companies (by drawing on the wider networks of the UK corporate governance
framework) and examines the ways in which, within this space, networks form
and re-form around and within the audit committee as it undertakes its allotted
tasks. Before proceeding to consider the data generated within the study, it is
appropriate to consider the broader corporate governance context, within which
audit committees operate, from an ANT perspective.
The Cadbury Committee was established in 1991 by the Financial Reporting
Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession: the
rationale for this is contained in the Introduction to the Committee's Report
(Cadbury Committee,1992: 2.1)
'Its sponsors were concerned at the perceived low level of
confidence both in financial reporting and in the ability of the
auditors to provide the safeguards which users of company reports
sought and expected.'
Recent financial scandals such as Polly Peck4 had exposed the accountancy
profession to unfavourable press comment and the need for public action was
important. The situation very closely paralleled that surrounding the
establishment of the UK accounting standard setting machinery in 1970: Robson
(1991) analysed this using the concept of translation. He observed that:
`..the 'problems' and 'worries' concerning accounting and
auditing practices were taken up and set against a particular
4 Smith (1992) provides an overview of creative accounting techniques implicated in such
scandals.
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professional discourse that defined the accounting profession in
the U.K. as a self-regulatory body. In the presence of prompting
by state agencies, a professional elite translated the 'problems'
articulated by others into their own terms and ideals.' (1991:566)
Robson also noted that the establishment of the Accounting Standards Steering
Committee (ASSC) in 1970 followed a lead given in the United States where the
Accounting Principles Board had already been set up:
'The bounded discursive interpretation by the profession of the
problematization of accounting practices drew upon an existing
policy legacy. The translation of accounting problems to the
discourse of accounting principles and standards allowed the
profession to invoke a response for which a major international
and professional precedent existed: the formation of the
Accounting Principles Board. As such the 'solution' put forward
by the profession displayed an institutional isomorphism (Meyer
and Rowan, 1977) by assuming common problems, and following
the practices of other bodies and professions.' (1991:565)
In the same way, the Treadway Commission in the United States (Treadway
Commission, 1987) provided a pattern for Cadbury to follow.
The parallel extends further: the ASSC was replaced by the Accounting
Standards Committee and reviews of the standard setting process were
undertaken by committees headed by Watts, McKinnon and Dearing during the
twenty years up to the establishment of the Accounting Standards Board in 1990
(Davies et al, 1997, 16-22). Similarly, the Cadbury Committee was followed by
the Greenbwy Committee (Greenbury, 1995) and the Hampel Committee
(Hampel, 1998). Although as Yonay (1994) has pointed out (see section 4.4
above) it is not necessary for a particular position to be widely accepted for it to
be 'black boxed', it would appear that there is a need for regular 'maintenance'
of interessement devices such as the accounting standard setting machinery and
the Cadbury Code, addressing criticism and enabling the devices to remain
useful in the wider professional arena as well as at the individual company level
which is examined in this study.
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Thus the setting up of the Cadbury Committee was a problematisation by its
sponsors of the financial aspects of corporate governance. The Cadbury Code
offered a solution at the level identified by Power (1997) as programmatic, in
contrast to the more practical technical level. In discussing the development of
formal guidance in the area of financial auditing, Power observed that, at the
programmatic level:
'Much of what goes on here is not guidance for practitioners at all
but a certain kind of institutionalized presentation of the
knowledge base of financial auditing. It must be 'practical'
enough to look like guidance to outsiders but not so practical that
these outsiders could replicate or judge it without the help of
insiders. In this way disturbances to the system, in the form of
new demands, or old demands with a new rhetoric, can be
managed by transforming the unfamiliar and intractable into the
familiar and possible.' (1997:25)
Thus the mystique of financial auditing is preserved and the accountancy
profession maintains its power in the same manner identified by Robson above.
The effect of the Cadbury Code may be similarly perceived. As Power
commented:
'Not only is the essential obscurity of financial auditing
undisturbed but there is a presumed relation between disclosure
and corporate activity which is highly problematic.' (1997:55)
He quoted Keasey and Wright (1993:301): 'Audit committees might be a means
not of more effective reporting but of avoiding scrutiny.' — a similar conclusion
to Collier(1996). Collier's explanation of his 'curious phenomenon' can be
interpreted through the ANT lens: large public companies5 are prepared to carry
the costs of audit committee establishment and to enrol, throwing in their lot
with Cadbury's sponsors (principally the accounting profession), to avoid the
possible burden of legislation and detailed scrutiny. As later chapters will
5 There has been some resistance to the implementation of the Cadbury Code among medium-
sized and smaller companies where the costs of setting up audit committees and difficulties in
appointing the requisite number of NEDs have been cited as impediments: see, for example,
Collier, 1997
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demonstrate, at company level the requirements of the Code with regard to audit
committees can be used as an interessement/enrolment device by groups and
individuals with particular objectives.
The Cadbury support for audit committees is based on the assumption that the
quality of financial reporting is closely related to the independence of external
auditors6 . The assumption underpinning Cadbury 7 is that this 'quality' is
potentially threatened by attempts by the executive directors to enrol the auditors
in employing accounting policies which, while strictly legitimate within current
generally accepted accounting practice, fall into 'grey' areas and might be
viewed pejoratively as 'creative'. These might be policies based on a specific
reading of the existing regulation which follows the 'letter' rather than the
'spirit' intended, as in the use of off balance sheet finance, (discussed by
Griffiths, 1995) or policies which push against the boundaries of acceptable
practice where none has yet been determined8, as in the case of accounting for
brands (Griffiths, 1995). At Glengarry plc the finance director described such
policies as 'sporty treatments'. Enrolment devices include the threat of losing the
company as an audit client (and possibly as a provider of other services) or an
adjustment to audit fees.
The Cadbury solution is to interpose the audit committee, composed of NEDs,
between the auditors and the executive directors. NEDs — objective, independent,
theoretically with a perspective more closely aligned with shareholders interests -
form the channel of communication between the auditors and the executives, in
theory providing an obligatory passage point through which the auditors are
enrolled into their 'independent' network, preventing direct influence by
6 Explored in more detail in chapter 7
7 Strongly rebutted by commentators such as Corrin (1993)
8
Although it is not impossible that directors and auditors together may wish to test the legal and
regulatory situation to provide the financial community at large with better guidance, in cases
where this argument has been advanced there is usually a clear competitive advantage to the
company concerned: see, for example, Power (1990, 1996)
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executive management. We thus see the board composed of two distinct
networks, each concerned to enrol the auditors.
However, in situations where obligatory passage points can be circumvented,
networks disintegrate ( Law and Callon,1992). In order to do their work, external
auditors must deal on a regular basis with the finance director. Good working
relationships may be as powerful an enrolment device as the threats outlined
above, as will be demonstrated in chapter 7. Further, the main source of
information for the audit committee is often the finance director: he or she thus
controls the obligatory passage point between the two networks of the board.
Where the audit committee chair has a finance background, it is very likely that
the audit committee chair and the finance director will form a good working
relationship. Thus the auditors may equally well be enrolled by management,
despite apparent compliance with Cadbury.
This sense of competition or contest for enrolment of actors permeates the
literature on audit committees. Corrin (1993:81) used a dramatic analogy:
'The whole report is like a script for a 'soap' where the non-
executive director is cast as saint, the auditor is a tarnished
guardian angel, and the executive director is a villain.'
It also links to the metaphor of surprise or threat, particularly evident in the
practitioner literature. The theme of actor-network studies as analyses of conflict
outlined above (although criticised by Singleton and Michael) intuitively
suggests that ANT is an appropriate analytical tool to examine this area. It also
suggests that a suitable focus for consideration would be how audit committees
achieve consensus on contentious issues, an area examined in detail in chapter 7.
Identification of problematisation, interessement and enrolment processes
illuminates the pattern of relationships between participants and the shifting
balance of power and influence surrounding audit committee operation.
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Participants' stories focused on the event of the audit committee meeting. The
next chapter examines the role of the audit committee meeting through an ANT
lens, exploring its use as an interessement and enrolment device.
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Chapter 5
The audit committee meeting: a private performance for a public audience
In chapter 3 a contradiction was identified between participants' scepticism about
the ability of audit committees to function in the way that Cadbury envisaged,
and their support for the practical value of audit committees. In this chapter this
contradiction is explored through an examination of the functions of the audit
committee meeting, using the approach of actor-network theory outlined in
chapter 4. The analysis demonstrates that the ceremonial performance of the
committee's existence is used as an interessement and enrolment device by the
full board to legitimate the company in the eyes of external suppliers of finance,
as well as a symbolic deterrent to fraud and incompetence within the company.
5.1 The audit committee meeting as a ceremonial performance
In seeking to understand the ways in which the audit committee meeting acts as a
resource in building and maintaining the external and internal networks of the
company, the enabling aspects of the ceremonial' of meeting process become
apparent as will be demonstrated.
However, participants interviewed were conscious of criticism such as that
expressed by Corrin (1993) 2 and did not wish the meetings to be described as
'ceremonial' or 'ritual', sensitive to implications of superficiality. Finance
I The use of the terms 'ritual' and 'ceremonial' have been extensively debated within
anthropology. For example, Gluckman and Gluckman (1977) argued that 'ritual' should only be
used to describe activities with a religious link. Goffman (1981:17) commented:
'The term "ritual" is not particularly satisfactory because of connotations of
otherworldliness and automaticity. Gluckman's recommendation
"ceremonious"... has merit except that the available nouns (ceremony and
ceremonial) carry a sense of multiperson official celebration.'
Although audit committee activity is an example of 'secular ritual' (Moore and Myerhoff, 1977),
the word 'ceremonial' is used in this study, following the example of Meyer and Rowan (1977).
However, other writers are quoted who use the word 'ritual' in contexts where the two words
could be interchangeable.
2 Quoted in chapter 1.
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directors emphasised this - Chris Tracker at Scrimshaw described the process of
preparing for the audit committee meeting as:
`.. making sure that the audit committee just doesn't become a
non-event, that it actually has teeth, that actually the company
benefits from it as well as the individuals. I think a few years ago
audit committees were a bit like that when they first started..'
Alex Anderson at Glengarry commented:
`..meetings which are strictly scripted are actually pretty
unproductive, we can all read out the papers and everyone nods
and says yes, agreed, is not actually that productive because where
you've got real issues, where you clearly present the facts, you
know, if someone has a question they're prepared to ask it or a
different point of view that is stated.... I've certainly had clients
where I was quite concerned about the way audit committees
worked, where there's quite a lot of friction particularly with the
finance director, you know, with a finance director who's actually
trying not to be open with the audit committee, trying to keep
things - pushing it under the carpet rather than actually explain
that there was an issue here and we did need to address what was
to be done about it..'
Both Chris and Alex emphasised that their audit committees engaged in
substantive activity rather than empty ceremonial. Max Tinker, however, offered
a frank description of his experience as a recently appointed non-executive
director chairing the audit committee at North Eastern plc, which implied that the
established pattern there was a ceremonial performance:
'The thing that I've noticed is I go along to North Eastern and
there's plenty of board papers but the background - you know
you've got no background, the executive directors make a
recommendation and you're pretty well expected to say `yes'..
Although Max indicated that this was not, in his view, a satisfactory state of affairs,
Roy Milford described his experience as an external auditor where NEDs had
apparently colluded willingly in similar situations:
`..yes, there are audit committees who don't want to know a thing,
they just want to show up..'
It is interesting to observe that these interviewees acknowledged experience of
faults and failures in audit committee processes which made such committees
examples of automatic 'rubber-stamping', but their illustrations were always
related to experiences in companies other than their current principal affiliation.
These stories were also related alongside stories of their current audit committee
roles, which revealed participants' manipulation of aspects of audit committee
meetings (examined in chapter 6) that could be interpreted as having equivalent
outcomes to those condemned above, effectively neutralising the audit committee
in the terms envisaged by Cadbury.
From an ANT perspective it is possible to discern the role of ceremonial as a
powerful interessement and enrolment device in itself, as well as a process which
enables other such devices to be brought into play. Kunda (1992:257)
summarised three approaches to ritual: the integrative view of ritual as behaviour
which serves to reinforce group solidarity, the conflict perspective of writers
such as Lukes (1975) who argue that ritual is used to achieve and maintain power
by dominant groups and an interpretive approach which sees ritual as 'a dramatic
form that may contain both conflictual and integrative processes.' It is the third
approach which informs this discussion.3
If the audit committee meeting is viewed as a ceremonial performance, who are
the performers? Many people may attend an audit committee meeting: apart from
the committee members, the finance director and the external auditors will
normally be present, as will others, such as internal auditors, whose activities are
of close interest to the committee. All board members are usually entitled to
attend if they wish. The audit committee members will probably be outnumbered
by the additional participants and this must inevitably influence their behaviour.
The principal form of performance that is revealed in participants' stories is the
asking of questions: this is discussed in more detail in chapter 8.
3 Both Kunda (1992: 259) and Lukes (1975:291) noted the difficulty of interpreting ritual: Kunda
concluded that `..the best one can do is to establish a plausible account that is consistent with
those descriptions and native accounts one has managed to uncover.'
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Descriptions of individual 'performances' at meetings were notable because they
were so infrequent: Simon Middleton, the internal auditor at Glengarry,
described the tense relationship between Martin Johnson and the company
chairman and noted that 'the other NEDs - all important people in their own
companies - have to sit and watch what goes on between the two of them.' He
described the audit committee chair as 'worrying at issues like a dog with a bone'
which frustrated the company chairman. At Runic, Henry Morton described an
American NED who often dominated proceedings: ' ... you sit round the [Runic]
board ... you hear [him]at great length.' Chris Tracker offered an unusual
description of a meeting at Scrimshaw: 'It got very emotional at the last one
when we were talking about technical requirements.'
However, in keeping with the general emphasis in their accounts on consensus
and agreement4, interviewees did not often relate stories about individual
behaviour, even their own. When asked the question 'What happens at audit
committee meetings?', most participants initially responded by describing
agendas and the type of information provided for discussion. They then
continued to describe the other features of the meetings identified as 'ceremonial
components' in section 5.5 below.
Three types of audience may be identified for the performance of audit
committee ceremonial: those external to the company, those within the company
but external to the committee meeting, and those who participate within the
meeting itself. The integrative view of ritual would suggest that its primary
importance is for those who participate: indeed, Schwartzman's anthropological
study of meetings supports this approach (Schwartzman, 1989). She analysed
meeting components in some detail and surveyed the literature on meetings in a
variety of disciplines, commenting on the tendency of other studies to use the
meeting as a tool to examine other issues such as decision-making, and
highlighting the paucity of research which focuses on the meeting itself as a
topic. However, although noting: 'After the fact, a meeting is objectified as it
bee. omes a text for interpretation and may be 'read' as tangible evidence of
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organisational activity or inactivity.'(1989:83), she did not consider in detail the
role of the meeting as a symbol for those not directly involved.
A similar emphasis is found in the work of Mangham (1986:127) who used the
metaphor of theatrical performance to explore interactions at board meetings,
characterising them as improvisations around commonly understood scripts:
' ... realizing in the performance a form of ritual. Not an empty
form, as so many of the usages of the term now imply; rather a
celebration and a grounding of the relations which obtain between
those concerned.'
He suggested that such performances help to define individuals' concepts of
themselves:
'Interpersonal behaviour.., is enacted to maintain or enhance each
actor's relative comfort, security and freedom from anxiety.'
However, the potential for the influence of ceremonial beyond the group directly
involved has been acknowledged in other studies. Kunda (1992:157) spoke of a
'secondary audience'. Brown (1994:863) observed that:
'Symbolic action and myth making are important means by which
individuals and groups seek to legitimate their privileged power
relations and actions and indeed to guarantee their organisation's
continued successful existence. This depends on the support of
internal and external constituencies, and accordingly, processes of
organisational legitimation are directed to both sets of
stakeholders.'
Baumann (1992:99) suggested that rituals may be addressed to 'Others' and may
indeed 'serve to negotiate the differing relationships of its participants with these
'Others". He further observed that it may be useful to view rituals as 'resources
competed for and used by various constituencies'. This supports the view of
audit committee meetings as interessement and enrolment devices used by both
the board and the individual participants.
4 Discussed more extensively in chapter 7
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Two types of performance may then be identified: performance of the meeting
and performance in the meeting. Performance in the meeting will be explored in
chapter 6 by examining participants' use of the ceremonial aspects of the meeting
in creating networks. The performance of the meeting and the audiences for that
performance are discussed below.
5.2 The role of the audit committee meeting: beyond the company
From an ANT perspective, the performance of the audit committee meeting acts
as an interessement and enrolment device both externally and internally.
Companies complying with the Cadbury Code give details of audit committee
membership in their annual report, in accordance with appendix 4, paragraph
6(f). Such reports vary in the level of detail but all indicate that the audit
committee has met during the year to transact appropriate business. Runic in
1995 reported :
'The audit committee meets regularly to review with the auditors
the Group's annual report and interim results and also ensures that
appropriate accounting policies and compliance procedures are in
place.'
Scrimshaw's report for 1995 was similarly brief:
'The Audit Committee receives reports regularly from the Group
Internal Audit Department and ensures that an objective and
professional relationship is maintained between the Board and the
external auditors.'
Glengarry in 1994 reported in considerable detail on the company's internal
control system, including the following description of audit committee activity:
'The Audit Committee comprises four non-executive Directors.
The Chairman and Finance Director normally attend the meetings
but the Committee also meets with the external auditors without
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management present. The Committee operates under written terms
of reference and its duties include the detailed review of financial
statements prior to their recommendation to the Board for
approval.'
In terms of Callon's 'moments of translation' (Callon, 1986) such reports, the
public demonstration of the existence of the audit committee, may be viewed as
punctualisations of the committee itself. The report then forms part of the
package of accountability provided by the board of directors to the shareholders
in the company annual report. This, in turn, acts as an interessement and
enrolment device by demonstrating to those parties with an existing or potential
relationship with the company that the company is concerned to establish high
standards of corporate governance by complying with the Cadbury Code in this
respect. This is likely to influence suppliers of finance, strengthening the network
node of the company by increasing its available resources. Tsui et al (1994) and
Felton et al (1996) both report evidence of this. Davis (1997) surveyed key
corporate governance indicators in the UK, the US, France, Germany and Japan
and observed:
'Corporate governance has become a significant factor considered
by institutional investors when making world-wide investment
decisions and tending ownership stakes.. .Many brokers and
shareholders now compare ownership rights and governance
characteristics as part of their routine due diligence reviews of
companies. Some are under a mandate to do so. Others have come
to the conviction that appropriate governance structures reduce
risk and promote performance..'
The public report of the existence and activity of the audit committee has a
symbolic function in speaking to those who have or are contemplating a
relationship with the company. It records the events of the time period covered
by the report and offers the reassurance that the positive outcomes of such events
will be repeated in the future: under the high standards of corporate governance
symbolised by the audit committee's existence, resources contributed to the
company will be efficiently and effectively managed with the promise of an
appropriate return to the providers. Additionally, the activities of the audit
committee offer a further reassurance, that the account of the company's
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activities may be relied upon — the auditors have, as a result of the protection of
the audit committee, been able to report independently, free of any pressure from
the management of the company. Ceremony and ritual emphasise stability and
continuity. As Moore and Myerhoff (1977:24) observed:
'Since ritual is a good form for conveying a message as if it were
unquestionable, it often is used to communicate those very things
which are most in doubt...Action itself may be soothing ...
Ceremony can make it appear that there is no conflict, only
harmony, no disorder, only order, that if danger threatens, safe
solutions are at hand..'
The ceremony of the annual financial reporting process is enhanced by the report
of the audit committee's activities.
The audit committee meeting remains essentially private: many other meetings
take place within a company but remain unreported externally. The reports
describe regular audit committee meetings focussing on areas which carry risks
for external parties: the reassurance lies not so much in the actual business
conducted — external parties do not receive detailed minutes — but in the reports
themselves. Only the fact of the meetings is a matter of public report: decisions
and outcomes are not — the committee itself is not reporting5 and there is no
indication of precisely how the committee's objectives are achieved. The
introduction of such reports is a recent addition to the package of disclosure
relating to the accountability of directors and has been absorbed into the
ceremonial format of such reports.
5.3 The meeting within the meeting: an even more private encounter
The private meeting between the external auditors and the audit committee
referred to in Glengarry's report quoted above is considered to be good practice:
'The [audit] committee should have a discussion with the auditors,
at least once a year, without executive board members present, to
5 Although, in the US, a small proportion of major companies do publish audit committee reports
in their financial statements: see Urbancic (1996) for comment on this.
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ensure there are no unresolved areas of concern.' (Cadbury
Committee, 1992:70)
Such a meeting is intended as a public demonstration that the audit committee
functions to support the independence of external auditor against any possible
pressure from the executive management of the company. The meetings are not
normally minuted, as Max Tinker, the finance director of Runic, described:
`.. the fourth one [audit committee meeting in the year] might be a
meeting just between the audit committee and the external
auditors, but in fact they had a meeting after our last audit
committee, and that's a private meeting, I don't know what's said
there - things like, you know, 'Is Max Tinker doing a reasonable
job? What do you really think about the accounts now that we've
got them out of the way?' but I actually don't know and as far as I
know there are no minutes of those meetings..'
Henry Morton indicated that Max did not need to be anxious about the content of
such meetings:
`..we always have a chat with the auditors at the end of audit
committee meetings, when nobody else is there, about the audit
committee, not that anything important particularly comes out of
that, it's really striving to find out that there isn't anything that
isn't being said really, and in the best ordered house that really
doesn't happen, it certainly doesn't happen here ..'
Ronald Roberts noted that this was a recent introduction and speculated about the
reasons for it:
`.. at the end of the audit committee meeting there [at Runic] they
ask the executive directors to leave, so we and they can discuss
whatever they want to discuss with us - now that has changed, it
has only happened in the last year - they may want to say things
very directly to us which they feel are possibly more embarrassing
to say in front of the executive members and also they just want to
make sure that we've got no burning issues that we couldn't say to
the executives, which I would say would surprise me..... it may
have changed because of the whole environment in which we're
seen to be independent and so on... one of the non-executives is an
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American ....and I think it's the style probably in America more
along, you know, having face to face chats, so we find it - I mean,
it's quite useful, I think it's probably more useful for them [the
audit committee] than it is for us. At Tiffin that doesn't happen, it
doesn't happen directly, you know, we might have - the chairman
of the audit committee may say: 'I want a one-to-one with you'-
but it's not necessarily at the end of every meeting—' Can we just
make sure that we have ten minutes, half an hour whatever with
the auditors separately from the executives?'.. I think this is
probably different because issues at [Runic] are complex ....and I
think because of the complexities they just want to make sure that
on a face to face that everyone makes sure that they are absolutely
happy with what's going on.'
This account seems to indicate that the private meeting works as a comfort
device for the audit committee - 'I think it's probably more useful for them than
it is for us', '..they just want to make sure that on a face to face that everyone
makes sure that they are absolutely happy with what's going on' - rather than the
more conventional view that it supports the external auditor's independence.
However, the comparison drawn between the two different companies should be
considered in the light of the fact that, at the time of this interview, the same
individual chaired the audit committees at Runic and at Tiffin, and the same
accountancy firm audited both companies, the audit teams including the same
audit partners. Good working relationships had been established and there was
fairly regular informal contact between Henry Morton and the audit partners, as
Henry Morton described:
'I meet XYZ socially anyway and also from time to time at other
meetings and other occasions, when we meet we have chats and
they would quite often ring me up about something or other and
talk to me so, yes, communication's very good. Without it I think
it would be very difficult to do it..'
In these particular circumstances, with very open channels of communication, the
role of the private meeting appears to be entirely symbolic. At Glengarry, Alex
Anderson described such meetings as 'routine':
'..the other point to make is that the audit committee does from
time to time see the auditors on their own without you know the
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executives present... I suppose typically it would happen at the
end of the meeting and we'd all know about it, I mean it's a
matter of routine..'
However, at Harrier, such a routine had not yet been established:
`.. in most audit committees I've been involved with the finance
director doesn't sort of stick around throughout the meeting -
when I was an auditor I used to be alone with the audit committee,
the finance function having left - here it's not quite like that - we
tend not to go away ... ' (Roy Milford)
This might perhaps be connected to Roy's specific situation as auditor-turned-
finance director for this particular company. No audit committee existed at the
time when he was the partner in charge of the company's audit. Harrier was, at
the time of the interview, in the early stages of establishing procedures in
accordance with Cadbury, having been until recently dominated by a single
founding entrepreneur. It is possible that the institution of this private meeting is
a part of the panoply of ceremonial 'good practice' which companies will adopt
to reflect particular circumstances: certainly at Glengarry the public
demonstration of high standards of corporate governance was of major concern,
whereas at Harrier a certain amount of reluctance could be sensed in the context
of complying with Cadbury. (Jeremy James, the deputy chairman was
particularly outspoken in his contempt for audit committees, describing them as a
'complete waste of time, they know nothing about the company.')
Chris Tracker at Scrimshaw commented:
'Also we have a session we allow during the process for anybody
to be thrown out who's not a member, so they will at certain times
of the year choose to talk to the auditors on their own and so it's
not just purely us saying 'Shut up, don't say that'..'
The use of the expression 'a session we allow' is of interest here: it implies that
even this ultimate guarantee of external auditor independence is somehow within
the gift of the executive directors.
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Bob Cunningham, a very experienced audit committee chair and member of the
Cadbury Committee, laid great emphasis on the importance of this private
meeting, pointing out that he considered it so important that he would normally
see the auditors privately before the audit committee meeting. He described the
fact of the meeting, and its demonstration that the external auditors had a direct
channel to the NEDs, as an important deterrent to fraud and incompetence, using
the term 'prophylactic'.
The role of the private meeting between the audit committee and the external
auditors illustrates both the symbolic nature of audit committee meetings and the
use of this symbol in strengthening of a variety of networks that is taking place.
The rhetoric presents this meeting as an important link to provide support for the
external auditors and to prevent undue influence being exerted over them by the
executive management of the company, but the external auditor at Runic saw this
meeting as more useful to the audit committee, offering it comfort. The meeting
is not minuted or mentioned in the company's annual report. It is a
demonstration of good practice to and by both the external auditors and the
members of the audit committee: the reassurance that those present are
complying with the recommendations of the Cadbury Code -`doing the right
thing' - acts as an enrolment device, strengthening the audit committee as a
network.
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 have thus examined the way in which the public reports of
the event of the audit committee meeting and of the private meeting with the
internal auditors act as a ceremonial demonstration of the maintenance of high
corporate governance standards to an audience external to the company.
5.4 The role of the audit committee meeting: within the company
The meeting event is also performed for an internal audience: it is used by the
board of directors as a deterrent, a protection from both fraud and incompetence
within the company. Interviewees generally insisted that audit committees would
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be powerless to prevent calculated fraud (see comments on Robert Maxwell
quoted in section 3.7), but incompetence was viewed as an equally serious threat
and a belief was expressed that audit committees could combat this by
highlighting issues of concern and calling individuals to account. Participants
spoke of 'keeping people up to the mark' or 'keeping people on their toes', as,
for example, Max Tinker, the finance director at Runic:
' ... in my experience the audit committee is regarded as an
important or a powerful body and so it isn't a question of saying 'I
don't feel like appearing' or 'I'll come and busk the answer'
because you know you can't. You may be very confident in your
own case but you are definitely there appearing a bit like if you like
the Houses of Parliament Select committees. However powerful you
are certainly in the outside world you have to appear before them...
unless you're ill and they'll still have you next time!'
Finance directors and internal auditors referred to 'pulling people in':
`..then they'd be called to the chairman of the audit committee and
the others would say 'What are we doing about this, it's been
raised as an issue now, I don't want to see it there again' - we
need to say that we're going to sort it..' (Chris Tracker,
Scrimshaw)
`..what happens is that most of them [high risk issues identified by
internal audit] are taken up by the chief executive and he will
follow those up and there have been occasions when management
of a particular function have been called to the audit committee to
explain ....(Bernard Seaton, Runic)
`.. the audit committee for example says periodically 'We're fed
up of this, we require the [X division] director to appear before
the next meeting and what we want him to address is this, that or
the other.. '(Max Tinker, Runic)
These comments emphasise the perceived authority of the audit committee
within the company. A similar view was expressed by Ken Palmer, an external
auditor with considerable experience of audit committees, and the author of
several publications offering guidance to audit committee participants. He stated
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that: 'The audit committee is effective if there are no nasty surprises', a
perspective echoed elsewhere in the practitioner literature (see, for example,
Warrick and Galloway, 1996)
The concept of the nasty surprise implies evidence of lack of control. Although
there may be unexpected changes in an organisation's external environment
which are beyond its control, the surprises referred to were seen as evidence of
failure of internal control systems. Interviewees observed that it is possible to
put elaborate systems in place (balancing cost against value to the company and
recognising that all risks cannot be prevented) but that such systems cannot
prevent a determined fraudster. Participants' accounts thus focused on the
mechanics of audit committee operation, suggesting that the audit committee
process itself offered protection against the threat of incompetence and, to a
much lesser extent, fraud:
'You assess effectiveness from the perspective of process - does
the system work? - and outputs — the lack of surprises, the degree
of comfort..'(Ken Palmer)
'The audit committee role is to improve systems and process..'
(Bob Cunningham)
The very existence of an audit committee which followed due process was
deemed sufficient to achieve this purpose6. The prescriptive outcomes of this
view are the unsubstantiated accounts of best practice, illustrations of audit
committee procedures where no nasty surprises have occurred — yet. Bob
Cunningham confessed that he did not know what made an effective audit
committee. He suggested that it was 'like the plumbing: as long as it works you
don't think about it'.
Here we have a view of the audit committee meeting as a ceremonial
performance designed to deter inappropriate behaviour within the company. The
calling to account of individuals representing groups within the company is a
6 See section 6.4 for a discussion of the 'passive' audit committee role.
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symbolic display. Chris Tracker, finance director at Scrimshaw commented: 'We
need to say that we're going to sort it ' — not 'We need to sort it'. Knowledge that
the audit committee exists and can demand reports acts as a deterrent and also as
a means of enrolling employees, analogous to Meyer and Rowan's 'logic of
confidence' discussed in section 5.5 below.
Chris Tracker's approach to audit committee meetings appeared ambiguous,
reflecting a belief that it is necessary for the finance director to 'manage' the
meeting but in a way that does not lead to an obviously superficial outcome: this
suggests that members are expected to 'perform' and the asking and answering of
questions provides this performance, allowing a degree of 'constrained
spontaneity':
`..you manage the audit committee - basically you make sure that
everyone's informed when you go into the meeting, you know
where your start point is and your end point is, it doesn't mean
managing the discussion before hand. I don't actually say a lot
but you know what you don't want is an audit committee that lasts
for twenty minutes, right, we've had an audit committee, tick,
we've done that for Cadbury..' (Chris Tracker, Scrimshaw)
How performance is managed in the meeting through the asking of questions will
be explored in chapter 8.
5.5 The audit committee as a network
The performance of the audit committee meeting is directed at audiences both
internal and external to the company. It acts as an interessement and enrolment
device to draw external parties — and material resources — into the company
network and to strengthen that network internally by enrolling company
employees through demands for accountability. At a third level, the audit
committee is itself a network: its non-executive members are punctualised actors
representing the shareholder network 7 . Members have been enrolled by a variety
7 The executive directors and the external auditors can equally claim to represent shareholders'
interests: mobilisation through recourse to such representative claims is illustrated in chapter 7.
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of devices — for example, the enhanced status of serving on the board of a well-
known company or working with other directors of high reputation - and are
prepared to join together for this public performance, to achieve consensus
through compromise and to allow themselves in turn to be represented by the
punctualised actor of the audit committee chair who will report to the full board
of directors on their behalf. The audit committee network node is then enrolled
within the board, strengthening the board network. Simultaneously the
participants in audit committee activity are also able to enrol the audit committee
to strengthen their own networks. Audit committee participants can use the audit
committee as an interessement and enrolment device to achieve their purposes
but this is only made possible by the process of establishing the audit committee
as a strong network node in its own right. The audit committee meeting and the
performance of questioning (discussed in chapter 8) demonstrates this strength
and the audit committee thus becomes a 'black box' to be used by participants.
The meeting itself thus acts both as an interessement and enrolment device for
the company network and as an arena within which its members and other
participants can operate to strengthen their own networks.
The ceremonial of the audit committee meeting serves as an interessement and
enrolment device on three levels: external to the company, internal to the
company and internal to itself. It provides the public symbol external to the
company necessary to enrol suppliers of finance and other resources, it acts as a
symbol of authority and control within the company, enrolling employees, and it
reinforces the links between the members to ensure that as a group they generate
the comfort for the board that is passed on to external users of the company's
financial statements and ultimately secures the legitimacy of the company.8
8 See chapter 9.
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The audit committee as a network derives its own strength from the skills and
experience of its members and from the authoritative support of the Cadbury
Code. Meyer and Rowan (1977) observed:
'By designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions
of myths in the institutional environment, an organization
demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purposes in a
proper and adequate manner.. The organization becomes, in a
word, legitimate, and it uses its legitimacy to strengthen its
support and secure its survival' (1977:349)
'The incorporation of structures with high ceremonial value, such
as those reflecting the latest expert thinking or those with the most
prestige, makes the credit position of an organization more
favorable. Loans, donations or investments are more easily
obtained.' (1977:351)
Thus, in this analysis, the 'myth' of the Cadbury Code, as a prescription for
ensuring higher standards of financial reporting and concomitantly higher
standards of corporate governance, leads to the widespread establishment of
audit committees in accordance with the Code, used by the companies
establishing them as a means of legitimation and access to resources. The means
by which legitimacy is established will be explored in subsequent chapters.
However, this motive for audit committee establishment was not articulated by
interviewees in this study who often appeared to express contradictory views,
asserting on the one hand that audit committees could not work in the way
envisaged by Cadbury but on the other hand supporting their establishment.
This contradictory approach reflects the concepts of 'espoused theory' and
theory-in-use' identified by Argyris and Schon (1974):
'When someone is asked how he would behave under certain
circumstances, the answer he usually gives is his espoused theory
of action for that situation. This is the theory of action to which he
gives allegiance and which, upon request, he communicates to
others. However, the theory that actually governs his actions is his
theory-in-use, which may or may not be compatible with his
espoused theory; furthermore, the individual may or may not be
aware of the incompatibility of the two theories.' (1974:7)
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The 'espoused' theory is the rationale for the establishment of audit committees,
despite the lack of evidence that they 'work' as intended in achieving their
programmatic purpose: the 'theory-in-use' underpins the ways in which
participants make audit committees 'work' to achieve their individual objectives.
Meyer and Rowan noted that the ceremonial practice adopted — in Power's terms,
the programmatic solution (Power, 1997) - is not directly linked to the practice
within the organization and may indeed conflict with such practice. This
divergence echoes the contradiction in interviewees' accounts between the
critical view of the audit committee as exemplified in Cadbury, and the
appreciation of its practical use. Meyer and Rowan (1977) use the notion of
decoupling to explore the gap between the ceremonial and the practical.
Decoupling is supported by 'the logic of confidence':
`..committed participants engage in informal coordination that,
although often formally inappropriate, keeps technical activities
running smoothly and avoids public embarrassments. In this sense
the confidence and good faith generated by ceremonial action is in
no way fraudulent. It may even be the most reasonable way to get
participants to make their best efforts in situations that are made
problematic by institutionalized myths that are at odds with
immediate technical demands' (1977:358-9)
The concept of decoupling offers a partial explanation of how the gap between
audit committee rhetoric and practice is managed. For example, how can a
committee meeting for approximately two hours three or four times a year
adequately exercise the internal control functions envisaged by Cadbury? One
might expect the audit committee to have a significant impact on the operation of
the internal audit function in fulfilling these requirements. Yet at Hobson plc no
internal audit function existed or was thought to be necessary by Michael
Turnbull, the deputy chairman, despite his assertion that the Hobson audit
committee was a Cadbury exemplar. When asked if an internal audit department
existed at another company where he chaired the audit committee, Michael
Turnbull responded: 'I don't know — there may be one.' Other interviewees
reported no change in the day-to-day activity of internal audit as a result of audit
committee activity: indeed, Bernard Seaton at Runic would have welcomed such
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evidence of a proactive audit committee. Robin Dunston at Scrimshaw valued the
audit committee as an enabling device — 'a lever' — and appreciated the direct
access to the board afforded by its existence and reporting requirements but
indicated that he spent much time 'educating' audit committee members, 'I'm
not sure I've yet got them quite to understand the range of work we cover', and
this perspective was shared with Simon Middleton at Glengarry. Although these
internal auditors report to the audit committee, there is a clear sense in their
accounts of this relationship that in practice that they are 'calling the shots' rather
than the committee: on one internal control issue Robin Dunston observed: 'I
think we came up with a solution before they asked'. It is possible that closer
links between the ceremonial performance of audit committees and the practical
implementation of internal audit procedures do exist and/or may develop but
within this study a significant decoupling has been identified.
5.6 The audit committee meeting as a 'centre of translation':
problematisation
Within the audit committee meeting participants are able to problematise issues
and use particular features of the meeting process as interessement and enrolment
devices to achieve individual objectives.
The use of the audit committee and its activities as a lever was a metaphor used
by Robin Dunston, the internal auditor at Scrimshaw: 'In some ways it [the audit
committee] is a nuisance — on the other hand, it's another lever I can pull..'
One benefit of audit committee establishment asserted within the literature is the
raising of the profile of the internal audit function (see, for example, Charkham,
1989:13) and it was evident that internal auditors interviewed particularly valued
audit committee support and sought to be proactive in achieving it, sometimes
through 'educating' audit committee members:
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'I'm not sure I've yet got them quite to understand the range of
work we cover, the sorts of things we come up with and how its
progressed in the business and they're almost taking a simplistic
view....it's a little more shaded and complicated than I think
perhaps they think at the moment. I'm mulling this over — perhaps
I need to get the chairman off line and run him through a few
audit reports...' (Robin Dunston, Scrimshaw)
One issue raised at Runic, Scrimshaw and Glengarry was the difficulty in
establishing the 'control culture' of the acquiring company within a foreign
subsidiary and the useful role the audit committee could play in this. At
Scrimshaw, Robin Dunston described the problems of introducing the company's
approach to controls in foreign subsidiaries, observing that it was difficult for
him to go in and tell them 'how to do internal audit':
`..the fact that I can translate what they [the audit committee]
think into other companies has helped.'
At Runic, Bernard Seaton reported to the audit committee that:
`..at [subsidiary company] there had been a refusal to admit access
to Corporate Internal Audit. This situation could not be accepted
and the matter would be followed through by the [Runic]
representative on the [subsidiary company] audit committee. The
recent change at managing director level at [subsidiary company]
should present a renewed opportunity to resolve this issue.'(Runic
audit committee minutes)
Bernard Seaton hoped that the fact that the audit committee had formally
recognised the existence of this problem would emphasise its importance to the
management of the subsidiary company and allow his team to undertake their
normal work.
At Glengarry, Alex Anderson explained:
`.. there are certain big issues arising from big reorganisations in
other countries., the audit committee has pushed ....to ensure that
management would never lose sight of the fact that those were the
very big risk areas. In [subsidiary company] we had a billion
pounds invested but didn't have much idea of what was going on
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so the audit committee could push and push for more efforts by
management, however much it might upset the [subsidiary
company management], to dig in and try and find out more of
what was going on.'
The context of these comments suggests that in this instance the audit committee
was perhaps being used to undertake executive responsibilities. Glengarry had
passed through a significant crisis some years previously. During the
management changes effected to resolve the crisis, Martin Johnson, the current
audit committee chair, had been brought in as the company's finance director. He
had previously had a high profile career as a finance director and was proud that
he had established audit committees long before the publication of the Cadbury
Code:
'I've always been a finance director who likes to have a proper
structure in place - I formed an audit committee at [company ]
when I became the first finance director there that they'd ever
had... If I was having difficulty in pushing through the control
culture they [the audit committee] would take it on board and
support it.'
He expressed the belief that the finance director's role was closely linked to that
of the audit committee:
'It's sometimes forgotten that the finance director of a big
sprawling multinational group himself is actually the most
independent person - he's not actually in operations at all, he is
effectively the chairman and chief executive's right hand to make
sure you keep everybody honest.'
It was clear that he had found it difficult to detach himself from the activities of
the finance function, although he claimed that the board supported these close
links:
'About that time they also appointed a very young finance director
so I was asked to act as a sort of mentor.'
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Simon Middleton, the internal auditor, expressed the view that this blurring of
role contributed to what he described as the 'rather tense relationship' between
Martin Johnson and the company chairman which was played out in audit
committee meetings.
The Glengarry stories demonstrate ways in which audit committee participants
may seek to 'use' the audit committee as a lever by problematising and drawing
attention to specific issues. Although the rhetoric of the audit committee,
expressed in Cadbury, offers a picture of an independent group, identifying and
pursuing issues autonomously, the audit committee is dependent on finance
directors and internal auditors for information and it is unlikely to operate in such
detached isolation. However, as the situation at Glengarry illustrates, there may
be grey areas where the audit committee may be drawn into executive functions.
Audit committee members may be aware of this, as Henry Morton indicated:
'One of the problems there has been with [Runic] is that they are
so keen to do the right thing that you could easily find yourself in
the situation that you weren't non-executive, that you were
executive - where one's been invited into some discussions .. I
think at one stage I actually said to [the company chairman] 'I
really don't think that I should be on that committee, it sounds a
little bit like an executive committee to me' and you can lose your
objectivity and you become involved with the decision and what
you should be doing is not taking the decision but vetting the
decision. It's difficult ground this - one which an accommodating
management, wishing to do the right thing, occasionally can go
too far in one way I think.'
As audit committees develop, these grey areas may increase. Clearly defined
terms of reference may help but there is a sense here that audit committees are
being moved on by participants into a different role which may focus less on the
issues for which Cadbury so strongly recommended them. This underlines the
divergence of participants' views on the appropriate role for the audit committee
and renders the assessment of 'effectiveness' even more difficult.
These accounts indicate examples of issues problematised by participants. The
network formation which follows successful problematisation is facilitated by a
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range of potential interessement and enrolment devices, which participants are
able to utilise. Such devices include:
• the documentation associated with meetings (agenda, minutes and
information supplied to committee members)
• logistical factors such as timing, location, numbers of people present
• 'conventions' of behaviour (Maddick and Pritchard, 1958) such as language
(e.g. use of company-specific acronyms) and seating arrangements.
These are the components of the ceremonial of audit committee meetings: they
give a structure to the process which both enables the meeting to take place and
defines its parameters. They act as constraints on spontaneity. They are all within
the control of specific participants. Their use will be explored in detail in chapter
6.
This chapter has examined the role of the audit committee from an ANT
perspective, exploring the use of the ceremonial performance of the audit
committee meeting as an interessement and enrolment device both outside and
inside the company. It has demonstrated that the meeting also acts as a centre of
translation, allowing participants to problematise issues. The concept of
decoupling has been suggested as an explanation for the gap identified between
participants' criticism of the audit committee rhetoric and their support for audit
committees in practice. The next chapter identifies further indications of
decoupling as it explores the performance in the audit committee meeting,
examining how participants make use of the ceremonial components of the
meeting to strengthen their own networks. These processes of translation make
the audit committee 'work' for them, irrespective of achievement of the Cadbury
objectives.
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Chapter 6: The ceremonial components of the audit committee meeting
In chapter 5 the audit committee meeting was viewed as a centre of translation,
an arena for the creation of further networks among audit committee participants,
in which the ceremonial components of the meeting are used by participants as
interessement and enrolment devices. The ceremonial components of audit
committee meetings were categorised into three areas: documentation, logistics
and conventions of behaviour. This chapter examines the use of these
components in more detail.
6.1 Meeting documents: the supply of information
The documentation associated with meetings — agendas, information supplied for
discussion at meetings and minutes - is circulated to audit committee members,
other participants and the remaining members of the board (who are normally
entitled to attend audit committee meetings if they wish). All of these documents
may be used as interessement and enrolment devices by participants.
The agenda and minutes have a formal role in the conduct of a committee, giving
structure to its proceedings and providing a formal record of its business. The
committee's terms of reference will define the scope of its activities at a broad
level: the agenda of each meeting constrains the consideration of specific issues
within a particular time frame. For example, a very crowded agenda may impose
pressures on the committee that limit full debate and this constraint may be used
to the advantage of particular participants. The audit committee agenda acts as a
vehicle for problematisation. The agenda is formally prepared by the company
secretary (usually the secretary to the audit committee) on the basis of
discussions with other participants, usually the finance director and the audit
committee chair, sometimes also the chief executive, the company chairman and
the internal auditor.
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At Scrimshaw and Glengarry , the finance directors emphasised a team approach in
answer to the question 'Who prepares the agenda for audit committee meetings?'
`..really a combination of myself, the secretary - pulling things out
of the previous minutes et cetera, and obviously the internal audit
manager, he's important, picking up any points between the three
of us..' (Chris Tracker)
'The agenda is actually approved by the chairman of the audit
committee and normally would be prepared by the group
company secretary who attends and would take the minutes of the
meeting so he'd prepare the agenda in terms of input to that
agenda and then I would put forward what I think should go onto
it and the head of group audit would - there are a number of
standing items we cover any way and the chairman would review
and may add or delete as he thinks appropriate, I mean, all this
with discussion with us, do we want to - at the end of the day do
we need to talk about this, should it be on ?' (Alex Anderson)
Both Chris and Alex were keen to stress that they did not take sole responsibility
for agenda preparation. At Runic, the balanced provision of information was
emphasised:
'You can manipulate it [the meeting]- for example, I do the
agenda and that's probably the most powerful single tool...I
would say that was principally the way that one would control it
and the other way is talking to the chairman beforehand, getting
your point of view across because people tend to agree with you
when you talk to them so you can if you like lead to a conclusion
or emphasise one particular point of view. Counter balanced to
that I think and in our case it's a pretty powerful counterbalance is
that the auditors produce a memorandum to the audit committee
which deals with the numbers in the accounts, deals with
presentational matters, SSAPs 1 and so on ... although I play a part
in that as well and they take that through the chairman and the
chief executive before its published. None the less, if they're
strong enough that's a parallel source of information going in to
the audit committee and it deals with the salient points so ..I can't
exclude items because they're there and the auditors are saying
'Look these are the important points' so I can't really belittle them
either so, yes, you can manipulate it or control it to some extent
but there are checks and balances, at least there are in our case.'
(Max Tinker)
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The words 'manipulate', 'control' and 'counterbalance' and the phrase 'if they're
strong enough' convey a sense of two groups — the executive directors and the
external auditors — competing to enrol the audit committee members through the
use of information. The complexities of such competition within the audit
committee arena are explored in more detail in the case of Runic in chapter 7.
While emphasising the independent input of the external auditors, Max Tinker
indicated that this input is subject to discussion with company executives before it
is presented to the audit committee. Indeed, he highlighted the importance of such
interaction in the development of the written information: `..people tend to agree
with you when you talk to them so you can if you like lead to a conclusion or
emphasise one particular point of view'.
A similar procedure was outlined by Alex Anderson at Glengarry:
`..the auditors wouldn't submit a paper without making sure that
the facts in it have been agreed by us, otherwise you get into
dreadful trouble about things that seem totally irrelevant as far as
the directors are concerned, but you've got to have accurate
information. But there's no stopping people asking questions or
making particular points so you know they are quite good from
that point of view ..'
Alex did not provide an illustration of the 'dreadful trouble' that was avoided
through this process. The final sentence of this extract seems to indicate a certain
defensiveness: all the information provided to the committee has been approved
by the information 'gatekeepers' — who thus constitute an obligatory passage
point — so that the important direct link envisaged by Cadbury between the audit
committee and the external auditors has been circumvented. However, Alex
indicated that committee members are still able to question the information
providers. The role played by the questioning procedure is discussed more
extensively in chapter 8.
I Statements of Standard Accounting Practice
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Chris Tracker was emphatic about the objectivity of the information supplied:
'I also ensure that the information that's available is factually
correct and not pruned so I don't go around saying we can't talk
about that, take that out or anything like that.. basically you make
sure that everyone's informed when you go into the meeting.:
These accounts emphasise the objectivity and accuracy of the information
supplied to the audit committee and a balanced approach representing all points
of view. However, the provision of information does not guarantee that
committee members will use it appropriately. The actual use made of this written
information was not made clear by interviewees, although they expressed the
view that NEDs were required to absorb a great deal, particularly the audit
committee chair. Max Tinker suggested that members might not make very
effective use of the written information supplied:
`..other members of the audit committee probably just turn up on the
day having leafed through the papers.'
As Henry Morton pointed out:
`.. there's a lot of reading to be done before, particularly in Runic
I think because some of the issues are fairly complex, complex
both from the financial angle in terms of currencies, that sort of
thing, and in understanding some of the technicalities and the
industry, I mean a non exec can never really understand the real
intricacies of the industry, all he can do is to get, you know, a
general picture .... it requires quite a lot of deep study to
understand. Even then you know what you hope you understand
and you remember until the next audit committee meeting and
then you find yourself doing the homework all over again - very
difficult to retain it when you sort of come at it from time to time
rather than live with it continuously.., there is an accumulation of
knowledge from each board meeting of course.'
Henry's account supports the argument for continuity of audit committee
membership achieved through lengthy service, as opposed to the position taken
by commentators such as PlRC 2 who argue that long service compromises
2 Pensions Investment Research Consultants Ltd: see <http://www.pirc.co.uk .>
independence. This is discussed further in chapter 8.
Interviewees emphasised the importance of having one audit committee member
with a financial background who could interpret the more technical areas:
'You also need someone who is frankly the sort of person who
will read all the papers very carefully, you know there's no doubt
that the finance guy will read the detailed notes to the accounts
and think through the implications and connotations of what's
said in a way that's different to somebody who hasn't got that
finance background' (Alex Anderson)
Information provided for discussion at the meeting is usually extensive.
'They don't tend to complain about lack of information, we have
executive committees about twenty times a year as well as the
board meetings and they get all the papers for those....what's
interesting I find is that ... every meeting I try to cut it down so
they don't have too much and they always seem to want more and
more, the non-execs, and that's all about the control issues, the
non-execs needing to realise what their responsibilities are ..we do
a management summary which has an appendix which is all about
all the detail behind, which had to be done to build it up anyway,
for internal distribution - once it has gone through the committee I
can send it round to the executive directors so that they could then
see what was going on in their respective areas - so the
management summary simply went out with 'If you like, a more
detailed summary is available' and all of them asked for it.' (Chris
Tracker at Scrimshaw)
'I suppose with us there's probably too much information in this
business and the history you know following [the company crisis]
was to produce huge great books to make sure every number
could be reconciled every which way.... we're not short of
information, we do produce a lot of quite lengthy reports certainly
in terms of the financial statements, there is a lot of information.'
(Alex Anderson)
These comments suggest that audit committee members derive some comfort
from the volume and extent of the information supplied. Max Tinker explained
how his experience as a non-executive director had influenced the quality of
information provided at Runic:
'I actually think if you have a non executive position it helps
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because you can see it from the other side - you get a different
perspective and see what your own non execs are doing... I've
tended to give more of the argument rather than just sort of state
what it is we're looking to do. Perhaps a large investment or
something so 'Here's the investment, the recommendation is that
we go ahead', that's fine if you know the background to it and
you've probably argued a couple of papers internally but for a non
exec there's a big gap in the middle which is 'Well, tell us the
options, where's the calculations?' and so on, so it's had that sort
of effect on me. It may not be a wholly desirable effect for the non
exec because it means more and more paper.'
Max's experience thus helped him to make more effective use of information as
an enrolment device at Runic.
Minutes of audit committee meetings are formally prepared by the company
secretary but the finance director often has considerable influence:
'I also clear the minutes although the secretary of the company is
the secretary and clears the minutes with the chairman - none the
less, I intervene partly to see that they're factual because you
know it's hard work writing minutes and, if you're not financial,
it's even harder work doing audit committee minutes.. '(Max
Tinker)
Max's considerate assistance for the company secretary would presumably also
allow him the opportunity for judicious amendment where he believed it to be
necessary.
The minutes are the main channel of report to the main board. Interviewees
reported that recommendations were likely to be accepted with little comment:
board members are generally happy to delegate the issues that form the audit
committee's terms of reference. Max Tinker commented:
'People get bored and drift off frankly and sort of you know
essentially I think people would say 'Why the hell don't we leave
this to the members of the board who know what it's all about'.
105
Alex Anderson observed:
`..you can't spend board meetings going through stuff the audit
committee has already been through.'
- although the issue at Runic which is examined in detail in the next chapter did
lead to extensive board discussion.
This contrasts with the findings of Samuels, Greenfield and Piper (1996) who
observed in their study of the role of NEDs after Cadbury that `..a number of
main board executive directors now felt they were being by-passed on audit
matters' (1996:12) However, interviewees in this study indicated that members
of the board rarely exercise their option to attend audit committee meetings. At
Scrimshaw, Chris Tracker observed:
`..they tend to only attend when they're invited ... they don't tend
to come along - they see the non-execs at the board and if they've
got any issues - subsequent discussions, they can raise them
there.'
These accounts indicate that, where the 'gatekeeper' who controls access to the
information needed for audit committee deliberation is also influential in
preparing the agenda and the minutes, that individual can then become an
obligatory passage point, with the opportunity of enrolling audit committee
participants to achieve the objectives problematised. The power of the finance
director as the usual gatekeeper is very significant, although balanced to some
extent by external auditors' reports and commentaries, the questioning role of the
non-executive audit committee members (discussed further in chapter 8) and the
'strength of character' of the chairman, as indicated by Max Tinker:
`... it depends upon the strength of the chairman of the audit
committee - by and large, because audit committees are comprised
of non executive directors and they turn up on the day and use their
knowledge and background, if you like, rather than perhaps having
played a big role in between audit committee meetings, the
chairman of the audit committee should, I think, be more active and
hence talk to the finance director and so on, so, you know, it
depends who is the stronger character really..'
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Documented meeting information is thus extensive (possibly leading to
information overload, possibly not read in detail by all audit committee
members) and controlled by the finance director and other participants (even the
material provided by the external auditor is discussed beforehand with the
information `gatekeepers'). It may be quite technical and require interpretation
by a finance expert. There is an expectation that this written information will be
explored and possibly extended by audit committee members through
questioning. The skills and personal qualities of the NEDs are clearly crucial —
they need to be able to interpret the information, identify areas where it is
inadequate or needs further explanation, and seek to fill such gaps through
intelligent questioning, understanding the adequacy of the responses.3
The practical value of such information as support for rational argument is also
augmented by its symbolic nature. Feldman and March (1981) discussed the
symbolic use of information in organisations. They observed:
'The gathering of information provides a ritualistic assurance that
appropriate attitudes about decision making exist. Within such a
scenario of performance, information is not simply a basis for
action. It is a representation of competence and a reaffirmation of
social virtue. Command of information and information sources
enhances perceived competence and inspires confidence'
(1981:177)
There is certainly a sense in interviewees' accounts that audit committee
members derive reassurance from the provision of extensive information: the role
of this 'ritualistic assurance' will be further explored in chapters 8 and 9.
6.2	 Meeting logistics
The setting for the audit committee meetings in the companies in this study was
normally the board room or an equivalent. In some cases numbers attending may
be significant. At Harrier, for example, Roy Milford described the logistical
3 Lee and Stone (1997) demonstrated a gap between the potential capabilities of audit committee
members as suggested by their previous experience, and the capabilities needed to fulfil audit
committee responsibilities and DeZoort (1997, 1998) extended this work.
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problems of large numbers of attendees:
' ... the room where we are sitting - this room isn't big enough for
our audit committee - we open it up - we bring that table in there
which is the same as these two so we have three of these
tables... so we have in the room five auditors, three non -execs,
two company secretaries, two from finance, the poor creatures
who are being done over, Keith [his deputy] and me, three
internal auditors and JJ [Jeremy James, deputy chairman].. [so] we
need a big room! That was who came to the last audit committee
meeting - one of the internal auditors won't come again so we're
down to two, so we'll be down to fifteen, the company secretary I
think we can stop coming so we'll be down to fourteen - it's quite
impossible to see how to reduce it from there.... When I've
suggested to [the audit committee chair] in the nicest possible way
that we've only got to tell a couple of these people not to come
and they won't, she won't hear of it - she thinks it's me being
devious and trying to keep someone out..'
The number attending may be a constraint on audit committee activities but is, to
some extent, within the control of the audit committee chairman. The comment
quoted above indicates that at Harrier, the chairman did not agree to the finance
director's suggestion of reducing the numbers attending: although Roy Milford
expressed the view that she saw these numbers as some sort of protection against
possible manipulation by him, it is possible that the large number attending may
in fact act to the advantage of the finance director. Bailey (1977) discussed the
effect on committee behaviour of large numbers: he noted that effective
operation may be limited by physical constraints of space, by the difficulty of
organising sensible debate and compromise among a large number and by the
need to simplify information. He observed that:
`..as you multiply the numbers present, so also you multiply the
chances of including stupid people, opinionated people,
unreasonable people and destructive people.' (1977:63)
He also noted that 'by increasing the size you increase temptation to pay
attention to an audience'(1977:63) - participants may be tempted to 'play to the
gallery'. Conversely, the size of the group could be intimidating to someone
wishing to raise controversial issues. At Harrier, the finance director effectively
controlled the agenda, the minutes and the information provided to the
committee, exercising considerable influence. The audit committee chair lived in
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New York, flying in for board meetings: Roy Milford explained that he usually
met her in a car at Heathrow and briefed her on the journey into London. Lack of
frequent communication with the audit committee chair might however be a
handicap in terms of interessement and enrolment. Max Tinker pointed out the
advantages of
' ... talking to the chairman beforehand, getting your point of view
across because people tend to agree with you when you talk to
them so you can if you like lead to a conclusion or emphasise one
particular point of view.'
Where audit committees had been established for a longer period of time,
interviewees reported regular contact with the audit committee chair, as at
Glengarry:
`[Martin] certainly puts in a lot of time and is available for us to
consult outside audit committee meetings anyway so if there are
things that we're particularly concerned about we'd actually speak
to him... we have operations in a number of countries with soft
currencies, you know, just thinking through how we manage our
exposures in those countries, I mean, so there's actually been
quite a lot of correspondence with him, either on the phone or in
writing on exactly what we ought to do in those areas so that's an
example of where we've had the benefit of his input outside the
formal audit committee. We always have meetings ahead of audit
committee meetings to take him through the papers and to brief
him on what the issues are and to give him the opportunity to ask
questions about issues he would want to raise outside - the very
detailed technical questions..' (Alex Anderson)
As previously noted, Martin Johnson was perhaps more closely involved in such
deliberations than would normally be the case. There is however no doubt that
the channels of communication between audit committee participants play a
central part in the provision and use of information by the committee and this
supplements the written documentation which may indeed be ceremonial in
format and presentation.
Another important logistical factor relates to the timing of the audit committee
meeting in relation to the main board meeting. The difficulties of synchronising
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the diaries of busy people suggest that the most practical time for the audit
committee to meet is immediately before the main board meeting - as Bob
Cunningham, put it: 'The audit committee meeting is adjacent to the main board
meeting because the chaps are there'. However, in some companies, this was
found to be an unacceptable constraint. Chris Tracker described changes made at
Scrimshaw:
'... [audit committee meetings] always take place a few days
before so that if there are any issues they can be picked up and
dealt with before the main board meeting. To be honest when I
started here the audit committee chair then, because he was
extremely busy - one of these active non execs with lots of
appointments - he used to quite like having it in the morning like
nine o'clock, the board starts at ten, something like that, but after
about two years we began to realise that it was totally impractical,
we didn't get the assurance that we needed if there were issues - I
couldn't rush out in two minutes and get the answer. So now you
know they tend to be on - it depends on the time and what it is - if
it's the year end that you're worried about or the half year, you
can't have it weeks before because you haven't got the results to
look at, you know, so they tend to be Monday, I mean the next
one's Monday with the board on Thursday, but it depends on
diaries as much as anything..'
At Glengarry, however, Alex Anderson reported:
`[the audit committee] meeting tends to happen on the evening
before the main board though that's not always the case. Broadly
what we have is three definite meetings per year then there's the
fourth if necessary in December and they're normally timed at the
convenience of the non executives and it so happens that the
evening before the main board is fairly convenient.'
The lack of a time gap was not perceived as a problem and he explained how
unresolved audit committee issues would be dealt with:
'..the chairman of the audit committee reports to the board on
matters discussed at the audit committee meeting and he would
clearly report that there was a particular subject that, you know,
he'd obviously explain the background et cetera and then say
'This is what action is going to be taken in respect of that item,
I'll report further whenever'..'
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Max Tinker commented on the Runic practice of leaving a gap of several days
between the two meetings:
'From our point of view within the company it's advantageous -
first of all, if there are changes and there might be a change for
example to the dividend recommendation, so if there are changes
and there's often changes in the drafting not necessarily in the
numbers or the notes but in the chairman's report so it enables us to
print those and get a book proof to the board if it's the finals anyway
so really it's giving us a little gap. Also it enables us to produce the
minutes so that the full board have the minutes of the audit
committee meeting and the chairman of the audit committee time to
think what he's going to report. Now all those things are possible in
24 hours or overnight but they're more comfortable [when there is a
gap] ... [When the board meeting immediately follows the audit
committee meeting] that has the advantage that everything's fresh in
your mind and you can talk about it and so on but it is under
pressure, there's no doubt and more pre-preparation is therefore
necessary. And something like the case I was talking about, the
contingent liabilities treatment or presentation'', really I mean we'd
just have regurgitated the same arguments if the one meeting had
followed the other very quickly whereas we were able to go away
and to produce new arguments, or arguments we'd forgotten
anyway!'
A time gap thus works to the advantage of participants providing information.
However, audit committee members and chairs interviewed did not comment on
this.
Collier (1992:81) observed that the average audit committee meets for a total of
seven hours each year. Given the range of activities the committee is expected to
undertake, it is clear that much important activity must take place outside the
meeting and that the meeting itself must be tightly structured to ensure that all
business is attended to. At Glengarry, Alex Anderson outlined the year:
' ... we've got meetings in March, May, September and there may
or may not be one in December. The March one would be
primarily about the year end results, May would be about internal
controls - things like control over pension funds and ... we would
4 Discussed in detail in chapter 7
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discuss the delegation of authorities and consider whether any
changes were necessary and then September - internal control
would be primarily - there'd be the [external auditor] internal
control report ... and final [external audit] fees - September would
be audit strategy ... last time round we actually did group audit
plans and obviously the interim statement and possibly accounting
developments though if we know we're going to have a meeting
in December we do that then as well .. and accounting
developments would include any new financial reporting
standards, anything of relevance from the Auditing Practices
Board of that sort of nature and we'd also pick up if we were
looking to change a particular accounting policy which is
unlikely, but if circumstances had changed, we'd cover that at that
stage and get audit committee approval, so those are the key
areas.'
This is a significant amount of business and, in a year when a number of
accounting and/or auditing standards might be issued, audit committee members
would be required to assimilate a daunting amount of information.
The structure and timing of meetings form part of the ceremonial of audit
committee meetings and are set by participants: they can operate to the advantage
of particular individuals or groups. They may inhibit spontaneity: despite the
insistence of interviewees on the atmosphere of open discussion with the
opportunity for members to ask questions, such questioning is only enabled
within specific constraints. As Moore and Myerhoff (1977) observed:
'Ritual discourages inquiry, not only because it presents its
material authoritatively, as axiomatic. It is itself a message stated
in a form to render it unverifiable, separate from standards of truth
and falsity... ..formality as such often conveys an element of
presented certainty.' (1977:22)
6.3 Conventions of behaviour
The ceremonial nature of meetings is further underscored by behavioural
conventions adopted by those present. Messages about the role and status of
participants are conveyed through seating arrangements, the use of language and
even dress code: Robin Dunston described the Scrimshaw audit committee
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meeting as 'jackets on rather than jackets off, if you know what I mean.' Such
messages are used as interessement and enrolment devices, emphasising the
situation of individuals as part of particular network groupings.
Maddick and Pritchard (1958,1959) studied local government committees and
asserted that:
'Like any other committee, they need a lead, and it makes a great
deal of difference who gives this lead. 5 This depends to some
extent on personalities but it depends chiefly on conventions,
which affect the part played by chairman, other members of
committees, and officers.'(1958:146)
Their study revealed considerable differences in practice among local
government committees which they ascribed to the adoption of conventions
influenced by local habit and characteristics: they were unable to generalise
about such patterns but emphasised the controlling influence of local conventions
in committee behaviour, noting for example that:
`..a newly appointed officer will tend to find a conventional code
has been woven around his position. The deviant officer is likely
to succumb to the pressure of custom..' (1959:139)
Similarly, Bailey (1983) commented on the integration of a new member into a
committee, noting that his/her behaviour was likely to exhibit either an
apologetic approach, acknowledging a lack of familiarity with the committee's
conventions, or an assertive approach demonstrating that the newcomer is a force
to be reckoned with. Conventions of behaviour may be communicated in
different ways according to the committee's stage of development. Bailey
divided the life of a committee into three periods - immaturity, adulthood and
senility - and suggested that communication 'codes' differ in each period. In an
immature committee:
`..messages are likely to be simple, unqualified and emphatically
delivered. They convey attitudes and feelings about people and
5 This is similar to the comment of Wheare (1955:229) that a committee must be 'wisely led and
wisely fed', quoted in section 2.3.
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things rather than information or plans to get work done.'
(1983:104)
The communication process becomes more refined during the 'adult' period,
although Bailey observed that this very refinement contributes to a certain
amount of ambiguity about messages conveyed: however, his view was that 'a
committee that has at its disposal a well-developed code is usually better able
than an immature committee to deal with real problems.' (1983:104) The final
senile stage is characterised by such extensive familiarity among members that
they
'have got to know each other so well that they think they can read
each other's mind; that it has all been seen and done before
anyway; that nothing is new, and therefore there is no point in
communicating with an external world.'(1983:104)6
While this continuum of development seems intuitively appropriate, Bailey noted
that every committee may not advance through these stages and also that the
behaviours of each stage may be exhibited in the same committee at the same
time.
The 'senile' stage is reached when the sophisticated code itself becomes a
symbol to the members of the committee. Committee 'ineffectiveness' is thus
associated with the immature and senile stages of development. The immature
committee is constrained by its simple code and what Bailey described as
'emotional posturing' - its main function is limited to 'letting off steam'. The
senile committee is similarly locked into `overcoding': the code itself has
become a ritual and the committee is unable to respond to external influences.
Bailey's analysis suggests that ritual is associated with the senile stage of
committee development where the committee becomes completely introverted:
'The committee meetings become ritual performances; no new
kinds of information are accepted because the received wisdom
comprises all that is needed; and the committee is incapable of
doing anything that it has not done before.' (1983:115-6)
6 The implications of this behaviour are explored further in chapter 9.
114
However this thesis argues that the ritual of the committee forms part  of the
communication that Bailey calls 'codes', rather than a demonstration of the level
of code used by the committee.
Many companies have their own internal language — acronyms which provide a
convenient linguistic shorthand and are also impenetrable to outsiders. Robin
Dunston observed that this reflected an aspect of the Scrimshaw culture, a 'need
to keep out the outsiders, once you understand you must be an insider by
definition'. Scrimshaw is still significantly controlled by members of its
founding family, one of whom had been an executive director some fifteen years
previously and had recently returned to the board as a non-executive. Robin
described how, at the first audit committee meeting the new NED attended, he
had asked for an explanation of all the acronyms currently in use — the other
audit committee members had appeared to be palpably relieved, having never
dared to ask. Robin also observed that at the Scrimshaw audit committee
meetings, the chairman was always addressed as 'Chairman', even by those who
would normally use his first name outside the meeting, and that everyone was
referred to by their initials where, again, first names would be used outside the
meeting.
Seating arrangements form another ceremonial component. Questions about
seating patterns were greeted with surprise by most interviewees who had clearly
never given this much conscious thought 7 . As noted in chapter 3, such questions
sometimes elicited differing answers from those attending the same meetings. At
Glengarry, Alex Anderson gave a detailed account, drawing diagrams:
'Do people always sit in the same places? I suppose no, though
it's changed over the last two years. The chairman would sit - I
mean it's a long oblong table so the chairman would tend to sit in
the seat that the chairman of any meeting tends to sit in, half way
down one side, back to the wall actually - I'll draw it for you.'
but Martin Johnson, the audit committee chair, expressed surprise at the question
7 It would have been interesting to observe whether the questions had any impact on their
behaviour at the next meeting.
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and wanted an explanation of its relevance before answering with a sketchy
description which did not match that of Alex.
Max Tinker described the potential for deliberate confusion of roles in a meeting
where additional attendees may well outnumber 'official' committee members:
'it's very interesting., here we had a chairman who ... believed he
was - and to a large extent he was - the only guy who knew about
the outside world, the City and so on - the rest of the board had
grown up in [Runic] ...... so he would not really allow anybody
to provide information outside the company, was very cautious
about what information was provided and chaired the audit
committee... so here was the chairman, executive, chairing the
audit committee, and it was quite clear that the finance director
wasn't on the audit committee but it was not quite clear who was
attending and who was actually on the committee... he then
became non executive and now felt that he was fully able to chair
the audit committee and did, but because he was chairman of the
board and the non execs owed their positions to him basically and
some of them for quite a long time, he dominated the meetings.
He then left and the guy who had been chief executive took over
as chairman and it's quite interesting to see where he sits - he
knows he's not on the audit committee but he sits on the side of
the table where the audit committee are and, just to confuse
matters, we've now got one member of the audit committee who
sits on the other side so it's very much a round table discussion
rather than a them and us, but it is very definitely them and us and
properly so in my view, but it's quite interesting, questions come
from all sorts of angles instead of just from across the table..'
Max, as a relative newcomer to the meetings, was clearly sensitive to the signals
sent by the seating arrangements and changes that he had noticed. Henry Morton's
account of the previous chairman and his own relationship with him was frank:
`.. he used to chair it [the audit committee], which was I suppose a
little bit naughty but I knew [him] quite well and I think when he
brought me in, he started the audit committee and although he
chaired it I think he did look to me to advise him, we were very
close so I think it worked alright but of course with the chairman
of the company also being chairman of the audit committee some
things could be steam-rollered through if one has to honest about
it..
but Henry indicated that the seating arrangements were unchanging, simply a
matter of long-standing habit:
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' [it's] a ritual at Runic - the chairman of the meeting always sits
with his back to the window right in the middle there, and the
chief executive if he's attending always sits dead opposite him
and the finance director to his right and the company secretary to
his left and so that rule in the broadest possible sense is followed
at the [audit committee] meetings - I just edge along and go into
the chairman's seat very tentatively 8 but otherwise people sit
where they normally sit [at main board meetings]. We try and
avoid an adversarial situation where the executives are sitting over
there you know because it isn't adversarial actually but [the
chairman of the company] is there, [the chief executive] is there
and Max is there of course.'
Henry did not indicate how the avoidance of an adversarial situation was
implemented: this would certainly require a recognition among those involved of
the subtle messages sent out by seating arrangements. No such concerns were
expressed at Scrimshaw:
'We have an oval board room table and - no, the chairman tends
to sit in different places. We tend to have if you like internal
people one side of this sort of curve, executives, non execs and
internal audit and then the auditors the other side.' (Chris Tracker)
At Harrier, Roy Milford's main concern (see section 6.2 above) was fitting all
those attending into the room, although he had observed a fairly regular seating
pattern, again reflecting the main board meeting pattern.
To some extent, observations about seating arrangements seemed to be linked to
status at the meeting: those attending the meeting who were not committee
members — finance directors and internal auditors, for example - seemed more
likely to observe in a detached way and provide apparently detailed description,
while some audit committee chairmen replied that they had never noticed, or
dismissed the question as an irrelevance. The chair of a meeting may have less
time to observe such detail, or may be very conscious of— even in control of -
8
The deferential 'very tentatively' is characteristic of much of Henry's story: for such a widely
respected and experienced company director, he was surprisingly self-deprecating. The possible
implications of this aspect of Henry's self-presentation are discussed in section 8.2.
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the messages sent by seating arrangements but not wish to indicate this in his
responses. The Runic stories were the clearest indication that seating
arrangements may be used to influence committee proceedings but neither
Bernard Seaton nor Ronald Roberts demonstrated any awareness of this in their
stories of the same meetings.
6.4 Ceremonial components as an indication of audit committee evolution
The characteristics of these ceremonial components permit a basic classification
of audit committee types which maps on to a similar continuum to that proposed
by Bailey through his analysis of communication codes, discussed in the
previous section. Audit committees may be characterised as either active or
passive. 9 Thus an active audit committee would probably have been established
pre-Cadbury, have developed its own clearly stated terms of reference, have
well-established channels of communication among participants and would meet
sufficiently in advance of the main board meeting to be able to deal with
complex issues before reporting to the full board. An active audit committee
would demonstrate a questioning approach, displayed in the tenor of meetings,
the level and type of communication among members outside meetings, requests
for information and recommendations to the main board. A passive audit
committee would probably have been established in response to Cadbury, using
the specimen terms of reference provided by Cadbury, and conduct relatively
brief meetings immediately prior to the main board meeting. A passive
committee would display a more submissive nature, content to be fed
information at meetings of a more overtly managed character. Thus the
'ineffective' audit committees described by interviewees in section 5.1 would be
characterised as passive. The evolution of audit committees along this continuum
is explored in more detail in Spira (1998).
The distinction between active and passive may also be linked to Meyer and
Rowan's concept of decoupling. Thus a passive audit committee would be part of
the ceremonial framework and would not be a part of the substantive company
This distinction is similar to that of Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) who distinguished between
mctximalist and minimalist boards.
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activity. In active mode, the audit committee appears to move closer to the
Cadbury exemplar and an integration of the programmatic and the technical.
However, in both modes the ceremonial of audit committee performance both of
and in meetings is of vital importance for external legitimation and internal
authority and the ceremonial components continue to act as interessement and
enrolment devices enabling participants to mobilise resources strengthen
networks to achieve their own objectives within the audit committee arena.
This chapter has explored the ways in which audit committee participants use the
ceremonial components of audit committee meetings — documentation, logistics
and conventions of behaviour — as interessement and enrolment devices to
strengthen networks around the audit committee and to achieve their objectives.
The next chapter identifies the emphasis in participants' stories on consensus and
demonstrates the formation and re-formation of networks and their role in the
achievement of consensus through an analysis of a specific issue which arose at
Runic plc.
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Chapter 7: Contention and consensus
The previous chapter examined the use of 'ceremonial components' of audit
committee meetings as interessement and enrolment devices by participants
seeking to strengthen networks. In this chapter, the process of network formation
and mobilisation is illustrated through an ANT analysis of the handling of a
contentious issue at Runic. This reveals varying models of relationships among
audit committee participants and highlights the shifting and fragmentary nature
of the networks which form around the audit committee. Participants' emphasis
on consensus as opposed to contention is explored and the importance of the
achievement of consensus from an individual and an organisational perspective
is discussed.
7.1. 'Looking for trouble': contentious issues
The concept of translation provides an appropriate framework for analysing the
ways in which audit committees operate because it recognises the dynamic
nature of the networks which connect audit committee participants both within
the specific areas of audit committee activity and among the wider networks
within which audit committee activity is located. By identifying 'moments of
translation' (Callon, 1986) and observing the sources of problematisation, the
means by which interessement and enrolment are effected and the outcomes of
mobilisation, we are able to see how networks form and re-form in response to
the further problematisations of contested positions.
To highlight these processes, 'contentious issues' were selected as a focus of
discussion. Contentious issues are here defined as issues on which differing
opinions are held by audit committee participants, for which resolution must be
achieved by some form of negotiation. The emphasis on conflict and contention
in ANT studies was noted in chapter 4: this linked to the metaphor of surprise
and ambush observed in participants' accounts and prevalent in both the
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academic and the practitioner literature on audit committees, such as this US
example:
'At the core of effective governance is the control environment or
culture of each enterprise. Culture is protected and nourished by
oversight activities that demand extraordinary strength to ward off
the multitude of threats encountered every day... While the
spectacular surprises often involve threats like fraud, employee
misconduct or errors of commission, governance control failures
can span a range of activities from uninformed strategic decisions
to inadequate actions taken to solve problems. A defensive
strategy includes effective oversight. When threats penetrate all
the defences, the perils to the enterprise can be
devastating.' (Warrick and Galloway, 1996:1)
An image of the audit committee as an arena for resolving contentious issues
may also be perceived in Cadbury:
Its sponsors were concerned at the perceived low level of
confidence both in financial reporting and in the ability of
auditors to provide the safeguards which users of company reports
sought and expected.'
- and one of the underlying factors was identified as:
`..competitive pressures both on companies and on auditors which
made it difficult for auditors to stand up to demanding
boards.'(Cadbury Committee, 1992:14)
The role of the audit committee is seen as central in raising confidence:
'Shareholders look to the audit committee to ensure that the
relationship between the auditors and management remains
objective and that the auditors are able to put their views in the
event of any difference of opinion with management.' (Cadbury
Committee, 1992:38)
The role of the audit committee in dispute resolution is also explored in the
academic literature. Knapp (1987) discussed the role of the audit committee in
the resolution of auditor-management conflict: he concluded that audit
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committees tend to support auditors in disputes with management but suggested
that this was related to the background of audit committee members, with
corporate managers tending to be more supportive of auditors than audit
committee members from other backgrounds. He also observed that the nature of
the dispute was relevant:
'Audit committee members were less likely to support the
auditor when the focal issue of a dispute was not the subject of
objective technical standards.' (1987:586)
A further factor was the financial health of the company:
'Audit committee members tend to be less supportive of the
auditor when the auditee is in strong financial
condition. '(1987:586)
Beattie et al (1996) examined interactions between auditors and directors; they
distinguished discussion from negotiation and suggested that:
`..audit committees are successful in reducing the confrontational
intensity of interactions between auditors and auditees (i.e. they
increase the level of discussion thereby reducing the level of
negotiation).' (1996:11).
However, they observed that further investigation of the process of negotiation
and conflict resolution is warranted since data derived from a postal
questionnaire survey does not permit this.
Previous research thus supports the notion of the audit committee as an arena
where contentious issues may be explored before referral to the main board but
this is not entirely consistent with the views expressed by participants
interviewed in this study. Without exception, interviewees preferred to shift the
focus from contention to consensus, effectively rejecting my own
problematisation. It was repeatedly suggested by interviewees that questions
exploring potential areas of contention were erroneously focused. The possibility
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of conflict arising from the NED role of monitoring fellow directors was
minimised and glossed over. Bob Cunningham was emphatic:
'You join a board because you are in sympathy with the aims of
the business and the people running it — you're not looking for
trouble.'
This perspective reinforces the image of a united band of audit committee
participants seeking to defend shareholders interests against the twin threats of
fraud and incompetence, confirming the Cadbury picture. It also allows
interviewees to present themselves as reasonable individuals, working as part of
a team, although the emphasis on positive consensual outcomes contrasts with
the accounts provided of audit committee inadequacy failure noted in section
5.1. Further issues arising from this re-problematisation by interviewees are
discussed in section 7.6 below where the importance and role of consensus is
assessed.
Contentious issues were viewed by interviewees as unusual. Most interviewees
had initial difficulty in identifying examples: with hindsight, they apparently
viewed audit committee activity as a seamless and unbroken process, with no
specific 'skirmishes' (Singleton and Michae1,1993). Max Tinker's comment was
typical:
'By and large we don't have many disagreements here. We
certainly don't have disagreements on things that people would
go to the post for..'
When offered hypothetical examples of issues that might be experienced as
contentious, such as accounting policy changes, some participants explained that
such matters would be dealt with at an informal level before developing into a
contentious situation. The locus of discussion would not be the audit committee
meeting. Accounting policies were negotiable although negotiation would
normally be conducted outside formal audit committee meetings:
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'We haven't yet had a disagreement between management and
the external auditors that's needed to go to the audit committee
but I don't think you'd expect to get in that sort of state.' (Chris
Tracker, Scrimshaw)
At Hobson, Michael Turnbull claimed initially that he did not understand the
concept of a contentious issue and finally asserted that if any did arise, they
would be dealt with before the audit committee met since 'no one would wish
them to be debated at length in the audit committee.' He used the expressions
'meeting of minds' and 'compromise' frequently but dismissed the idea of any
distinction between formal and informal communication among board members,
asserting that 'dialogue is continuous — the members of a board are colleagues
working to achieve the objectives of the company'. In the context of Hobson plc,
a company chaired and aggressively led by a dynamic and entrepreneurial
individual of international repute, Michael's emphasis on the board as team was
considerably at variance with the public image of the company.
Clearly, perspectives differ: one person's 'dispute' may be another person's
'reasoned debate':
`.. it depends what you mean by a dispute.. at the end of last year,
for example, there was a particular item in the accounts that we
decided to treat in one particular way - the auditors said the way
we're treating it is perfectly acceptable but there was another way
that they, on balance, would prefer. There was a discussion about
it and in the end we went down the road that we suggested, so I
mean you could call that a dispute but actually I would call it
raising an issue and having it properly debated and resolved
...... in the paper I wrote for the audit committee I made it quite
clear that there were two ways of dealing with this and that we
had chosen a particular way for particular reasons, there was no
question of ducking the issue with the audit committee by not
telling them or presenting the thing in a balanced way.' (Alex
Anderson, Glengarry)
This 'balanced presentation' is in itself an enrolment device: there is little scope
for audit committee meetings to open up the debate in the context of the time
available (at Glengarry, the audit committee normally meets on the evening prior
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to the main board meeting) and the apparent rationality of the arguments
presented may well inhibit debate.
There were, however, undeniable areas of tension. Such areas could be declared
'off limits' through established conventions of behaviour. For example, Roy
Milford was horrified at the prospect of the Harrier audit committee insisting on
changes to the financial reports:
`..what they tend not to do, thankfully, is say the accounts should
change.. they're not accountants and in the end I would find that
more than just painful..'
He amplified the last sentence by adding that the audit committee should back
me or sack me'.
More frequently, participants indicated that debate would take place outside the
audit committee meetings: the meetings would confirm that consensus had been
achieved and allow the audit committee chairman to report this to the main
board.
`..we've had lots of discussions about things like, you know,
presentation, directors' emolument presentation, and things like
that, but we've had those internally with the external auditors and
we've always reached again agreement and I've then presented it
in effect to the audit committee saying 'This is what we're
planning to do'..' (Chris Tracker, Scrimshaw)
'We do strive to try and make sure we resolve issues before they get
to the audit committee... in some cases there's a lot of debate
before the committee meeting... I've been in situations where
there have been issues which are arising and although you might
not directly meet with members of the audit committee, everyone
agrees that everyone ought to talk to everybody a lot before we get
to the audit committee and to make sure that everybody knows
where everyone's coming from because I mean purely because it
saves such a lot of time..' (Ronald Roberts, Runic/XYZ)
Such examples of substantive activity taking place outside the meeting provide
further evidence for the existence of decoupling, as noted in section 5.5.
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In other situations, a level of 'constrained dissension' demonstrated through
questioning acts as a confirming device and is tolerated and indeed turned to
advantage by participants, using it for interessement/enrolment. This is
illustrated in the discussion of consensus achievement at Runic which follows.
Bailey (1965) explored the distinctions between committees which arrive at
decisions on the basis of consensus and those which vote, grounding his
observations in his experience of Indian village councils and of university
committees. He examined the concept of consensus, suggesting that it has
considerable importance in decisions in communities where individuals have
multiple interactions with the same group of people and would be unable to
conduct their daily business if disagreement was widespread. However, he
distinguished between the expression or suppression of dispute and degrees of
readiness to compromise, observing that:
'An avoidance of open dispute does not necessarily mean a
readiness to compromise and to seek for unanimity; nor does plain
speaking, even abuse, automatically and always indicate
intransigence.' (1965:8)
Avoidance of open dispute may allow individuals to demonstrate their own
reasonableness and understanding of committee etiquette. However, in situations
where conflict will impede future action at the expense of all concerned, Bailey
suggested that compromise will be sought.
However, participants' accounts of audit committee activity do not focus on
decision-making: the role of the audit committee is couched in reactive terms.
The duties outlined in the specimen terms of reference included in Cadbury use
the words 'consider', 'discuss' and 'review' (Cadbury Committee, 1992:93) The
outcomes of such activities are limited to requests for information and referral to
the main board: the specimen terms of reference give the committee authority
only to investigate relevant matters and to seek external professional advice.
Within this framework, where does contention arise and how and why is it
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resolved into consensus? These questions are explored through an examination
of a specific issue of contention which arose at Runic. Tracing the 'moments of
translation' in this episode illustrates the formation and re-formation of networks
among audit committee participants and the use of interessement and enrolment
devices: the participants' views of the importance of consensus achievement are
also highlighted, offering insight into the use of consensus itself as an
interessement/enrolment device, a further network resource.'
7.2. 'How much should we tell them?': the problem of disclosure
At the core of controversy about financial reporting is the issue of disclosure.
The shift in the approach to financial reporting from stewardship to decision-
making (noted in chapter 1) has reinforced the view that increased disclosure of
information is beneficial for users of financial statements. The extent of
information disclosed has increased substantially in the last thirty years: the
accounting standard setting regime has had considerable success in this area.
However, problematic areas remain. Can the information be understood by
users? Is it relevant to users' needs? The balance between satisfying the
information needs of users at a reasonable cost while maintaining commercial
secrecy is a delicate one which fundamentally influences the selection of
accounting policies.
At Runic, certain financial guarantees associated with sales of specialised
products give rise to contingent losses which must be reported in a note to the
company's balance sheet. 2 These contingencies have traditionally been reported
In considering the Runic stories which follow, it is important to bear in mind that, although all
interviewees were asked directly about how any contentious issues were dealt with, it would not
have been appropriate under the condition of confidentiality to question them in detail with
reference to information revealed by a previous interviewee (although some would have liked very
much to know what other interviewees had revealed - and indeed did ask). This means that the
stories are inevitably incomplete, as a detailed picture of the handling of the issue was not offered
by every participant involved.
2 SSAP 18 defines a contingency as 'a condition which exists at the balance sheet date, where the
outcome will be confirmed only on the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain
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by Runic on a basis that reveals the net potential liability after deducting the
value of securities held against the guarantees offered. The securities take the
form of assets which are specialised technological items and may be unique:
external specialist valuers are employed, although the finance director described
the valuation process as 'a bit of black magic'. This suggests that although,
through conventional practice the valuer's technique and skills are effectively
'black boxed' (Callon and Latour, 1981), some doubt might exist about the
numbers produced, particularly from the perspective of accounting objectivity.
The valuation is itself a form of ceremonial which provides comfort': although
those involved in the process may well recognise its limitations in terms of
'objectivity', the process offers reassurance to the users of the company's
published accounts. An alternative method of reporting contingent losses would
be to report the gross potential liability, ignoring the value of the security.
A review of the Runic disclosure policy was prompted by two factors: decreasing
asset values reported by the external valuers and an increasing level of
contingent losses that were crystallising, due to customers encountering financial
difficulties during a period of recession. Members of the audit committee had
specific views on this issue, as Max Tinker reported:
`..one factor that is influencing us here quite a lot is that we've got
an American as a non exec and he is extremely conscious of the
threat of being sued, whereas we go along in happy oblivion really ...
and so he, for example, was all for gross disclosure because you
can't fault it - once you've done it you certainly can't go back and
you've given maximum disclosure, so he was all for that. We've got
a banker and what do bankers want? They want to know what your
exposure is, so he was for the gross as well..'
The minutes of the audit committee meeting held to discuss the draft accounts
for 1994 gave a hint of the problem:
future events. A contingent gain or loss is a gain or loss dependent on a contingency.' (ASC,1980,
para 14)
3 Power (1996) discussed the issues involved in reliance on independent professional expertise.
17R
In the area of sales financing, exposures were increasing due to
the continued fall in [the second-hand value of the assets used as
security] as advised by [the specialist valuers] and to the
movement towards taking direct funding risk rather than the more
traditional asset value guarantee risk. This required that the
necessary level of funding was available and gave impetus to the
need for a defined board policy and limits. [The company
chairman] believed that this was a situation which had to be
managed according to the strength of the [Runic] balance sheet'
(Runic audit committee minutes, February 1994)
The final sentence from the minutes extract indicates that the company chairman
was reluctant to move towards 'a defined board policy and limits' which would
require more detailed disclosure. He wished to 'manage the situation' with
regard to the expected level of crystallising losses in the context of the
company's ability to meet these demands. He clearly saw little value in spelling
out the detail of amounts which were unlikely to crystallise as losses: even
hidden in the notes to the accounts, this could have the effect of weakening the
balance sheet, sending signals to creditors and investors which might be
interpreted adversely, affecting the company's share price and its ability to raise
finance.
7.3. Competing networks: moments of translation
Here we see the beginning of the problematisation process. The audit committee
members identified the problem 4 - the need for an accounting policy change -
and raised the issue at the audit committee meeting. They were, however, faced
with opposition to policy change from the company chairman, as observed from the
minutes, and also from Max Tinker:
`..we have disclosed the net exposure as a potential contingent
liability for many years... The issue has now arisen as to whether we
4 The reason(s) why the audit committee chose to do this are not revealed. The audit committee
chair does not mention this issue at all. The American NED was seen by the finance director as
• promoting the change in disclosure policy and the FD offered a potential explanation alluding to
the NED's background. However it should be recognised that the unseen networks in which all the
audit committee members have been enrolled will have considerable influence here. In this respect
any ANT analysis is inevitably incomplete.
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should show the gross exposure and I have argued that we should
not, first of all because its a big number and will frighten people,
secondly because it's a meaningless number because it assumes that
the security has nil value and under no circumstances does it have
nil value, we're only talking about what value it does have.'
Two networks can now be identified: the non executive directors comprising the
audit committee, and the senior executive directors who already constitute a well
established grouping, as Henry Morton explained:
`..the responsibilities are shared between these three [chairman,
chief executive and finance director]- they are the dominant figures
in the policy making and there wouldn't be any one person
pushing the case, they'd be acting as a team collectively, there's
never any apparent difference of opinion between those three so
they've obviously talked it out themselves beforehand ..'
The impetus for policy change had, according to Max, been boosted by the
particular concern of the American non executive director who was used to the
more conservative approach of reporting the gross contingent loss figure required
under US accounting rules. In explaining this, Max emphasised that there are no
UK rules in this area:
'So that was a real case example where there's no ruling - if we had
to do US GAAP5 then we would have to disclose gross but under
UK GAAP we don't and we're not listed in the United States.'
Thus neither the audit committee network nor the executive director network
punctualised by Max Tinker was able to draw on any 'black box' in terms of ruling
or precedent.
Although Max Tinker and his executive colleagues believed that the existing
policy of net disclosure was appropriate, they recognised the increasing
'exposures' noted in the audit committee minutes and, in the context of plans to
5 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: see Davies et al (1997)
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raise additional equity finance, were prepared to provide additional information.
However, Max had argued strongly against gross disclosure, as noted in the
extract quoted above, and so a compromise solution was proposed - net disclosure
coupled with a sensitivity assessment. The current policy of net disclosure of the
potential loss would thus be amplified by an indication of how this figure would
change in relation to a change in the value of the security. Max Tinker explained
this:
'..we said 'OK, well here's our net figure - what would happen if
the value of the security fell by x per cent?' Twenty per cent was
the figure we chose and the potential exposure then becomes so and
so and that was the way we put forward our accounts.'
Each network was aiming to persuade the full board of its views, a final process
of enrolment and mobilisation which would result in the company's accounts
being prepared on the basis of the 'winning' accounting policy. The first target
for interessement and enrolment was the external audit team6 headed by Ronald
Roberts, who reported:
'..at Runic this year for instance there was a specific issue that came
up .. they [the audit committee] asked us for our specific advice on it
- they said 'What is your specific advice on this particular issue?'
Although no detailed account of the discussions is available, Max Tinker's account
indicates that the audit committee successfully enrolled the external auditor - but
that this enrolment was only temporary:
'The auditors wanted us to show the gross value but they'd actually
come off it and agreed with us that the net and the sensitivity was the
way to do it... the auditors said 'We were in favour of the gross
figure - it's very unusual to show sensitivity in accounts but we've
been persuaded." (Max Tinker)
6 In this study the external auditor interviewed was in each case the engagement partner (see
section 3.4) and is treated as a single individual, although clearly this individual represents the
simplification of a powerful network, including the partners of the audit firm and their associated
technical expertise and professional influence.
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Ronald Roberts did not indicate what advice was given to the audit committee - it is
not clear whether initial support from the auditors encouraged the members to
persist in their proposal or whether the executive network had already enrolled the
auditors before any advice was given to the audit committee. (The issue of the
external auditor's relationships with the networks is discussed in more detail below.)
Having enrolled the external auditor, Max also acted to enrol and mobilise the
'unseen armies' of the users of Runic's accounts:
'..the clinching argument was 'What is it that the shareholders and
the bankers and so on are interested in?' They're interested in what
happens if the value of the security falls and we're giving them a
benchmark, not a graph that shows all the way, but we're giving
them a pointer and that was the clinching argument - it certainly was
for me.'
Ronald Roberts' comment indicates that the company's bankers were indeed
consulted:
'[The audit committee] considered it themselves and the board
considered it and the bankers considered it and it was all to do with
disclosure but they wanted to make sure that they really had
everybody in the pot ....'
There is, however, no evidence that any attempt was made to determine
shareholders' requirements in this regard - for example, by discussion with
institutional shareholders. It is important to remember that all parties involved can
claim to represent shareholder interests — all directors are elected by shareholders
and the external auditors are employed to report to the shareholders.
The stronger network of the executive combined with the auditors then met again
with the audit committee and formally presented the compromise proposal:
`..the circumstances7 had highlighted the difficulties in predicting
liabilities under asset value guarantees given to customers as part of
a sales financing package. The continuing financial difficulties at
... [a customer] had led to a lot of discussion on the drafting of
note... [the contingent loss note] A revised note was tabled which
included a broad sensitivity statistic based on a 20% reduction in
second hand [asset] values. The alternative would be to give figures
for the gross contingency as well as the net; this was regarded as
potentially misleading because of the size of the figure which had to
be seen in relation to the spread of risk. Recognising the disclosure
requirements in connection with. .. 8, it was agreed that some further
disclosure was prudent, although this did not go so far as to require
the gross figures to be given.
[Ronald Roberts, the external auditor] confirmed that this
conformed with current accounting standards.
[A member of the audit committee] believed that giving the
sensitivity example produced a spurious speculative contingent
liability figure which could be arbitrarily misinterpreted. He
believed it might be better to give the gross figure coupled with
appropriate explanation.'(Runic audit committee minutes, March
1995)
As the last sentence indicates, the meeting was inconclusive: audit committee
members would not agree to the tabled note and Max Tinker was asked to prepare a
paper for the full board meeting setting out the pros and cons of each proposal, so
that the issue could be fully debated.
Max Tinker's account indicates that the executive network almost fragmented at this
point with some movement towards accepting the audit committee's view, perhaps
because they believed that the remaining members of the main board would be
enrolled by the non executive directors on the audit committee, and the argument
would be lost in a public and potentially damaging way.
In any event, it would appear that the chairman needed to use all his influence to
secure the desired outcome:
7 An example of a contingent loss which had crystallised, discussed in an earlier minute
8 A proposal to raise new finance for the company, discussed in an earlier minute
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'In the audit committee it was left that we would take it away and
think again which we did - our audit committee is approximately a
week before the board meeting - so we went away and thought about
it and we actually wavered and at one point in that week we were
going to disclose the gross but by the time we came to the board
meeting we were back on to the sensitivity so we had another debate
at the board meeting and in fact it's ended up with sensitivity. But
there's an issue - I mean, I can't say that all the directors agreed but
in that sort of circumstance I'm afraid the chairman's facing a
difficult task and I suppose he takes the majority.'(Max Tinker)
The board was finally enrolled by the executive network and the final accounts for
1995 carried a contingent loss note based on the net disclosure accompanied by a
sensitivity assessment.
Consensus may be defined as the situation reached when participants are prepared to
forsake their individual positions to enable the group to act with unanimity. It
implies that participants have reached a level of comfort where further debate is not
deemed necessary but it does not mean that all agree, only that all are at this point
prepared to set aside their differences in order to move forward together. In ANT
terms, consensus represents a conscious process of enrolment allowing the network
to be mobilised.
7.4. The network web: a network of networks?
These stories may be read as an illustration of an audit committee acting in
precisely the manner anticipated by Cadbury, demonstrating best practice in
implementing high standards of corporate governance. The audit committee, an
independent and forceful group, raised an issue of accountability and disclosure:
its concern was to ensure that users of the company's accounts should have
access to relevant and reliable information in an area where no clear legislative
or regulatory guidance existed. Although the view of the audit committee was
• ultimately rejected by the main board, the issues were openly debated. The
network represented by the finance director comprised the chairman and the
chief executive and the external auditor: these allies were enrolled on the basis of
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the finance director's argument that the audit committee approach was
unnecessarily conservative and could indeed be damaging - could 'frighten
people' - and the claim of this network to represent the best interests of the users
of the company's accounts.
No attempt was apparently made to influence the audit committee other than in
formal debate. Henry Morton did not discuss this specific example but contrasted
his experience at Runic with his experience of chairing an audit committee
elsewhere:
`..whereas in another company I know where there's a very very
aggressive - very pleasant but very aggressive - chairman who
has very determined ideas, he would, if he had a contentious
issue, have raised it with me several times before it ever got near
the audit committee by telephoning me, meeting me to do
whatever, so each has its own style - it depends upon the people.'
However, the stories are incomplete. Henry Morton, although happy to give more
detailed information about incidents relating to his equivalent position in other
companies in the past, would not be drawn on any specific issue relating to Runic.
The accounts given by Max Tinker and Ronald Roberts, together with careful
reading of the audit committee minutes, seem to indicate that he adopted a neutral
position during the events described.
Perhaps more crucially, we also have no information about the processes through
which the external auditor was influenced to change from one network to the other:
an important influence here may have been another network, less distinct than those
already outlined, linking the finance director, the audit committee chair and the
external auditor and revealed in the interviews with Ronald Roberts and with Henry
Morton.
Henry Morton had also chaired the audit committee of another company, Tiffin,
for many years. The auditors of Tiffin had more recently won the tender for the
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audit of Runic and Henry had a close working relationship with the audit team -
the same team for both companies. In discussing channels of communication
between audit committee participants, he observed that communication was
facilitated by these established relationships:
'I meet XYZ socially anyway and from time to time at other
meetings and other occasions., when we meet we have chats and
they would quite often ring me up about something.'
Ronald Roberts confirmed that these equivalent roles at Tiffin brought him into
contact with Henry Morton more frequently than might be the normal case. He
also revealed a friendly relationship with Max Tinker who had first joined Runic
(at a lower level) at the same time as Ronald became involved in the audit team:
`..we sort of grew up in that respect together so I got to know him
very well.. .we know each other sort of from a business and a
personal sense.'
It would appear that such relationships are not unusual: Hussey and Jack
(1995), in a study of the relationship between the finance director and the
auditor, reported that the most important characteristic influencing the
appointment of external auditors is the personal chemistry between the
finance director and the local audit partner. The consequent challenge to
auditor independence is discussed in more detail in chapter 8. Although
participants are quick to assert that such close relationships are essential to
the effective performance of their duties and are bounded by unwritten
codes of 'professionalism', it is not difficult to envisage a situation in which
the existence of such informal relationships might be used as
interessement/enrolment devices serving to undermine what appear
superficially to be sound corporate governance mechanisms. An alternative
reading of the Runic stories brings this less distinct network into the
foreground to examine its influence, with a particular focus on the role of
the external auditor.
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7.5 The network associations of the external auditor
The extensive literature on the 'expectation gap' (see, for example, Humphrey,
1997) underlines the ambiguity perceived in the role of the external auditor. The
auditor's report certifying that the company's accounts present a 'true and fair
view' is addressed to the members of the company (the shareholders) although
the auditor has no direct contact with this group. Formally appointed by the
shareholders at the annual general meeting, the auditor is effectively employed
by the company and, in order to undertake the duties of the audit role, must work
closely with company management. The possibility of adverse influence by
management, against the interests of the shareholders, is a fundamental
assumption of the agency model and is widely recognised in the literature on
auditor independence, although an alternative view has been suggested by
Wolnizer (1995) and by Grout et al (1994) , discussed in chapter 8.
The Cadbury Code reflects the view that auditor independence is fundamental to
sound corporate governance and recommends the audit committee as a safeguard
for this independence, enabling the non executive directors and the external
auditor to join together to support the interests of shareholders in the face of
pressure from the company executive. Section 5 (Cadbury Committee, 1992) sets
out the Committee's approach in detail:
'The central issue is to ensure that an appropriate relationship
exists between the auditors and the management whose financial
statements they are auditing. Shareholders require auditors to
work with and not against management, while always remaining
professionally objective...An essential first step must be the
development of more effective accounting standards. Accounting
standards provide important reference points against which
auditors exercise their professional judgement. Their position is
strengthened if standards do not allow alternative accounting
treatments.... A second step should be the formation by every
listed company of an audit committee which gives the auditors
direct access to the non-executive members of the board.
Shareholders look to the audit committee to ensure that the
relationship between the auditors and management remains
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objective and that the auditors are able to put their views in the
event of any difference of opinion with management.' (Cadbury
Committee, 1992:38)
From an ANT perspective, this identifies the external auditor as a punctualised
actor representing the shareholders and using the audit committee and the 'black
boxed' resources of the Cadbury Code and accounting standards to enrol
executive management.
In the context of these general assumptions about the role of the external auditor,
let us consider the situation as revealed at Runic. The contingent loss situation
outlined above is very specific to Runic and its particular customers and markets.
The accounting standard covering this area, SSAP 18, requires disclosure but
permits a wide range of possible approaches (Davies et al , 1997:1407), precisely
because of the recognition that companies are likely to differ widely in their
specific situation and that generalised rules may lead to inappropriate reporting
( an argument against accounting standards developed by Baxter, 1981). In this
case, therefore, the external auditor was required to exercise professional
judgement without the support of clearly stated guidance.
From the Cadbury perspective, we might expect the external auditor to support
the audit committee approach - the demand for the more conservative gross
disclosure - and, indeed, it is clear from Max Tinker's account that this was the
first position:
'The auditors wanted us to show the gross value but they'd actually
come off it and agreed with us that the net and the sensitivity was the
way to do it.. the auditors said 'We were in favour of the gross figure
- it's very unusual to show sensitivity in accounts but we've been
persuaded'.
Max suggests that the change in the external auditor's view was effected through an
appeal to user requirements:
HR
`..the clinching argument was 'What is it that the shareholders and
the bankers and so on are interested in?' They're interested in what
happens if the value of the security falls and we're giving them a
benchmark, not a graph that shows all the way, but we're giving
them a pointer and that was the clinching argument - it certainly was
for me.'
- but Ronald Roberts made no comment on the switch. However, his general
comments on the pattern of relationships surrounding the audit committee are
more illuminating:
`.. one says 'Well, what is the role of the auditor in relation to the
audit committee and the finance director and should the finance
director actually let the auditors in a sense help him steer things
through at audit committees or should the audit committee look to
the auditors as a direct link to them?' and I think my own view is
that its both - the finance director looks to us to do certain things to
help him... Well, sometimes we actually in a sense impose our
advice through Max to the audit committee on specific issues ...there
are issues within Runic where we say to Max: 'We suggest that you
say this that and the other' and so we would draft things for him
We'd say to Max: 'We are going to do this, we are going to produce
papers on this, that and the other because we feel it's right for the
audit committee' and we would hope that he would see that as a
positive move rather than trying to take things away from him - you
know things like 'What are the key issues in the group?' - we would
issue a highlights memorandum for the audit committee - that is,
then going straight to the audit committee to do with it, as it were,
what they want and we would debate that with them fully ... we like
to have as much as possible fairly open debate with the audit
committee there and we indeed we do say, at the end of the audit
committee meeting there, we ask the executive directors to leave
and then they can discuss whatever they want to discuss with us ...'
This account offers three models of relationships between the finance director, the
audit committee and the external auditor.
The first - `.. the finance director looks to us to do certain things to help him' -
implies enrolment of the external auditor by the executive network, a situation
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apparently fraught with potential threat to shareholder interests through the
compromise of auditor independence. However, in areas where standard accounting
practice has yet to be developed, or requires rethinking due to changes in the
business environment, innovation or improvement is unlikely without the initiative
being taken by the preparers of accounting statements, with whom the responsibility
and accountability ultimately rests.
This point was expressed by Alex Anderson at Glengarry:
`.. the point to make really is that we are responsible for our
accounts, the auditors are there to audit them, and it's a much
harder challenge for us to be comfortable that we're doing things
the right way than it is to convince the auditors that we're doing it
right ...I think that's a very important point to make and one that I
do make to the directors, you know, it's not a matter of
convincing the auditors to accept some sort of sporty treatment
but actually are we comfortable that it is the right treatment?'
From this perspective, enrolment of the external auditors is a positive advantage,
when it has been achieved through rational argument and the exercise of
professional judgement (see also Grout et al, 1994, discussed in chapter 8)
The second model has the problematisation undertaken by the external auditor who
then seeks to enrol the audit committee, either by initially enrolling the finance
director:
`..sometimes we actually in a sense impose our advice through [Max
Tinker] to the audit committee on specific issues..'
or by a more direct approach:
`..We'd say to [Max Tinker] 'We are going to do this, we are going
to produce papers on this that and the other because we feel it's right
for the audit committee' and we would hope that he would see that
as a positive move rather than trying to take things away from him -
you know things like 'What are the key issues in the group?' - we
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would issue a highlights memorandum for the audit committee - that
is, then going straight to the audit committee to do with it, as it were,
what they want..'
The third model implies problematisation by the audit committee, followed by
enrolment of the external auditor:
`..we do say, at the end of the audit committee meeting there, we ask
the executive directors to leave and then they can discuss whatever
they want to discuss with us..'
From a Cadbury perspective, the third model would presumably fit the expectations
of how an audit committee should operate, with the second model also acceptable.
The first model would be more questionable: in assessing this, much would depend
on the process of interessement - if the enrolment of the auditor was based on a
process of rational argument this might be acceptable, whereas undue pressure
(threat of auditor change, for example) would not. Within these two extremes lies a
variety of possible interessement devices. A process of interessement and enrolment
which did not compromise the independence of the parties involved would have
greater acceptability: the perception of independence would underpin and validate
the consensus achieved. This point is discussed in more detail in chapter 8.
The events at Runic appear to begin with the last model but shift rapidly to the first.
The process of interessement and enrolment is not transparent from the accounts
available but has been presented as one of rational argument. However, the
existence of the other network identified must be influential here, acting as an
interessement device itself. Again we may discern a range of perspectives within
two extremes. From one view, the second network could be seen as a mechanism to
'smooth the path', ensuring swift and amicable communication between the parties
involved: from another, it could be viewed as a means of exerting more subtle
pressure, encouraging dissenting members to set aside differences in order to
maintain the network, and thus to conform.
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ANT analysis of the Runic stories has thus demonstrated the formation and re-
formation of networks involved in resolving a specific issue. Examination of the
processes of interessement and enrolment underscores the fragility of these
networks. The core 'executive' and 'audit committee' networks remained stable
during the period covered by these events but the enrolment of the external auditor
in each network consecutively demonstrated the speed and impact of change that is
possible and emphasised the need to consider the role and nature of interessement
devices, which may well include membership of other networks.
7.6 Consensus: an enrolment device and a commodity
At Runic, the finance director, the audit committee chair and the external auditor all
emphasised that both formal and informal communication were vital in ensuring
that the work of the audit committee could proceed in a helpful fashion, and saw
their informal relationships as a great strength. The suggestion that these
relationships might damage auditor independence from the Cadbury perspective was
strongly countered by the arguments that independence was secured through the
appropriately 'objective' behaviour of professional people, that the existence of
mechanisms such as the audit committee could not prevent individuals determined
to commit wrongdoing and that it would be impossible to operate effectively in any
other way. Similar views were expressed by other participants.
Bailey (1965) noted the importance of such relationships:
'..they [committee members] must be wary of trampling too heavily
on one another's corns, because they require favours of one another
in other spheres and other committees; a mode of social interaction
which the perceptive Cornford [Cornford, 1953] calls 'squaring'. It
is to be noted that a consensual decision reached through squaring is
only possible when a small number of people are concerned, and
when they interact with one another in several different situations.
We are not saying that this frequency of interaction enforces a
consensual decision: only that the 'horse-trading' negotiations which
can lead to consensus are only possible when there is a frequency of
interaction. '(1965:11)
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The account of events at Runic further demonstrates the paradox of the audit
committee: at one level, the stories illustrate an audit committee operating in
precisely the way envisaged by Cadbury, but an exploration of the networks
surrounding the audit committee reveals that it is the existence of such networks,
and the negotiations that underpin shifting enrolment between them, that enable the
committee to perform in this apparently 'effective' manner. The existence of these
networks directly contradicts the Cadbury emphasis on independence, undermining
the concept through the establishment of close working relationships. Meyer and
Rowan's notion of decoupling is again observed here. (see section 5.6)
My own initial problematisation centred on an exploration of areas of contention.
Through shifting the focus of problematisation to consensus achievement rather
than conflict resolution, interviewees asserted that consensus was achieved by
negotiation through networks of relationships that did not harm shareholders' or
lenders interests and indeed demonstrated a high level of concern for them,
although theoretically such relationships undermined independence and
'infringed' the prescriptions for good corporate governance.
This suggests that, for valid demonstration of consensus, such consensus must be
seen to be arrived at in a way that does not compromise the independence of those
involved — indeed, there is a need to perform the achievement of consensus in a way
which emphasises such independence, through rational debate. Yet the practical
achievement of consensus is effected paradoxically through networks which appear
to undermine the notion of independence because they are based on close
relationships between participants.
The achievement of consensus is itself an interessement/enrolment device since it
confers individual benefits — participants are seen as reasonable people who are
prepared to compromise for the common good and act as part of an effective team.
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The re-problematisation may also be interpreted as a device to enrol me in
confirming the self-presentation of the individuals concemed9.
Consensus assists ceremonial in the achievement of its purpose, as Myerhoff
(1977:222) observed:
'..all rituals are dramas of persuasion. They are didactic, enacted
pronouncements concerning the meaning of an occasion, and the
nature and worth of the people involved in the occasion. In many
ways rituals may be judged like any drama — they must be
convincing. Not all the parties involved need to be equally
convinced or equally moved. But the whole of it must be good
enough to play... the appearance of attention is essential, and
everyone is in it together... all must collude so as not to spoil the
show...'
Consensus serves an important purpose at an organisational level. The desire to
establish consensus can be explained in terms of comfort: for example, Power
(1997:126) noted that adversarial reporting produces discomfort and there are
significant pressures to constrain the level of criticism in audit reports to an
acceptable indication that the audit is 'adding value' in assisting management
through its critique. The ultimate critical expression of the qualified audit report
is rare.1°
Consensus of the audit committee reported to the main board offers comfort and
reassurance that specific issues relating to monitoring and control have been
comprehensively dealt with by a small group of 'experts' — 'black boxed' in
ANT terms (Callon and Latour, 1981). Black boxes provide comfort and
reassurance: a neat and tidy parcel of assumptions that may be taken for granted
and do not need to be unpacked. However, the value of this consensus appears to
be intimately linked with independence — consensus achieved through 'undue
influence' would have less value than that achieved through a visible process. As
Alex Anderson emphasised:
9 Issues arising from these individual interactions are explored further in chapter 9.
10 The generation of comfort is explored in more detail in chapter 9.
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`..meetings which are strictly scripted are actually pretty
unproductive. We can all read out the papers and everyone nods and
says 'Yes, agreed' ... [a productive meeting is] where you've got real
issues where you clearly present the facts, you know, if someone
has a question they're prepared to ask it, or a different point of view
is stated.'
Such meetings are unproductive in that they do not produce a consensus validated by
demonstrations of independence. Consensus may thus be viewed as a commodity
produced within the audit committee with a worth or value which is dependent on
the process through which it is seen to be generated. Crucial within this process is
the demonstration of independence, discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8: Independence
In chapter 7 it was suggested that consensus is a commodity produced by the
audit committee with a value which determines the level of comfort such
consensus may generate for the main board, and that this value is derived from
demonstrations of independence among those arriving at consensus. In this
chapter, assumptions about the relationship between financial reporting quality
and the independence of external auditors are discussed in relation to the role of
the audit committee. Participants' stories which illustrate their understandings of
independence are recounted. The performance of independence within the audit
committee through questioning is examined and the use of independence as a
commodity and interessement device is explored.
8.1 The importance of independence: the Cadbury perspective
The manifestation of independence is of considerable importance within the
corporate environment. Relationships between companies are under constant
scrutiny in order to identify dependencies permitting potential concentrations of
power which may distort or constrain markets. Given the complexity of industry
and group structures and the multiplicity of transactional relationships, the notion
of 'total independence' within such relationships is a goal of unlikely attainment:
there is, however, a need to acknowledge the existence of, and risks inherent in,
situations where unequal relationships may lead to economic consequences
perceived as adverse. Disclosure of the existence of such relationships allows
those who may be affected to assess the risks involved. For example, the
accounting consequences of transactions undertaken within subsidiary, associate,
joint venture and related party relationships are reported in accordance with a
series of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) and Financial
Reporting Standards (FRSs). However, as Davies et al (1997) indicated in
connection with FRS 8 Related Party Disclosures, there remains considerable
difficulty in defining terms such as 'control' and 'influence' in a way which
effectively eliminates the 'grey' areas of such relationships. They observed that:
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`..users of accounts should be under no illusion that FRS 8 will act
as more than a mild deterrent to those intent on corporate fraud on
the scale that allegedly occurred in companies connected with
Robert Maxwell. Indeed, it is food for thought that, in earlier
editions of this book, extracts from the accounts of those
companies were included in this chapter as (then) virtually unique
examples of good related party disclosures!' (1997:1578)
The corporate governance literature surveyed in chapter 2 suggests that the
traditional stewardship approach of accountability through disclosure is
inadequate in the context of modern expectations of corporate governance:
among the suggestions for improvement is the strengthening of the exercise of
independent judgement by external auditors and non executive directors (NEDs).
A number of studies and reports have explored the problem of requiring NEDs to
act as monitors as well as advisors (e.g. Binder Hamlyn,1994; Ezzamel and
Watson, 1997). It is not clear that all NEDs perceive this as a problem: Bob
Cunningham, for example, a widely experienced NED, explained that the role of
the NED was not to perform a direct monitoring function but to ensure that
systems were in place that required the executive directors to monitor themselves
(he did not offer any explicit examples of how this would work in practice). The
literature on auditor independence and NED independence addresses definitions
of independence, threats to it and possible solutions to such threats but does not
consider the broader role played by independence expounded in this chapter.
Agreed outcomes in the context of a relationship with clearly unbalanced
dependencies are presumed to be more easily achieved because of the exercise of
the power resulting from the dominance of one party or coalition of parties. Such
a consensus is generally viewed as having less value than a similar outcome
among a group of independent individuals who arrive at consensus through the
exercise of objective judgement and rationality, unclouded by subjective
influence. The ANT analysis in chapter 7 effectively demonstrates that
'formally' independent relationships - those generating high value consensus -
may. in fact be subtly altered within the surrounding network of other networks
where complex alliances, temporary and fragile though they may be, affect
outcomes.
147
The audit committee offers an arena for the demonstration of independence. Its
existence requires (to comply with the Cadbury Code) the appointment to the
board of directors of a minimum of three individuals who are expected to
demonstrate their personal independence, thus guaranteeing the independence of
the external auditor, enhancing the credibility of the company's financial
statements and ultimately the standing of the company in the eyes of finance
providers. The audit committee 'produces' consensus which reassures the main
board, and hence the users of company reports, that the specific issues within the
remit of the audit committee have been appropriately dealt with. This consensus
is validated by the degree of independence associated with those who arrive at it.
Thus the audit committee also 'produces' independence.
Through all participants' accounts of audit committee activity, a common thread
of reference to 'independence' could be discerned. All respondents described
'independence' (or associated ideas of 'objectivity' and 'personal integrity') as a
characteristic of audit committee members which was fundamental to their
understanding of audit committee effectiveness. 'Independence from
management' was specifically identified as a factor which might contribute to
audit committee effectiveness in Collier (1992) and was thus included in the
questionnaire for ranking by respondents (see appendix B). Most respondents
also included a further emphasis on independence in their answers to the open
questions. The importance accorded to the concept of independence would thus
appear to match the Cadbury perspective outlined in figure 1: this assumes a link
between the independence of auditors, underpinned by the independence of the
non-executive directors forming the audit committee, and an improved quality of
financial reporting which in turn supports the development of higher standards of
corporate governance.
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The Cadbury recommendations focus on the independence of non-executive
directors who, by virtue of their status, have 'independence from executive
responsibility' (Cadbury Committee, 1992:20) and are expected to 'bring an
independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance,
resources.., and standards of conduct.' (1992:22) They should 'be independent of
management and free from any business or other relationship which could
materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgement' (1992:22)
and the probity of their relationship with the board should be demonstrated by 'a
formal selection process, which will reinforce the independence of non-executive
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director..'(1992:23) Length of tenure may compromise this independent status:
'Non-executive directors may lose something of their independent edge, if they
remain on a board too long.'(1992:23) The underlying assumption is that the
independence of non-executive directors will afford an increased level of auditor
independence, through the operation of the audit committee.
As Power (1997:132) observed: 'There is a deeply held view that without
independence, audit has no value.' However, although problematic outcomes
may be ascribed to lack of auditor independence, the existence of apparent
threats to independence does not inevitably lead to the undermining of
accountability processes. Gwilliam (1987) commented:
'Independence is ultimately a psychological construct and the
appearance of non-independence is only indicative of the
likelihood of non-independent behaviour.' (1987:105)
Wolnizer's critique of audit independence (Wolnizer,1987) was based on the
argument that the conventional accounting notion of independence is incomplete
since it is based only on the mental attributes of the individual auditor and the
relationships between auditors and their clients. He asserted that:
`..the presumption that any steps taken to strengthen the
independent status of auditors will lead of themselves to more
'objective' financial statements is unfounded.'(1995:54)
-because independence of evidence - the capability of external verification of the
content of accounting statements - is the key to objective financial reporting.
Drawing parallels with medicine and law where practitioners base judgements on
independently verifiable evidence, he concluded that:
'Unless accounting practices are reformed so that financial
statements can be authenticated by recourse to reliable
commercial evidence, audit committees are red herrings'
(Wolnizer, 1995:45)
Power (1996) developed Wolnizer's argument by demonstrating that the
character of independently verifiable evidence is not an intrinsic quality but
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depends on socially negotiated agreement. Power's notion of epistemic
independence captures the essence of this problem:
'Where clear rules of auditee conduct and robust techniques for
determining compliance with those rules exist, the audit process is
epistemically independent of the auditee. The auditor may be
dependent on some information from the auditee but the basis on
which conclusions are drawn is independent.' (1997:133)
Where epistemic independence is limited, rules are indeterminate or ambiguous
and auditor and auditee must necessarily negotiate to establish the existence of
compliance or breach.
Ezzamel and Watson (1997) also cast doubt on the ability of audit committees to
fulfil the Cadbury expectations, with regard to guaranteeing auditor
independence, observing that Cadbury did not provide sufficient detail about the
purpose of the audit committee or how such purpose is to be achieved in practice,
as noted in section 2.2.1.
Beattie et al (1997) provided evidence that audit partners and finance directors
view audit committees as a major factor in enhancing auditor independence but
they offered no indication of why respondents believed audit committees to be so
important or how audit committees achieved this enhancement.
The next link in the chain - the presumption that improved auditor independence
leads to improved financial reporting - has also been challenged by Grout et al
(1994) who demonstrated that remedies introduced to deter practices seen as
compromising independence did not necessarily have the desired effect: they
suggested that a degree of auditor dependence on clients may in fact improve the
quality of financial reports. Power (1997:29) described the relationship between
the costs of audit and the assurance levels provided as obscure and noted that:
`..it is not obvious that making financial auditors more
. independent, whatever that means, will maintain or enhance the
existing cost-assurance relation.'
151
8.2 Conceptions of independence
Within the literature on auditor independence, a distinction is frequently made
between independence in fact and independence in appearance (see, for example,
Wallman, 1996; Falk and Frucot, 1997). Bartlett (1993) quoted definitions of
independence in fact and independence in appearance taken from US auditing
standards. The former relates to the mental attitude of the auditor and is difficult
to establish in an 'objective' fashion. The latter relates to circumstances which
could be perceived as threatening independence and which may be controlled, in
order to demonstrate the necessary distancing which is seen as fundamental to
objectivity. 'To be independent, the auditor must be intellectually honest; to be
recognized  as independent, he must be free from any obligation to or interest in
the client, its management, or its owners.' (AICPA, 1991, quoted in Bartlett,
1993:55). In the UK, the ICAEW Guide to Professional Ethics does not make
this distinction explicit but initially stresses the fundamental role of individual
integrity before describing a series of potential threats to auditor independence
and offering guidance on their practical avoidance or minimisation (ICAEW,
1997b). The limited literature addressing the issue of audit committee
independence does not dwell on this distinction.
However, it would appear that, among participants in this study, a similar
distinction is generally accepted with regard to the independence of audit
committee members. Two aspects of independence were identified in
participants' stories. The first relates to a personal quality found in a particular
individual, defined here as independence of mind (equivalent to independence in
fact) and the second represents a notion of distance and detachment which is
assumed to be essential to objective judgement, defined here as independence of
connection (equivalent to independence in appearance)'.
A link between the two aspects may be discerned in situations where close
relationships exist which may be interpreted as compromising independence of
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connection. At Glengarry, Martin Johnson, the audit committee chair, had
previously been the company finance director; at Runic, complex
interrelationships had developed between audit committee participants through
roles in other companies (described in chapter 7) and Henry Morton, the audit
committee chair, had served in this capacity for almost ten years. In every
interview with these participants, the close relationships or length of service were
cited as important to audit committee operations, helping those involved to do a
better job through close familiarity with the company concerned: in every case it
was argued that the objectivity of judgement to be derived from independence of
connection was not compromised through these relationships but was guaranteed
by 'professionalism', by the personal qualities of the individuals involved. This
individual quality - independence of mind - is seen to provide even greater
assurance of independent and objective judgement than the concept of
independence of connection, which can be more clearly defined and monitored.
As Samet and Sherman (1984:55) observed:
'The effectiveness of the audit committee will depend more upon
it being composed of dedicated individuals with a deep sense of
personal commitment to the company and its shareholders, than
being composed of individuals formally independent of
management.'
Varying approaches to the demonstration of independence of mind could be
observed in the self-presentation of individuals during discussions on this topic.
Martin Johnson presented himself as 'hero'. He described his career prior to his
appointment at Glengarry in great detail', emphasising that he had always been
in favour of audit committees and had established one at every company where
he had been employed as finance director, long before they became common:
'I've been doing this a long time, I've been chief financial officer
of public companies since I was 31, that's a long time. I've always
been a finance director who likes to have a proper structure in
place - I formed an audit committee at [ABC plc] when I became
the first finance director there that they'd ever had ..'
The different categorisation emphasises that the discussion which follows relates to the
independence of the audit committee rather than the independence of the auditor.
2 He provided me with a copy of his four page curriculum vitae at the beginning of the interview.
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However, it was almost impossible to get him to answer direct questions about
how these audit committees actually worked. His overall demeanour was that of
someone used to being interviewed by journalists, deflecting questions on areas
that he did not wish to explored. When questioned about the apparent threat to
his independent status as a non executive director of Glengarry from his previous
relationship with the company as its finance director, he presented a curious
answer:
'It's sometimes forgotten that the finance director of a big
sprawling multinational group himself is actually the most
independent person - he's not actually in operations at all, he is
effectively the chairman and chief executive's right hand to make
sure you keep everybody honest.'
This seemed to imply that there was no difference between his role as finance
director and as non executive director, an unusual perspective on both roles. The
implication of Martin's relationship with the company is explored in more detail
in section 8.3.
Alex Anderson's relationship with Glengarry was equally complex. He had
previously acted as the engagement partner on the company's audit. He gave a
practised account of the advantages to Glengarry of such a situation (quoted in
section 8.3), giving the impression that the issue had been raised many times
before, and insisting that the independence of the external auditors was not
affected in any way. He presented himself as objective, fair-minded, not
influenced by previous working relationships:
`.. it certainly doesn't cause problems in terms of conflict. I have
absolutely no doubt where my responsibilities lie.'
Henry Morton's self-presentation relied on an amusing and self-deprecating
approach. He commented on our shared professional training and used this to
help me to identify with his position (noted in section 3.3). Although Henry is an
individual of considerable standing within the business community, his manner
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did not reflect this status. Describing the seating arrangements for the Runic
audit committee, he commented:
'A just edge along and go into the chairman's seat very
tentatively..'
Referring to the chairman of another company where he had been a non
executive director, he observed:
`..I think he drew some comfort from the fact that he had some
fairly important non executive directors around him - not
including me, I was one of the less important... plenty of double
barrelled names with lots of ministerial and other experience..'
He laughed a lot during the interview, and his comments were often humorous in
style:
`..you know, if I were still a finance director I'd jolly well have to
alter my ways!'
Henry's relationship with the previous Runic chairman had been close: they had
filled the same roles at Tiffin plc, working with the same audit team — again, a
relationship which could be perceived as a threat to independence. Henry's
approach was to acknowledge this:
`..he [previous Runic chairman] used to chair it [the audit
committee], which was, I suppose, a little bit naughty but I knew
[him] quite well and I think when he brought me in he started the
audit committee and although he chaired it I think he did look to
me to advise him, we were very close so I think it worked alright
but of course with the chairman of the company also being
chairman of the audit committee some things could be steam-
rollered through if one has to honest about it..'
Combined with his charming manner, this straightforward recognition of possible
imperfections was designed to be disarming and to reassure as to his
independence.
All three individuals were concerned to present themselves as independent in
mind, although in each case their independence of connection might be called
into question.
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8.3 Threats to audit committee independence
The Cadbury Code envisaged threats to audit committee members independence
arising from financial relationships (section 4.12 recommends that NEDs should
have no other business relationship with the company; section 4.13 recommends
that while fees should be adequate to reflect the time spent on the company's
affairs, share option scheme participation and pensions are inappropriate), from
'patronage' (section 4.15 recommends a 'formal selection process' for NED
appointments) and from length of tenure (section 4.16). Additionally, the
Committee recognised a need for a sufficiently weighty NED presence on the
board, section 4.11 recommending the appointment of a minimum of three
NEDs.
However, finance directors and internal auditors interviewed indicated that the
most problematic limitation to the useful contribution of NEDs was not lack of
independence but lack of understanding of the company. These accounts
expressed tones of disappointment rather than satisfaction that such NEDs would
be easy to manipulate, as these examples indicate:
'I'm not sure I've yet got them quite to understand the range of
work we cover, the sorts of things we come up with and how its
progressed in the business., they're almost taking a simplistic
view.., it's a little more shaded and complicated than I think
perhaps they think at the moment... .having said that, the quality
of non-execs is probably improving ..[newly appointed NED] is
probably the most heavy hitting business man that we've
had... [he] could be valuable — I could imagine him saying 'In my
company...this is a hot issue at the moment' and if that general
steer came, that would be quite good.. [the other NEDs] bring
their perspectives to things but not quite the understanding of the
business of running a business.., most of the others are halfway to
the golf course, if not already on it' (Robin Dunston, Scrimshaw)
`..it's so easy in maturity when you're a non exec to start
pontificating but when you're the finance director of a company,
it tends to become yours - now yours in the nicest sense, you
know, that you're just protecting it and you're doing what you
think is right and these other fellows around, these non execs, are
quite useless really, they don't really understand the issues..'
(Henry Morton, Runic)
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These comments may be intended to demonstrate the inevitability of
management influence over NEDs, in the face of their lack of experience of the
company (or even lack of interest in developing such experience, as Robin
Dunston's last comment suggests). Participants indicated that independence of
connection may undermine the potential contribution of NEDs, although this
may be overcome as familiarity with the company develops over time — a further
argument against the independence of connection supposedly derived from
limited tenure. Several participants observed that it will take considerable time
for a non-executive director to be able to contribute effectively in a complex
company:
'I have an advantage in having been a non exec here for quite a
long time - now I believe the pensions body [PlRC] at the moment
are saying you become an insider if you're here for more than ten
years - I think I've been here for about ten years. I see their point
but also a company like [Runic] doesn't half take a long time to
understand what's going on.' (Henry Morton)
This suggests that generalised rules about length of tenure may be inappropriate.
The effect of length of tenure on independence has been examined with varying
conclusions. Ecton and Reinstein (1982) reported that new committee members
ask the 'best' (a quality not defined) questions and suggested on this basis that
rotation of membership would achieve greater audit committee effectiveness.
However, Spangler and Braiotta (1990) assumed that a transactional leadership
style underpinned effectiveness and suggested that membership continuity
achieved by long tenure was necessary to develop this.
More subtle threats to audit committee independence may arise from other close
relationships: significant relationships may exist between finance directors and
external auditors which impact on audit committee operations. At Glengarry and
Harrier, the finance directors were the companies' former external audit partners;
Alex Anderson, the Glengarry finance director, described the advantages of
having been a partner at PQ, Glengarry's auditors:
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`.. well I'm gamekeeper turned poacher I suppose... quite a
number of people have left [PQ] at partner level and moved to
clients.., it certainly doesn't cause problems in terms of conflict. I
have absolutely no doubt where my responsibilities lie. It does
have huge advantages in that I understand exactly how [PQ]
works and therefore when we're looking to get the best people to
do the work, when we're considering who should do particular
assignments, particular special work, you know, we know who to
go to and we know the areas on the other side where [PQ] are not
particularly strong ... so I'm very well placed to maximise value
for shareholders out of that relationship and do that in a very
productive and business like way.. relationships have worked very
well here, I mean I knew people well before I joined - it was a
great advantage joining a client rather than joining a company that
I didn't know that much about, you know, I'd been to many of the
key locations, I understood the business, you know, I'm almost a
natural fit for this sort of position... .from the client's point of
view again it's a lower risk appointment than going for someone
who may have shone in interviews and assessments but you really
don't know that much about..'
These appear to be well rehearsed arguments. Hussey and Jack (1995) indicated
that this situation is not uncommon 3 , and that 'personal chemistry' between the
finance director and audit partner is a major factor in auditor appointments.
There is a fine balance to be struck between the professional friendships that
make a good working relationship possible and the personal friendships which
may be perceived as compromising independence. It is difficult to see how the
audit committee can, in practice, influence the impact of such relationships: as an
obligatory passage point, it may become ineffective when such networks
strengthen.
At Glengarry, Martin Johnson, the audit committee chair was the former finance
director: he acknowledged that there had been some criticism by PERC about his
status as an independent director but argued that his situation was unique in that
he 'was involved in that difficult period and was involved in setting up the
control culture' so his experience of the company was of particular value. (see
chapter 5, 5.5) Martin dismissed PIRC's criticism of his anomalous position with
the observations that the other non executive directors were 'very independent'
3 However, Michael Turnbull insisted that in his experience this would be very unusual and that
finance directors in the Hobson group were never recruited from audit firms associated with the
company.
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and 'They know I'm a very independent person'. Independence as a personality
trait was here used to indicate 'I am prepared to make a nuisance of myself':
indeed, Simon Middleton, the internal auditor, described him causing
considerable tension at audit committee meetings by 'worrying at issues like a
dog with a bone'. His relationship with company management clearly remained
close but the effect of this closeness seemed to be that he was continuing to act as
an executive influence, rather than being influenced by management. His
involvement in such areas appeared to be welcome — Alex Anderson commented:
'We have operations in a number of countries with soft
currencies, you know, just thinking through how we manage our
exposures in those countries - I mean, so there's actually been
quite a lot of correspondence with him either on the phone or in
writing on exactly what we ought to do in those areas, so that's an
example of where we've had the benefit of his input outside the
formal audit committee.'
However, Simon Middleton, expressed the view that this blurring of role
contributed to what he described as the 'rather tense relationship' between the
audit committee chair and the company chairman which was played out in audit
committee meetings.
Such influence may potentially draw the audit committee into areas beyond the
standard Cadbury terms of reference: indeed, Martin Johnson explained that he
saw the audit committee role developing into strategic direction, once internal
control procedures had become well established and merely required
monitoring4 . Other participants saw this as inappropriate:
'One of the problems there has been with [Runic] is that they are
so keen to do the right thing that you could easily find yourself in
the situation that you weren't non-executive, that you were
executive - where one's been invited into some discussions..., you
can lose your objectivity and you become involved with the
decision and what you should be doing is not taking the decision
but vetting the decision. It's difficult ground this - one which an
4
Commentators such as Porter and Gendall (1997: 31) have cautioned against such
developments, arguing that the audit committee's monitoring role would be compromised.
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accommodating management, wishing to do the right thing,
occasionally can go too far in one way I think.' (Henry Morton)
There is also evidence that external auditors may exert more influence over their
clients than is assumed in the Cadbury model. Eichenseher & Shields (1985)
demonstrated the influence of major accountancy firms in encouraging clients to
establish audit committees, observing that audit firms have considerable
incentives to do so, since, for no cost to the firm, they enhance auditor
independence and may well protect from allegations of fraud. Further evidence
of the keen interest of external auditors in the operation of audit committees is
the extensive production of advice in this area for clients by large accountancy
firms and professional accountancy bodies, as noted in the literature review in
chapter 2. Audit partner Ken Palmer admitted: 'We have a vested interest in
making sure audit committees work the way we want'.
From an ANT perspective, threats to audit committee member independence,
such as financial and business relationships and length of tenure, are
interessement devices, deployed in attempts to enrol members in networks such
as those linking finance directors with external auditors. In theory the audit
committee acts as an obligatory passage point but in practice networks such as
those identified in chapter 7 act to circumvent this. Networks form and re-form in
relation to specific issues. Independence of connection becomes less relevant as
time passes and the audit committee member creates essential working
relationships: the NED's most important 'defence' against enrolment is
independence of mind. If independence of mind can be demonstrated, there will
be greater confidence among observers that, when enrolment in these networks is
inevitable, objectivity will be maintained. One way of demonstrating
independence of mind within the ceremonial activity of the audit committee
meeting is by asking questions.
8.4 Performance of independence: the asking of questions
A factor of prime importance in participants' accounts in relation to
independence of NEDs was the asking of questions. Questioning appears to be an
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important feature of audit committee work: audit committee members are
expected to ask questions (for example, see Ecton and Reinstein,1982; Sommer
1991), although Tricker (1978:61) quotes a US commentator who observed that
the role of the audit committee was very limited:
'Although questions are asked, not much can be done about the
answers.'
Skill in questioning is seen as a prime quality in an effective NED. The US
practitioner journal Directors & Boards carries short articles about individuals
who are considered outstanding by their peers: Alden (1996) wrote about Philip
Caldwell who was credited with a major impact at Digital Equipment
Corporation:
'The pressure he exerted through discerning questions asked as
chairman of the audit committee and in private sessions with
management contributed much to the pace and success of the
recovery... He was firm but polite in his incisive questions to
management and our independent auditors. He was patient but
would not tolerate easy answers. But at the same time he did not
dominate board or committee discussions.'(1996:77)
Spencer (1983:40) quoted an interviewee:
'The central role of the non-executive director is the asking of
awkward questions. His other role is getting the answers. For this,
a high order of skill is needed, both social and technical.'
Three iterative levels of questioning may be identified5. The first focuses on
questions that are anticipated and to which answers may have already been
supplied to the questioner, often in the form of written documentation. The
asking and answering of such questions is a form of procedural ceremony which
may be used to establish the relative positions of the questioner and questionee
and the context of subsequent questions. At the second level questions have also
been anticipated but answers, although readily accessible, have not been pre-
produced. At the third level questions are potentially more challenging — they
have not been anticipated and the provision of satisfactory-answers requires
careful thought and possibly further research. From the perspective of the
5 I am grateful to Professor Gerald Vinten for suggesting this idea (personal communication)
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demonstration of independence, the level of questioning is important.
Participants expressed regret that NEDs did not ask searching questions: Bernard
Seaton expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the way the Runic audit
committee operated and was particularly disappointed in the lack of questions:
'I think it was difficult for these people to understand the
operational difficulties — they're not close to it, I don't think they
understand the day-to-day problems at all., so perhaps you wouldn't
expect them to ask questions. Operationally they're not really up to
speed with what is happening ..'
Two internal auditors suggested that, on occasion, they had managed the entire
process: 'I identified the problem — and the solution - for them' (Simon
Middleton, Glengarry), 'I think we came up with a solution before they asked'
(Robin Dunston, Scrimshaw). This confirms the argument advanced in chapter 5
that the meeting itself may represent a ceremonial process, most of the
substantive activity having taken place elsewhere. This is hardly surprising when
one considers the brief to be fulfilled by audit committees (Cadbury Committee,
1992:73-4) in the context of a total meeting time per year which averages seven
hours (Collier, 1992:81).
Regret at a limited level of questioning may appear to contradict the assumption
that executive directors wish to influence NEDs but possibly indicates that
demonstration of the capacity to cope with more searching questions is of value
to finance directors. Chris Tracker spoke proudly of previous experience as
finance director at a company where
..it [the audit committee] was much much tougher...... we had
Sir John Harvey-Jones, Sir Cohn Marshall, Sir David Simon and
Dick Giordano..'
The satisfactory handling of searching questions from individuals of such
standing in the business world reflects well on all concerned, enhancing
reputations: again, a ceremonial performance may be discerned. Although the
content of the questions was not explained, it seems unlikely that questions
would be designed purely to seek information since most participants described
the possibility of 'information overload' (see section 6.1). The performance of
questioning is as important, for both questioner and those providing answers, as
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the information conveyed. The audit committee provides an arena for NEDs to
demonstrate their independence:
'A think most problems are because people just don't read the
papers or they're not inclined to ask the next question after
they've read the papers... he[a member of the audit committee] is
tremendously useful and a real bulldozer, he really gives the
management a hard time on occasion.., you sit round the [Runic]
board you hear [him] at great length... (Henry Morton)
There is a hint here of a slightly antagonistic personality tolerated because audit
committee participants and board members derive some reassurance from this
behaviour: this person can be relied upon to ask the 'difficult' questions that
others might shy away from. However, this demonstration will take place within
constraints.
The process of iteration will also be conditioned by the need for the NED to
maintain his or her own position. Finch (1992:199) commented:
'Apart from any lack of independence, a non-executive director's
eagerness to probe .. may be tempered by a perceived need to relate
constructively to executive directors and to avoid 'being seen as a
nuisance'.'
Spencer (1983:41) also observed:
'The 'awkward questions', it seems, must be asked 'non-
abrasively', but also in a manner sufficiently skilful to obtain
answers. There would seem to be rather a precise question of
balance involved there, in that: `..there is the point that asking too
many awkward questions may cause you to be regarded with
disfavour and even removed from the board."
The response of those required to provide answers — usually the finance director
or internal auditor — may range from a resigned tolerance of being led down
blind alleys because they've read something in the papers or this is happening
down the road' (Robin Dunston, Scrimshaw) to an enthusiasm for a genuine and
helpful interest expressed through questions:
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`..you want an effective audit committee which means that if the
finance director knows they understand accounts, he will do a
better job too - it all moves on to a higher plane..' (Roy Milford,
Harrier)
The asking of questions and receipt of a response is part of a complex
interaction. Either the initial answer is considered to be satisfactory when
measured against some unspecified yardstick ( for example, are we convinced by
this person's account?) or unsatisfactory, in which case more reassurance would
be demanded through an iterative and possibly negotiated process until an
appropriate level of consensus about satisfaction was reached. At the extreme, if
consensus cannot be reached, the audit committee member may opt to resign
from the board:
`.. there was an entrepreneurial chairman ... there was no audit
committee. It was a public company, I insisted upon an audit
committee and we worked it a couple of times and then I found
that, yes, things came out of the audit committee but things came
out that should have been brought to the board before and I felt
very uncomfortable about it. I felt that the communication wasn't
right and I resigned from the board.' (Henry Morton)
The point at which a NED will appear to be satisfied with answers received will
probably vary according to the level of perceived risk in the issue involved.
Henry believed that the risk to his reputation was such that resignation was his
only option although he indicated that this was by no means an easy decision:
`..you know one looks back and thinks 'Should there have been
some other thing that one should have done?' and I decided no,
there were shareholders interests, the shareholders were best
served by my simply doing that - because one could create a
tremendous furore, share price collapses and God knows what,
what have you achieved by that? It was a perfectly well run
company, it had got good management, it was just that they
weren't complying with what one felt they should do and the fact
that there was this one chairman with a lot of shares who still
treated the company as his own..'
Part or all of this questioning process may take place within the formal audit
committee meeting but participants' accounts indicated that much of the
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committee's activity took place outside meetings and centred on the audit
committee chairman who appears to take on a greater responsibility than other
members:
`..as a chairman I talk about the agenda and the papers beforehand
and suggest directions that it might go particularly in the internal
audit side and I run through the judgements and the presentation
format if you like of the accounts beforehand so that I'm prepared.
As I say, other members of the audit committee probably just turn
up on the day having leafed through the papers..' (Max Tinker,
Runic)
Asking the right questions and interpreting the answers appropriately is made
possible by the experience and knowledge of the NEDs: participants believed
that NEDs required a general business background to be effective and that the
audit committee should include one person with sufficient technical expertise to
grasp accounting issues, who may be expected to ensure that the process
generates an appropriate level of comfort for all concerned:
'You also need someone who is frankly the sort of person who
will read all the papers very carefully - you know, there's no
doubt that the finance guy will read the detailed notes to the
accounts and think through the implications and connotations of
what's said in a way that's different to somebody who hasn't got
that finance background'
(Alex Anderson, Glengarry)
The process was summed up by Robin Dunston:
'They [the audit committee members] are conscious of their
responsibilities and lack of knowledge of the day to day running
of the business — [they are] feeling their way in terms of
information required and what sort of reassurance they want from
us.. they just want to be sure that the company is addressing
control issues seriously and that's what they're finding their way
towards, that comfort.'
The questioning process may thus be viewed as a means by which audit
committee members can demonstrate their independence of mind. The outcome
of the process will normally be a carefully managed consensus about issues
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raised — a confirmation that audit committee members are reassured by the
responses provided. This will be reported to the main board who will be similarly
reassured that the audit committee has dealt with the matter on their behalf. Thus
the independence of audit committee members is performed in the audit
committee meeting by a process of questioning: it is produced as a commodity
which enhances the value of consensus by demonstrating that the parties
involved have arrived at agreement without coercion or influence, through a
process of logical debate and rational judgement.
8.5 Independence as a commodity and as an interessement device
Williams (1992:106) suggested that independence may be viewed as a
commodity:
'Independence no longer refers to a virtue possessed by a
practitioner; it is now a commodity disembodied from any
particular practitioner at all... Independence is no longer
something to be committed to, no longer something that is; it is
now something one calculates.'
Both conceptions of independence that Williams described appear within the
accounts of participants: while they emphasise the importance of independence
of mind, there is also a sense in which independence may be seen as a
commodity in the context of audit committee activity. Independence is
'produced' within the framework of audit committee activity through the
independence of connection of its members, demonstrated through the formal
selection process and limits to tenure, and their independence of mind,
demonstrated through their behaviour in the questioning process. It is then
'supplied' by the audit committee to the main board, to the external auditors and
to users of financial statements, as a component of 'comfort' (discussed in detail
in chapter 9).
At a broader level the demonstration of independence becomes an interessement
device, giving the company the opportunity to mobilise resources: Tsui et al
(1994) demonstrated that bankers would more readily advance loans where they
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perceived that auditor independence was assured by the existence of an audit
committee.
This chapter has discussed the importance of independence within the Cadbury
perspective and within the stories of audit committee participants. It has
suggested that an important role for independence lies in the validation of
consensus, and has highlighted the ceremonial aspect of questioning by audit
committee members as a demonstration of independence.
The process may be represented thus:
INDEPENDENCE
is a personal quality of audit committee members demonstrated by
QUESTIONING
leading through iterations to a validated
CONSENSUS
about appropriateness of responses
The next chapter further develops the relationship between consensus validated
by independence and the production of comfort.
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Chapter 9: Comfort
Chapters 7 and 8 identified the audit committee's achievement of consensus,
validated by perceptions of its independence, as a means of generating comfort.
This chapter explores participants' use of the word 'comfort' and associated
expressions and suggests that comfort is a commodity which is passed to and
from the audit committee. Generation of comfort is proposed as an important but
unarticulated role of the audit committee, as it is for the audit process itself,
giving the financial reports authenticity which legitimises the company and
allows its continuing existence through access to resources.
9.1 The comforting role of audit
'Auditing has the character of a certain kind of organizational
script whose dramaturgical essence is the production of comfort.'
(Power, 1997:123)
The notion of comfort as a commodity was identified by Pentland (1993) in an
examination of the audit process. He asserted that the role of auditors is to:
`..give 'comfort' to people who are vulnerable to erroneous, self-
interested, and possibly fraudulent statements from corporate
management.' (1993:606)
Pentland then examined how 'comfort' was created, through his observation of
audit teams at work and interviews with members of the teams and other
auditors. Within the audit activity he identified processes of purification, social
control and impression management which give audit a ritual nature. He noted
the use of the concept of comfort in the language used by those he observed and
interviewed, concluding that:
'Objectively, unaudited numbers may be risky or uncertain, but
subjectively, they make auditors feel uncomfortable. Audit rituals
make them 'comfortable' by transforming and purifying the
inherently 'unclean' client data.' (1993:609)
Pentland suggested that the process of 'getting comfortable' was based on a
'series of repeated interactions with members of the team' and that comfort thus
became a commodity that could be passed on to other individuals, changing from
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an emotional state shared between individuals and eventually becoming 'an
objective, institutionalised fact' l as it is passed on via the audit report to the
public:
'The audit opinion found in every annual report constitutes the
paradigm example of comfort as a commodity' (1993:611)
Pentland thus demonstrated how:
`..micro-interactions within the engagement team create comfort,
which makes the macro-order of capital markets and other
financial institutions possible..' (Pentland, 1993:606)
The stories of audit committee participants indicate that interactions in and
around the audit committee perform a very similar function of comfort
generation and exchange.
9.2. The audit committee as a seeker of comfort
The words 'comfort' and 'comfortable' were used frequently by interviewees, as
were similar expressions such as 'reassured by' and 'happy with'. The network
of comfort provision traced in the stories of participants is complex: comfort is
provided both to and by the audit committee. The audit committee initially seeks
comfort:
'I think because of the complexities they [the audit committee] just
want to make sure that - on a face to face - that everyone makes sure
that they are absolutely happy with what's going on.' (Ronald
Roberts)
In chapter 5 the physical environment and timing of the audit committee meeting
were examined as interessement/enrolment devices used by participants to
strengthen their networks. The usefulness of these devices depends on the level
of comfort generated. Part of the process of achieving comfort relates to the
physical environment of the meeting. Seating arrangements may add important
emphasis to issues of status and influence among members of the committee:
1 This echoes the comments of Williams (1992) on independence as a commodity, quoted in
section 8.5
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`..he knows he's not on the audit committee but he sits on the side of
the table where the audit committee are and just to confuse matters
we've now got one member of the audit committee who sits on the
other side.. '(Max Tinker, Runic)
- a strategy which Max viewed as designed to induce discomfort among
participants.
Audit committees normally meet in the board room or its equivalent, usually in a
setting of considerable physical comfort (except perhaps in the more crowded
circumstances described by Roy Milford at Harrier, quoted in section 6.2), often
designed to emphasise the status of the board and its members. The comfort of the
environment thus contributes to the generation of comfort by the audit committee,
an additional enrolment device employed by those participants 'managing' the
meeting.
Further comfort is provided by the security of habit: participants' stories indicated
that those attending the meetings usually sat in the same place each time, often the
same place as they would sit for main board meetings:
`..it's the comfort of sitting in same place at meetings.' (Alex
Anderson, Glengarry)
'.1 think people feel comfortable knowing that that is the situation
but I don't think there would be a terrible trauma if someone sat in
a different place.' (Henry Morton, Runic)
The timing of the meeting, discussed in section 6.2, is also important in
generating comfort: if the audit committee immediately precedes the main board
meeting — a logistically convenient arrangement — there may be considerable
pressure on the audit committee to complete its business in time to report to the
subsequent board meeting. Max Tinker and Chris Scrimshaw both observed that
a time gap was more comfortable for those participants required to provide
information:
`..if there are changes, and there might be a change for example to
the dividend recommendation, so if there are changes and there's
often changes in the drafting, not necessarily in the numbers or the
notes but in the chairman's report, so it enables us to print those and
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get a book proof to the board, if it's the finals anyway, so really it's
giving us a little gap. Also it enables us to produce the minutes so
that the full board have the minutes of the audit committee meeting
and the chairman of the audit committee time to think what he's
going to report. Now all those things are possible in twenty four
hours or overnight but they're more comfortable [if there is a time
gap]' (Max Tinker, Runic)
`.. he [the audit committee chair] used to quite like having it in the
morning like nine o'clock, the board starts at ten, something like
that, but, after about two years, we began to realise that it was
totally impractical, we didn't get the assurance that we needed if
there were issues.. I couldn't rush out in two minutes and get the
answer.' (Chris Tracker, Scrimshaw)
Comfort is provided to the audit committee by the finance director and internal
auditor through the iterative questioning process discussed in chapter 8. Finance
directors described how they would manage this process:
`..[the internal audit] programme as well is significant because
behind that is their risk analysis so there's a discussion on that
where people will say 'Well, I thought that (let's say) your foreign
exchange hedging was a big risk - why doesn't that appear very
high?' and the internal auditor will explain why he graded it low and
I will say 'Well, it's all under control, as you know': (Max Tinker)
`.. the chairman of the audit committee and the others would say
'What are we doing about this? It's been raised as an issue now, I
don't want to see it there again' - we need to say that we're going
to sort it... (Chris Tracker)
The context of these stories and the manner in which they were recounted
suggested that the process of questioning was a necessary formality, further
emphasising the ceremonial aspect of the audit committee meeting. The
questions posed by audit committee members were not sufficiently penetrating to
address the underlying issues in a way that challenged the respondents to any
great extent and the questioners could be satisfied with comforting comments
such as 'It's all under control' and 'We're going to sort it'.
At Scrimshaw, Robin Dunston, the internal auditor described the process in
greater detail:
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`.. they're looking for, you know, 'What recommendations have
we made that haven't been put in? What are the main outstanding
issues?' - this sort of thing, which is fine but I'm not sure I've yet
got them quite to understand the range of work we cover, the sorts
of things we come up with and how its progressed in the business
and they're almost taking a simplistic view., you know they're
talking about financial risk here .. 'The auditors have said do this,
..the Barings factor comes into this .... these are being done,
we've said do it, it doesn't happen, why hasn't [Chris Tracker, the
finance director] made them do it?' Usually there's a degree of
greyness about it, these are big issues but then they're not just
pure financial risk, these are largely often operational things.'
The distinction Robin makes between financial risk and business risk is an
important one, echoed by Bob Cunningham who emphasised that the role of the
audit committee should be confined to issues of financial risk. However, the two
types of risk may be very difficult to disentangle and the ambiguity of the NED's
dual role, as a monitor of fellow executive directors and also as a director
brought in to contribute broad business skills to board activity, adds further
complexity. Robin's account suggests that NEDs find it difficult to understand
that financial risks cannot be addressed in isolation since the consequences of
measures taken for their minimisation may increase general business risks. The
balance between the two types of risk needs to be explained carefully to ensure
that comfort is still maintained.
Comfort levels will also be threatened by external factors: Robin referred to the
`Barings factor' and Chris Tracker indicated the problems which are raised by
NEDs' experience of the 'nasty surprise' in other companies:
'It got very emotional at the last one [audit committee meeting]
when we were talking about technical requirements, obviously
internal control, partly because the non-execs had been at other
audit committees where the year end had perhaps been the
calendar year end, so the discussion had taken place a few weeks
earlier where they were talking about getting independent
advice... It was a discussion rather than a criticism - how are we
going to handle it?'
'Internal control' is a reference to a particularly problematic area of the Cadbury
recommendations: the recommendation that 'directors should make a statement
on the effectiveness of internal controls and that the auditors should report
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thereon.' (Cadbury Committee, 1992:27) Response to this was generally
unfavourable as criteria for assessing effectiveness were unclear and there was
general concern about the possibility of subsequent litigation based on such
reports. Power (1997:56) noted that the controversy about this requirement
illustrated 'the problems of an indirect regulatory style' since:
`..a certain chain of empty opinions substitutes for information
and can be created by auditors forming an opinion about the
opinion of directors.'
Glengarry, however, was one of the few companies which chose to report
unequivocally in this area: this is discussed below in section 9.4.
Reassurance on internal control may be sought from the internal audit function:
`..[audit committee members are] conscious of their
responsibilities and lack of knowledge of the day to day running
of the business — feeling their way in terms of information
required and what sort of reassurance they want from us... .they
just want to be sure that the company is addressing control issues
seriously and that's what they're finding their way towards, that
comfort all that means it's becoming a more serious committee,
it realises its responsibilities and is thinking about how it can
handle them. '(Robin Dunston at Scrimshaw)
However, at Runic the relationship between the audit committee and the internal
auditor was rather different, as illustrated by Bernard Seaton's story of
expressing concerns to the audit committee that were not followed up:
'I feel and have expressed the view that the audit committee and the
board ought to be asking for me to do more work in terms of
compliance. There's been a board decision based on this data to
achieve this objective - in six months time you want your internal
audit to go and audit the factual outturn of that information that was
given to the board. Now I think that's what they ought to be doing
but that isn't something that happens.. I wouldn't say they take the
initiative — I'm giving them the initiative. I'm giving them the
bullets to fire if you like ....I think they're reactive., they have very
little operational knowledge of the business. I think Cadbury really
is asking them to do things that they're not trying or have the
experience to undertake..'
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In Bernard's view, the Runic audit committee were excessively complacent and
were ignoring areas of risk about which they should have expressed more
concern. Bernard had been unsuccessful in enrolling the audit committee to
achieve his objectives. Ronald Roberts revealed that there was some difference
of opinion on the value of internal audit within the committee, but ascribed the
lack of apparent interest on the part of the audit committee to their confidence in
Bernard:
`..one has to say that there are certain people that are not desperately
keen on internal audit, certain non executives who genuinely don't
see a huge value out of internal audit, and others who see a lot of
value and there is that mix and I think that's the difficulty that
[Bernard] faces.. the way they look at it in a lot of ways is 'Are we
happy with the general breadth of what he's doing and the depth of
what he's doing? Then leave it up to him highlight by exception
those issues which he wants to discuss with us'.. I think they have
confidence in [Bernard].. if he feels there's an issue to be debated,
he's not going to stand on ceremony, he will put it down so, from
that point of view you know that's a positive side, it's not as if
someone's saying, well he's not allowed to say things, from that
point of view he's entirely independent..'
Bernard's behaviour had, however, antagonised Henry Morton, the audit
committee chairman: when referring to Bernard, Henry pointedly called him
'Seaton' whereas all other individuals were referred to by their first names.
`.. [Seaton] produces all the reports - sometimes the odd point which
perhaps he thinks in his view is important but which we might not
weigh the same importance to - now I think one of the things which
he felt very strongly about and it's almost outside of the audit
committee's terms of reference2, was on audit fees where he thought
that the audit fees were too high. I think he felt that internal audit
were doing certain things to replace the work and here were the
auditors coming along and wanting a big jump in their fees. It may
be no secret to you to know that [XYZ] when they won the audit at
[Runic] quoted substantially lower than their predecessors but three
or four years later I can well understand why they wanted to
increase the fees so that was an area where [Seaton] was being
really quite aggressive saying 'Here am I doing all this, how can
2 This seems an odd comment since consideration of the audit fee is part of the first of the duties
of the audit committee listed in the specimen terms of reference in Cadbury (Cadbury Committee,
1992:73)
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they justify it?' and was possibly a bit disappointed - we were in a
much more compromising role and felt the audit fee, although it was
high and we'd challenge it, I think on the whole we felt we were
getting value for money. I am not one who likes to squeeze
professional fees too tightly, although I don't like paying too much -
there is a point where you start reducing the fees, you start reducing
the service..'
Bernard was dismissive of the audit committee and emphasised that, although he
reported to the finance director, he was also in direct communication with those he
considered to be the more important members of the board:
'A need to know that they [chairman of company and chief
executive] are comfortable - the audit committee is only the agent of
the board. I do make a point of going to see them both, really as a
comfort test as far as I'm concerned.' (Bernard Seaton, Runic)
There is a sense in these stories that Bernard, not a member of the audit
committee, was almost performing the monitoring role expected of a non
executive director. This may have been useful in terms of initiating a form of
'constrained dissension' within audit committee meetings that would serve as a
demonstration of independence, in a similar way to that performed by the
American NED on the Runic board (see sections 5.1, 7.2, 8.4). Both individuals
were clearly unpopular, standing outside the friendly relationships described in
chapter 7: their unsuccessful attempts at enrolment could be seen as
strengthening the network of which they were not a part. The fact that these
individuals were raising issues for discussion provided a form of reassurance to
the committee because the discussion offered an opportunity to demonstrate
concern about the issues, even if, as Bernard believed, the concern was not
followed by appropriate action. Audit committee members could also derive
comfort from a display of their own tolerance.
In contrast, the internal auditors at Scrimshaw and Glengarry were clearly skilled
at creating comfort through their interactions with the audit committee,
particularly in managing the questioning process, as noted in chapter 8.
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A further external source of discomfort may be pronouncements by the Accounting
Standards Board which need explanation. Such pronouncements are often fairly
technical and audit committee members may need reassurance about their
implementation. Here comfort may be provided to the audit committee by the
external auditor in his/her capacity as expert advisor :
`..when we've had controversial issues, which we have had, it's
been quite important that in the end the [external auditor] partner
says well yes, having warned us about being reported to the FRC'
and all this nonsense, that in the end what we're doing is
acceptable and proper.. '(Roy Milford, Harrier)
`..the chairman of the committee can turn to [XYZ] and say 'Are
you satisfied with this approach?' and that gives the chairman a lot
of comfort that it has been looked at.' (Bernard Seaton, Runic)
Comfort may also be generated internally within the audit committee, for
example to the chair through the status and calibre of the other non-executive
directors:
`..I think he drew some comfort from the fact that he had some
fairly important non executive directors around him - not
including me, I was one of the less important... plenty of double
barrelled names with lots of ministerial and other experience..'
(Henry Morton, Runic)
At what level will audit committee members feel comfortable? Presumably at the
point at which the iterations of the questioning process described in chapter 8
reassure them that the risk of 'nasty surprises' has been contained. Resignation
from the board will be the ultimate expression of discomfort as noted in Henry
Morton's story in section 8.4.
The audit committee thus seeks comfort from the specific characteristics of
meetings such as the physical environment, seating arrangements and timing,
3 This is inaccurate: the FRC (Financial Reporting Council) is the umbrella body which directs
the policy issues associated with the UK accounting standard setting programme and does not
deal with individual cases - the Financial Reporting Review Panel is the body which identifies
financial reporting irregularities and may request directors to amend financial statements.
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from the status and background of other members and from the finance director
and internal auditor through the questioning process examined in chapter 8.
9.3. The audit committee as a provider of comfort
Having been 'made comfortable', the audit committee is then in a position to act
as a comfort provider. It provides comfort for finance directors and internal
auditors through its support over internal control issues, as discussed in 5.5.
There is no doubt that this audit committee role can be immensely helpful in
problematic areas of internal control - for example, in industries where long term
research and development investment is crucial to success but difficult to monitor
where cultures of innovation and control clash:
`..internal audit say constantly we don't control [Y division]
adequately from a financial and administrative control point of
view and I just say in passing that there's the issue of when people
are innovative and so on.. you have a balance between stopping the
innovation with the control or controlling them without them
running out of control at the other side.'(Max Tinker, Runic)
As well as demonstrating to the world at large that the external auditors are
independent from management influence, there is evidence that external auditors
themselves derive comfort from the existence of the audit committee (Beattie et al,
1997) although none interviewed referred explicitly to this. The audit committee
offers a means of enhancing the appearance of auditor independence at no cost to
the auditor (Eichenseher and Shields,1985) and in situations of crisis over
company reporting the existence of an audit committee may divert allegations of
blame away from the external auditor.
The audit committee provides comfort to the main board through its specialist
focus on delegated tasks:
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`..key reports that are done are shared with the executive directors
who don't attend, so it's also if you like a bit of comfort for
them.' (Chris Tracker, Scrimshaw)
`..with this particular item last year.. the chairman of the audit
committee would have reported it to the board that there was this
issue, it had been discussed, there were these two alternatives, this
is what had been decided.. he's reporting to the board so the board
are aware of the decision that's been made... you can't spend
board meetings going through stuff the audit committee has
already been through.' (Alex Anderson, Glengarry)
However, as noted in section 6.1, Samuels et al (1996) reported contradictory
evidence, citing executive directors who were unhappy that they were no longer
fully informed on audit matters. Clearly, they had not been provided with a
sufficient level of comfort to believe that the audit committee was undertaking its
delegated tasks appropriately: since all directors are equally liable, their concern
is understandable.
Chris Tracker suggested that the view of the executive directors could be
summed up thus:
`..the accounts are signed off and as long as the people who've
signed them are happy, the auditor's happy, the finance director's
happy, you know it's not really our problem.'
The ritual importance of the audit 'signing off process in generating comfort
was observed by Pentland (1993). The final signing of the company accounts
performs a similar function: the published statements will be used as an
interessement/enrolment device to confirm the status of the company in the eyes
of providers of finance. Comfort is thus passed on to external users of company
accounts.
9.4 The maintenance of comfort levels
This analysis demonstrates that the audit committee will itself receive comfort
froin various sources and will then be able to transmit it to others. The notion of
comfort as a commodity implies some concept of its value.
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'You assess effectiveness from the perspective of process - does
the system work? - and outputs — the lack of surprises, the degree
of comfort.. '(Ken Palmer)
Different perceived levels and sources of risk may require different levels of
comfort generation; participants' stories indicate a continuing preoccupation with
the provision and maintenance of comfort. Comfort is emotional and has a
certain fragility that may be swiftly undermined: the network of relationships
among audit committee participants requires a level of 'maintenance' in order to
support the generation of comfort.
At Glengarry, the recent controversial history meant that comfort was a priority,
in terms of the public image of the company, as indicated by Alex Anderson:
'I think that it - firstly because of what happened, that was a
catalyst to change and therefore there was a lot of change in terms
of people which meant that we could bring in a lot of very good
people. Secondly, there was a clear recognition that we needed to
be very strong on controls and also very strong on corporate
governance and controls are an important part of that and I think
that the further point there is, in terms of financial reporting, that
seems one way to demonstrate our commitment to high standards
- to always have a very high standard of financial reporting and
that would obviously depend on a number of areas and I think
now we attempt to always represent best practice but not
necessarily to be leading the field. So I think, you know, that the
history has made it much easier for people to get focussed on
internal control and for the senior management to recognise that
internal controls are important. One obviously focuses very much
on how to make money for shareholders but that's all very well
but you've actually got to have the right controls and the right
framework in place so that not only do you make money but you
do it in the proper way, you don't lose it for them... .we are
responsible for our accounts, the auditors are there to audit them
and it's a much harder challenge for us to be comfortable that
we're doing things the right way, than it is to convince the
auditors that we're doing it right and I think that's a very
important point to make, and one that I do make to the directors.
You know it's not a matter of convincing the auditors to accept
some sort of sporty treatment but actually are we comfortable that
it is the right treatment?'
The replacement of the board which led Glengarry into crisis by directors such as
Martin Johnson, with established reputations for probity and experience of
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'turning round' companies in crisis, was very important. A demonstrable
commitment to high standards of corporate governance was also essential. Note
Alex's comment about not necessarily 'leading the field' in financial reporting
practice: the company's image - and the comfort of potential finance providers -
could be compromised by the suggestion that the reports were based on creative
accounting practices or 'sporty treatments'. The company did not want to be seen
as being in any way controversial. However, the board opted to report on internal
control effectiveness, an issue that had caused some difficulties at other
companies, as noted in section 9.2. Any concerns about potential liability from
such statements were presumably outweighed by the benefits of being perceived
as keen to disclose such information, particularly when other companies had
proved reluctant to do so. The use of the terms 'right' and 'proper' also
highlights Alex's concern to present the company appropriately.
Participants' stories demonstrated that comfort is generated and maintained
within the ceremonial framework of the audit committee. However, there may be
dangers associated with comfort generation, as identified by writers such as Janis
(1985) who introduced the concept of `groupthink', Gersick and Hackman
(1990) in their examination of the effects on performance of 'habitual routines',
and Harvey's notion of the 'Abilene paradox' (Harvey, 1988). A desire to
conform to group norms, to 'fit in', may prevent audit committee members from
raising difficult questions and challenging assumptions that appear to be widely
held. The 'irritant' provided by difficult personalities, such as Bernard Seaton at
Runic discussed in section 9.2, and Martin Johnson at Glengarry, serves a useful
purpose: the behaviour of these individuals serves to demonstrate the
independence of the audit committee, while saving other members from
jeopardising their own position within the group4. Bailey's analysis of
committees characterised the 'senile' committee as follows:
'The committee meetings become ritual performances; no new
kinds of information are accepted because the received wisdom
4 Mangham (1988:83) discussed the ambivalence of membership of executive groups, the need to
display differences in order that they may be resolved coupled with an awareness of the
concomitant threat to group cohesion from such a display.
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comprises all that is needed; and the committee is incapable of
doing anything that it has not done before.' (1983:115-6)
Part of the role of the independent NED is presumably to ensure that this
stagnation does not happen, that the committee does not become so comfortable
that it falls into an unquestioned pattern of consensual behaviour. Alex Anderson
certainly viewed the independence of NEDs as a factor enabling them to restrain
misguided enthusiasm:
'I think from the point of view of the company there is no doubt
that non executives do bring an added dimension. They are, you
know, because they are independent, they are able to deal with
people getting a bit over enthusiastic, to say 'Hang on a second
guys, let's be sensible about this' so I think, you know, it does
work..'
Henry Morton had a similar view, describing the effect on the Runic chairman of
non executive appointments in other companies:
`..particularly if you're in good quality companies, and he is, and I
can see he comes back and he wants to introduce some of these
things he's seen and sometimes the non execs say, you know,
'Good idea!', others say Tor God's sake, that's too avant garde,
let's leave somebody else to take the lead on that!' but it's caused
him to bring up issues that he would never have known about
probably..'
9.5 Comfort as a commodity
Comfort is generated within the interactions within and around the audit
committee. Chapter 6 examined the ways in which participants use the
ceremonial devices of the audit committee meeting as interessement and
enrolment devices: these manoeuvres may all be seen as 'comfort generators'
since enrolment depends in part on comfort. Actors will be enrolled in networks
if they believe that such enrolment will make them feel comfortable to a degree
that will encourage them to abandon other enrolments.
Pentland's discussion of comfort generation in the audit process uses Collins'
theory of interaction ritual chains. Collins (1981) developed the concept of
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'interaction ritual chains' to demonstrate the link between micro and macro
levels of sociological analysis. He suggested that:
'Such chains of micro-encounter generate the central features of
social organization.., by creating and recreating "mythical"
cultural symbols and emotional energies. '(1981:985)
He argued that aspects of social structure such as property and authority are
ultimately based on individuals' 'feelings of membership in coalitions' and that
any explanation of social structure should therefore answer the questions:
'What makes someone a member of a coalition? What determines
the extensiveness of a coalition and the intensity of bonds within
it? How do people judge the power of coalitions?' (1981:998)
These are similar questions to those explored by Callon's 'moments of
translation', discussed in chapter 4, and the analysis of network formation
through the processes of problematisation, interessement, enrolment and
mobilisation goes some way to answering them.
Collins focused on the individual interaction ritual of conversation which he
characterised as an exchange of emotional and cultural resources which have
been acquired by the participants from previous exchanges, leading to the
concept of the 'interaction ritual chain' through which such resources are
constituted at macro level into the social structure. Using this approach, Pentland
(1993) demonstrated that comfort, an emotional resource, is generated within the
audit team through micro interactions and is then passed on within the audit firm
and ultimately to the general public. In a similar way, this chapter has
demonstrated how comfort is generated within the audit committee through the
interactions between members and other participants, and is then passed on to the
main board and ultimately to the users of the financial statements presented by
the directors.
The relationship between independence, consensus and comfort may now be
summarised as follows:
1R2
INDEPENDENCE
is a personal quality of audit committee members demonstrated by
QUESTIONING
leading through iterations to a validated
CONSENSUS
about appropriateness of responses, which generates
COMFORT
transmitted to main board and users of financial statements
From an ANT perspective:
INDEPENDENCE demonstrated through QUESTIONING facilitates the
interessement and enrolment of audit committee members, validating the
CONSENSUS which represents the mobilisation/punctualisation stage, leading
to COMFORT, a resource generated within the network, which is of value to
other networks (the main board, external resource providers) and thus
strengthens the network within which it is produced.
9.6 Comfort and Legitimacy
In the context of audit committee activity, the principal purpose of comfort
generation is reassurance about perceived levels of risk. Comfort is provided to
the audit committee:
• by the finance director and internal auditor who supply information about
systems and processes designed to minimise risk. This information may be
supplied directly or elicited through questioning. Other members of company
management may be asked to provide further information in specific areas.
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• by the external auditor in his/her role as expert in technical accounting
matters.
• by its own members' status, skills and experience.
Comfort is provided by the audit committee:
• to the finance director and internal auditor as a support in implementing
internal control procedures.
• to the main board by reporting on the accomplishment of delegated tasks.
Comfort is then passed on by the board of directors to the external users of
financial statements: the public report of the existence and activity of the audit
committee boosts confidence that the company has high standards of corporate
governance, reassuring resource providers.
The existence and activity of the audit committee thus confirms the belief that
standards of financial reporting quality are adequate (to prevent 'nasty surprises')
but within the existing framework of financial reporting there is no
independently verifiable measure of such quality, as Wolnizer (1995) has
observed. There is, however, some evidence that engendering this belief may be
sufficient to permit companies to access resources. Tsui et al (1994)
demonstrated that bankers perceived a lower loan risk when given information
on the presence of audit committees as a result of increased confidence in auditor
independence. Felton et al (1996:170) reported a survey which indicated that
investors would pay a premium of up to 16% for investments in companies
which they perceived to have good governance, for the following reasons:
'Some believe that a company with good governance will perform
better over time, leading to a higher stock price.. Other see good
governance as a means of reducing risk, as they believe that it
decreases the likelihood of bad things happening to a company.
Also, when bad things do happen, they expect well-governed
companies to rebound more quickly. Still others regard the recent
increase in attention to governance as a fad. However, they tag
along because so many investors do value governance. As this
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group sees it, the stock of a well-governed company may be worth
more simply because governance is such a hot topic these days.'
Thus the demonstration of concern with good governance appears to generate
comfort among both investors and lenders with positive effects on a company's
ability to raise finance.
A company's display of concern for high standards of corporate governance is
facilitated by the demonstration of established internal monitoring procedures.
The role of monitoring procedures as a symbol of legitimacy has been noted by
writers such as Power (1997:14) who characterised 'the audit society' as a
collection of:
`..ritualised practices of verification whose technical efficacy is
less significant than their role in the production of organizational
legitimacy.'
Harrison (1987:113) commented, with particular reference to audit committees,
that:
'Since it is very difficult to observe what work these committees
actually do, however, there is the possibility that monitoring
committees will be established to create a favourable appearance,
but that they will do very little in terms of active oversight of the
corporation's activities..'
Harrison's analysis drew on the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who
suggested that organisations introduce structural changes such as audit
committees through a process of 'institutional isomorphism' which is designed to
ensure legitimacy (and access to resources) through compliance with established
norms:
It is important to note that each of the institutional isomorphic
processes can be expected to proceed in the absence of evidence
that they increase internal organizational efficiency. To the extent
that organizational effectiveness is enhanced, the reason will often
be that organizations are rewarded for being similar to other
organizations in their fields. This similarity can make it easier for
organizations to transact with other organizations, to attract
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career-minded staff, to be acknowledged as legitimate and
reputable, and to fit into administrative categories that define
eligibility for public and private grants and contracts. None of
this, however, insures that conformist organizations do what they
do more efficiently than their deviant peers.' (1983:153-4)5
Institutional theory thus offers a possible explanation for Collier's 'curious
phenomenon' of audit committee establishment. More recently, Kalbers and
Fogarty (1996) observed that:
'The formal empowerment of the audit committee appears to be
designed for the consumption of external parties with some
interest in the adherence to adequate forms of corporate control...
This study suggests that changes in the structure of corporate
governance may be primarily symbolic..' (1996:26-7)
The empirical data reported in this study provides further confirmation of the
suggestions of Kalbers and Fogarty. The generation of comfort is revealed as an
important but unarticulated role of the audit committee, suggesting that an
important aspect of audit committee operation may be the level of comfort
generated — the confidence that there will be no nasty surprises. The generation
of comfort may thus provide a partial explanation for the apparently unjustified
popularity of audit committees — Collier's 'curious phenomenon'.
This chapter has demonstrated that the notions of independence, consensus and
comfort are central to the operations of the audit committee. The level of comfort
generated within these operations acts as an interessement/enrolment device,
persuading parties external to the company that high standards of corporate
governance are being maintained, supporting the company's claim to legitimacy
and facilitating its access to resources from external parties.
5
Bourdieu, in his analysis of the generation of practices, also observed that `..conformity of
practice to the rule [brings] an additional symbolic profit..' (1990:77). Bourdieu's notions of
symbolic capital and profit and their generation and exchange within 'fields' parallel the
exchange and market metaphors used by Collins (1981).
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Chapter 10: Conclusion
As Pomeranz has observed:
'Very few studies exist which indicate any benefits, however
slight, accruing from audit committee operations..' (1997:283)
He proposed that the audit committee's role should be changed 'by reintegrating
it into overall board operations.'(1997:284) Does this imply that there is no task
for the audit committee to undertake? This is the position of commentators such
as Corrin (1993) who have argued that the full board should take responsibility
for monitoring and control activity since there is no distinction in liability
between NEDs and executive directors. Or does it mean that the task identified
by Treadway, Cadbury and other reporting bodies is impossible because the
underlying assumptions from which it has developed are incorrect?
By using a qualitative approach to explore participants' perspectives on the audit
committee role, this study has approached such questions tangentially and has
demonstrated that the audit committee fulfils an implicit and unarticulated role in
substantiating company legitimacy, thus permitting access to the resources
necessary to sustain and expand company activity. From this viewpoint, the rapid
development of audit committees in large UK public companies is an illustration
of the concept of institutional isomorphism, since companies which do not adopt
such mechanisms as they become generally accepted may be disadvantaged in
competing for resources.
10.1 Theoretical and methodological considerations
As noted in chapter 1, the study was envisaged as an investigation of the role of
the audit committee. The original research question evolved, as explained in
section 3.6, from a broad consideration of: what is an audit committee, how does
it work and what makes it effective? to: what does audit committee effectiveness
mean to audit committee participants? This was the outcome of initial data
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analysis which highlighted the contrast between the rhetoric about the value of
the audit committee as a corporate governance mechanism, as embodied in the
Cadbury Code, and the scepticism expressed by those directly involved in audit
committee work. Within the audit committee literature, an associated research
question was identified: why have audit committees become so widely
established in large UK public limited companies when evidence of their
effectiveness is limited? — Collier's 'curious phenomenon'(Collier:1996).
The study was not intended to derive further prescriptions relating to audit
committee activity in pursuit of the ideal 'effective' model. The review of the
relevant literature in chapter 2 confirms that evidence of audit committee
effectiveness is scarce. This scarcity is attributed in part to the lack of clarity
about audit committee purpose, which makes it difficult to develop criteria
whereby effectiveness might be assessed. This study suggests that the situated
nature of understandings of effectiveness compounds the difficulties involved: it
demonstrates that concepts of effectiveness are likely to vary between
individuals, organisations, countries and over time, making generalised
prescription inappropriate.
As well as demonstrating a shortage of evidence to substantiate audit committee
effectiveness, the literature review has highlighted significant criticism of the
potential for audit committees ever to be effective, in terms of their
representation by Cadbury as a monitoring and control device. The assumptions
that underpin the Cadbury Code have been questioned: the link between auditor
independence and improved financial reporting quality appears tenuous and the
definition of such quality is also obscure. The use of a qualitative approach
focuses attention on the fact that the practice of corporate governance involves
people - people who operate within a complex pattern of relationships that may
contradict and subvert such assumptions. This study thus supports the challenges
presented by Grout et al (1994), Wolnizer (1995) and Power (1997), by
highlighting the existence of networks linking audit committee participants in
ways .that may undermine accepted understandings of independence but do not
overtly damage the symbolic representation of high standards of corporate
governance to external parties.
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As observed in chapter 2, the influence of the dynamics of the relationships
operating among audit committee participants remains largely unrecognised in
the assessment of audit committee 'effectiveness', which has focused on
conformity with generalised prescriptions with regard to structure and process.
The methodological approach of this study was therefore chosen to facilitate the
exploration of the conceptions of the audit committee role, and its effectiveness
within that context, held by individual audit committee participants. The
inductive approach characteristic of grounded theory seemed most appropriate,
given the desirability of using a qualitative approach, discussed in chapter 2, and
the broadness of the original research question which suggested a need for
flexibility in response to data collected.
The data collection process was constrained by access limitations, as described in
chapter 3: given such constraints, interviews offered the most appropriate method
of gathering data, although the methodological critique of the interview process
is noted in section 3.5. The questionnaires, reproduced in Appendix B, were not
designed as formal survey instruments, and the data collected therein has not
been separately analysed, although, since it provided the basis for discussion in
the subsequent interviews, it has essentially been incorporated into the study.
However, it is clear that the use of this approach, even within such limitations,
has generated a rich source of data which has not previously been explored in the
audit committee literature.
As data analysis through coding and the development of categories proceeded,
following the general analytic procedure outlined in Hussey and Hussey
(1997:258), a reading of the actor-network theory literature indicated that the
ANT approach would offer an appropriate way of thinking about and describing
audit committee activity. As outlined in chapter 5, ANT focuses on the
generation of power and influence within and between networks which form and
re-form. The emphasis on performativity in ANT resonated with the categories
derived from the data that were associated with 'performance', as discussed in
chapter 5. The data analysis also revealed complex and dynamic relationships
among audit committee participants which could be examined and contextualised
through the use of the concept of translation. A further advantage of ANT is that
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its tools of analysis may be used at both macro and micro levels: section 4.5
explores the development of the Cadbury Code from an ANT perspective,
providing a context for the micro analysis in subsequent chapters.
Since ANT recognises the precariousness and fragmentation of networks, as
demonstrated in the examination of the debate over the disclosure issue at Runic
in chapter 7, it offers a richer picture than other theoretical frameworks
previously used in the audit committee literature discussed in chapter 2. The
assumptions of agency theory, for example, underpin a more rigid explanatory
framework which does not encompass the influences of the shifting allegiances
forged by individuals in everyday interaction.
The robustness of the major categories derived from the data - performance,
consensus, independence and comfort — was determined through repeated
interplay with the data. The use of the ANT concept of translation facilitated a
theorisation of the relationships between these categories, summarised in section
9.5. Against the background of the audit committee meeting, providing
simultaneously an arena for the problematisation of issues and a ceremonial
performance employed by participants as an interessement/enrolment device, the
process of comfort generation is traced. The independence of participants is
demonstrated through the key role of the performance of questioning, and
independence is essential to the comfort value of consensus reached by the audit
committee and main board. The acquisition of legitimacy is intimately connected
to the provision of comfort through the formal report of audit committee
existence and activity in published financial statements.
ANT is an evolving paradigm which has been subjected to both external criticism
(eg Collins and Yearley, 1992) and internal criticism from its proponents (eg
Law, 1997). Law, involved in the earliest development of ANT, explained the
difficulty of summarising the theory:
'I think we might imagine that, like its objects of study, ANT cannot be
• told. Cannot be told as a single narrative. As an overall story about the
growth of a centred network with its successes and reverses. And
instead imagine that it can only — and best — be represented as a set of
little stories.' (1997:11)
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He suggested that the adaptation and change he perceived in reviewing a series
of ANT studies was a positive development to be encouraged.
Those using ANT as a theoretical framework to examine accounting issues have
been selective. Robson (1991) studied the development of the UK accounting
standard setting programme using the concept of problematisation but did not
make use of the more detailed framework of 'moments of translation'. Chua
(1995) analysed the introduction of an accounting system - the development of a
'fact-building network' - using the ANT concept of inscription and explicitly
rejecting the presentation of inanimate objects as actors. Ezzamel (1994) traced
the individual stages of problematisation, interessement, enrolment and
mobilisation in the contested situation of an attempt to introduce a budgeting
system within a university. Many ANT studies are based on a series of events
surrounding a specific and well-documented contest: both Ezzamel and Chua
used ANT to frame individual case studies of situations where accounting
systems were implicated in change which was resisted and both had privileged
access to data as participants in the processes analysed.
This study has been similarly selective with regard to analytical tools but has
attempted to use the identification of 'moments of translation' in three different
ways:
• to analyse relationships among audit committee participants as networks
form and re-form
• to explore the performative role of the audit committee meeting as an arena
for problematisation as well as an interessement and enrolment device used
by audit committee participants
• to explain the roles of independence, consensus and comfort as
interessement and enrolment devices that strengthen the audit committee as a
punctualisation of varied interests
One particular problem was encountered in using the concept of 'moments of
translation' as an analytic tool. Ezzamel (1994:225) noted that 'the devices of
interessement per se do not guarantee successful enrolment.' but the distinction
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between interessement and enrolment, while theoretically clear, was not always
easy to observe within the data collected for this study. The actual process of
enrolment may be obscure and enrolment may only be observable from
subsequent behaviour in situations where, unlike those studied by Ezzamel and
Chua, extensive and accessible documentation does not exist. This does not
invalidate the applicability of the approach in this study since the focus is less on
the occurrence of interessement or enrolment but rather on the devices employed
to achieve them and there is no theoretical reason why the same device may not
be used for both purposes.
10.2 The contribution of this study
The principal focus of this study is an exploration of the role and functioning of
the audit committee within the UK framework of corporate governance. It
contributes to the existing audit committee literature in the following important
respects:
• it uses the theoretical approach of actor-network theory which has not
previously been employed in the study of audit committees
• it presents a qualitative examination of the role of the audit committee in
large UK public limited companies, which has not previously been attempted
• it confirms the thesis that audit committees have a role beyond that envisaged
for them by the Cadbury Code, in enabling companies to acquire resources
by establishing legitimacy through a demonstrable concern for reassuringly
high standards of corporate governance. According to Cadbury, audit
committees contribute to high standards of corporate governance: this study
argues that this assertion remains unproven but that audit committees enable
companies to present an image of concern about such standards which may
be sufficient to establish legitimacy and access resources.
The study is thus theoretically, methodologically and substantively innovative.
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10.3 Further directions for research
There are many directions in which the methodological and theoretical
approaches used here could be extended within the corporate governance
framework. The use of actor-network theory to explore patterns of power and
influence around boards of directors through an examination of other board
subcommittees such as remuneration and strategy committees, would add
significantly to the body of knowledge about boards, as advocated by writers
such as Lorsch quoted in chapter 2.
In highlighting its ceremonial role, this study has suggested that the audit
committee may be decoupled from the practical internal control procedures
within a company: useful insight into the extent of such decoupling could be
gained by using a qualitative approach to explore the relationship between the
audit committee and the internal audit function more closely.
The importance of comfort generation within systems of accountability could be
explored more generally using a similar approach to that of this study. Data for
this study was collected in large public companies only: Conyon (1995) reported
that almost 1000 0 of FT-SE 350 companies had established audit committees by
June 1995. The establishment of audit committees in smaller companies has been
far more limited: Collier (1997) explored this, using a case study approach.
Actor-network analysis could usefully be applied to examine how networks are
formed around the boards of smaller companies and how these contribute to the
demonstration of company legitimacy and access to resources.
Audit committees have been established in National Health Service Trusts and in
universities (Dewing and Williams, 1995) but very little research has yet been
undertaken into their role, which may be quite different from that of a company
audit committee. An approach similar to that used in this study could be
employed to explore the development of audit committees in these institutions.
Comparative studies of audit committee activity in different countries have been
undertaken (e.g. Porter and Gendall, 1993) but these have been based on surveys
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and published data: a qualitative approach, exploring the accounts of participants,
could offer useful insight into the impact of differing institutional arrangements
between countries, as noted in section 2.2.1.
10.4 Coda
Pomeranz (1997:281) asserted that:
'It is well known that the mere act of audit committee creation is
likely to have little or no effect..'
The critique of audit committees exemplified by this statement is clearly
challenged by this thesis. From the perspective of the rhetoric embodied in the
report of the committees led by Cadbury, Treadway and others, where
effectiveness and criteria for its assessment are both poorly defined, audit
committee creation may indeed be perceived as having 'little or no effect'.
However, through these reports, the role of the audit committee in corporate
governance has been 'black boxed' (Callon and Latour, 1981). The
demonstration of high standards of corporate governance in large UK companies
has become associated in part with the existence of an audit committee which, in
consequence, becomes a prerequisite for resource access: the presence or absence
of an audit committee may thus have a profound effect on a company's situation,
regardless of the committee's substantive activity. This effect is dependent on the
level of comfort extended to resource providers: the existence of an audit
committee is, of course, no guarantee that a company does indeed achieve high
standards of corporate governance, although there is some evidence to suggest
that 'passive' audit committees established in poorly governed companies may
over time develop an 'active' role which eventually raises standards (Spira,
1998).
'You want to know about our audit committee? Well, our deputy chairman says
it's a complete waste of time because none of the members know enough about
the company to make any useful contribution and they don't know what the audit
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committee is meant to do anyway... no, I don't agree with him... well, come to
lunch and we'll tell you..'
One of my questions over lunch was: 'Why do you have an audit committee,
then?' The answer was: 'Well, if we didn't, people would ask questions and we
wouldn't look very good after Cadbury, would we?'
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APPENDIX A: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
I am writing to seek your help with a research study which I am undertaking
which examines the work of audit committees, through interviews with those
involved in order to gain some insight into their perceptions of how audit
committees work and what makes them effective.
The areas that I am particularly seeking to explore are:
* the communication links and relationships between the audit committee and
the finance director and internal and external auditors
* sources of information provided to the audit committee
* management of audit committee meetings
* the effect on audit committee operations of the 'control culture' of the
company
* the evolution of the audit committee over time
Ideally I should like the opportunity to attend, observe and take notes at audit
committee meetings. If this is not possible, it would be very helpful to examine
minutes of such meetings. I should also like to conduct taped interviews lasting
about one hour with the audit committee chair, finance director, head of internal
audit and external audit partner. The data collected will remain strictly
confidential: no company or individual names will be quoted in any publication
arising from this study without express permission.
Companies and firms offering assistance to date include [Runic] plc, [Harrier]
plc and [XYZ], together with members of the Cadbury Committee, academics
and practitioners with a particular interest in corporate governance and a number
of individuals who hold non-executive directorships in a variety of business
enterprises.
After graduating from the University of Manchester, I served articles with KPMG
(then Peat Marwick Mitchell) in London. For the last eight years I have taught at
Oxford Brookes (formerly Oxford Polytechnic) on a wide range of undergraduate
and post-experience courses, specialising in corporate financial reporting,
accounting theory and ethics in business. My early research concentrated on
accounting education and curriculum development but a term spent as Visiting
Research Fellow at the London Business School aroused my interest in corporate
governance issues.
I do hope that you will feel able to assist in this work and I shall be happy to
provide any further details that you may require.
Laura F Spira (Mrs) BA (Econ) FCA
Principal Lecturer
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRES
Questionnaire for Audit Committee Chairs
The objective of this questionnaire is to explore your views on the factors
influencing the effectiveness of audit committee operations. Please answer the
questions as indicated and add any further information which you consider relevant.
1.How long have you been Chair of the Audit Committee? 	 years
2. How long has the Audit Committee existed? 	 	 years
3. How long have you been a member of the company's board of directors?
	 years
4. Do you hold a non-executive directorship of any other company? YES/NO
If YES, are you involved in audit committee work in that other company?
YES/NO
5. Do you have a financial background in terms of
a) formal financial qualifications? YES/NO
b) finance function experience? YES/NO
6. How many members does the Audit Committee have? 	
7. How often does the Audit Committee meet? 	 times per year
8. Do the following attend meetings? (please tick as appropriate)
Always	 By invitation Never
for specific
agenda items
Finance Director
External auditors
Internal auditors
9. Do you prepare the agenda for Audit Committee meetings? YES/NO
If NO, who does? 	
ii
10.Who provides information to the Audit Committee ? (please tick as appropriate)
Routinely On request
The Finance Director
The internal audit department
The external auditors
Other sources (please give details)
11. During the period of your chairmanship, has the Audit Committee ever sought
information that had not been supplied on a routine basis? 'YES/NO
If YES, please give further details:
12. Have the external auditors of the company offered advice to audit committee
members on the operation of the committee? YES/NO
If YES, what form has this advice taken?
13. Has the audit committee made recommendations for action to the main board?
YES/NO
If YES, has the board acted on these recommendations? YES/NO
If NO, what has been the reason?
14.Has the audit committee ever been required to arbitrate in a dispute between the
company's auditors and management? YES/NO
15. In your opinion, what are the main characteristics of an effective audit
committee?
i i i
16. In the following list of possible functions of an audit committee, please tick
those that your audit committee has undertaken during your chairmanship.
Review of company accounting policies and practice
Review of significant changes in accounting policy and practice
Review of audited financial statements
Review of interim reports
Review of entire annual report
Review of summary financial reports
Review of circulars issued in respect of takeovers, defence of takeovers and
other major non-routine transactions
Review prior to issue of press statements and advertisements relating to financial
matters
	  Monitoring of compliance with statutory and Stock Exchange reporting
requirements
	  Discussion with auditors of their experience of carrying out the audit and any
problems arising
	 Discussion of scope and timing of audit work
	  Discussion of the meaning and significance of the audited figures and notes
thereto
Review of company internal control systems
	  Review of factors that might impair, or be perceived to impair, auditor
independence
Review proposed audit fees
Approve the auditors
Nominate the auditors
Review internal audit objectives and plans
	 Discuss with internal auditors their findings and reports
	  Discuss with internal auditors their experience and problems in carrying out the
audit
iv
	  Ascertain whether proper action has been taken on recommendations from
internal auditors
	 Evaluate the adequacy of the resourcing of the internal audit department
Review the organisation of the internal audit department
Review the independence of the internal audit department
	  Discuss the relationship between internal and external auditors and the
co-ordination of their audit work
	 Enquire into illegal, questionable or unethical activities
	  Initiate special investigations into any matter within audit committee terms of
reference
Review significant transactions outside normal company business
Compare company financial statements with those of other companies in same
industry, looking at format and disclosure
17. The following attributes of audit committee members have been suggested as
those which may affect the effectiveness of audit committee operation. Please rank
them in order of importance (1 — most important to audit committee effectiveness)
No.
... knowledge of finance, accounting and auditing
... knowledge of company's business areas
... ability to devote necessary time
... experience at board level across range of businesses and functions
... independence from management
... personal qualities of integrity and sound judgement
... full understanding of purposes & responsibilities of audit committee
18. The following factors have been suggested as influencing the effectiveness of
audit committee operation. Please rank them in order of importance (1—most
important in influencing audit committee effectiveness)
V
No.
... attributes of members
... selection of members
... continuity of membership
... ready access to external auditors
... ready access to internal auditors
... ready access to all levels of management
... prompt answering of queries
... written statement of objectives and responsibilities
... availability of relevant information
Please add any further factors which you believe to be important in influencing the
effectiveness of audit committee operation
Thank you for completing this questionnaire - please return it to:
Laura F Spira, School of Business, Oxford Brookes University, Wheatley, Oxford
OX33 1HX
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Questionnaire for External Auditors
The objective of this questionnaire is to explore your views on the factors
influencing the effectiveness of audit committee operations. Please answer the
questions as indicated and add any further information which you consider relevant.
(Part A contains general questions; part B is company specific)
Part A:
1. Does your firm produce a booklet giving advice to clients on the operation of
audit committees? YES/NO
If, YES, is this routinely circulated to audit committee members of all client
companies? YES/NO
2. Do you offer advice to client companies on audit committee operation in any
other form? YES 'NO
If YES, please describe:
3. In your opinion, what are the main characteristics of an effective audit
committee?
4. The following attributes of audit committee members have been suggested as
those which may affect the effectiveness of audit committee operation. Please rank
them in order of importance (1 = most important to audit committee effectiveness)
No.
... knowledge of finance, accounting and auditing
... knowledge of company's business areas
... ability to devote necessary time
... experience at board level across range of businesses and functions
... independence from management
... personal qualities of integrity and sound judgement
... full understanding of purposes & responsibilities of audit committee
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5. The following factors have been suggested as influencing the effectiveness of
audit committee operation. Please rank them in order of importance (1—most
important in influencing audit committee effectiveness)
No.
... attributes of members
... selection of members
... continuity of membership
... ready access to external auditors
... ready access to internal auditors
... ready access to all levels of management
... prompt answering of queries
... written statement of objectives and responsibilities
... availability of relevant information
Please add any further factors which you believe to be important in influencing the
effectiveness of audit committee operation
Part B (please answer the following questions with reference to one specific client
company)
6. Are you invited to attend audit committee meetings (please tick as appropriate)
* on a regular basis? ...
* to address specific agenda items only? ...
* seldom) never? ...
7. When attending audit committee meetings what is your role? (please tick as
appropriate)
* active participant in discussion ...
* contribute to discussion when invited to do so
* passive observer ...
8. Do you meet with the audit committee chairman or members outside audit
committee meetings? YES/NO
If YES, please give details:
vii i
9. Has the audit committee ever sought information from you that had not been
supplied on a routine basis? YES/NO
If YES, please give further details:
10. Has the audit committee ever made recommendations for action to the main
board? YES/NO
If YES, has the board acted on these recommendations?
YES/NO
If NO, what has been the reason?
11. Has the existence of the audit committee affected your relationship with the
company's management in any way?
The AC assists me
The AC hinders me
The AC makes no difference
12.Has the audit committee ever been required to arbitrate in a dispute bewteen you
and the company management? YES/NO
13. In the following list of possible functions of an audit committee, please tick
those that the audit committee has undertaken to your knowledge
Review of company accounting policies and practice
Review of significant changes in accounting policy and practice
Review of audited financial statements
Review of interim reports
Review of entire annual report
Review of summary financial reports
Review of circulars issued in respect of takeovers, defence of takeovers and
other major non-routine transactions
Review prior to issue of press statements and advertisements relating to financial
matters
	  Monitoring of compliance with statutory and Stock Exchange reporting
requirements
	  Discussion with auditors of their experience of carrying out the audit and any
problems arising
	 Discussion of scope and timing of audit work
	  Discussion of the meaning and significance of the audited figures and notes
thereto
Review of company internal control systems
	  Review of factors that might impair, or be perceived to impair, auditor
independence
Review proposed audit fees
Approve the auditors
Nominate the auditors
Review internal audit objectives and plans
	 Discuss with internal auditors their findings and reports
	  Discuss with internal auditors their experience and problems in carrying out the
audit
	  Ascertain whether proper action has been taken on recommendations from
internal auditors
	 Evaluate the adequacy of the resourcing of the internal audit department
Review the organisation of the internal audit department
Review the independence of the internal audit department
	  Discuss the relationship between internal and external auditors and the
co-ordination of their audit work
Enquire into illegal, questionable or unethical activities
	  Initiate special investigations into any matter within audit committee terms of
reference
Review significant transactions outside normal company business
Compare company financial statements with those of other companies in same
industry, looking at format and disclosure
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Please return it to Laura F Spira,
School of Business, Oxford Brookes University, Wheatley, Oxford 0X33 1i-IX
xi
Questionnaire for Finance Directors
The objective of this questionnaire is to establish a picture of your relationship with
the audit committee of your company and to assess your views on the factors
influencing the effective operation of audit committees. Please answer the questions
as indicated and add any further information which you consider relevant.
1.How long have you been Finance Director? .... years
2. Did you have any connection with your company in previous post(s) with other
employers?	 YES\NO
If YES, please explain:
3. When was your company's Audit Committee established? 19..
4. How often does it meet? 	 times per year
5. Do you attend Audit Committee meetings?
Always...
By invitation only....
Seldom
Never....
6. Do you provide information to the Audit Committee (please tick as appropriate)
routinely? 	
on your own initiative?
in response to AC requests? 	
7. Is there an established pattern for provision of information to the Audit
Committee? YES\NO
If YES, please describe
8. Have the external auditors of the company offered advice to audit committee
members on the operation of the committee?
YES/NO
If YES, what form has this advice taken?
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9. Has the audit committee made recommendations for action to the main board?
YES/NO
If YES, please give details:
Has the board acted on these recommendations? YES/NO
If NO, what has been the reason?
10. Do you meet with the Audit Committee Chair outside Audit Committee
meetings for
a)prior discussion of agenda items? YES/NO
b)review of minutes before issue? YES/NO
c)any other reason? YES/NO
If YES, please give details:
11. Do you meet with other Audit Committee members outside Audit Committee
meetings? YES/NO
If YES, please give further details:
12. Has the existence of the Audit Committee affected your relationship with the
company's external auditors in any way?
The AC assists me
The AC hinders me
The AC makes no difference 	
Other comment:
13.Do you believe that the Audit Committee affects your influence on the main
board in any way?
The AC assists me 	
The AC hinders me 	
The AC makes no difference
Other comment:
14. In the event of a dispute between the management and the external auditors of
your company, would the audit committee be involved in any way eg arbitration?
15. Is there anything unusual about your company that results in any unusual pattern
of operation for the Audit Committee?
16. In your opinion, what are the main characteristics of an effective audit
committee?
17. In the following list of possible functions of an audit committee, please tick
those that the audit committee has undertaken
Review of company accounting policies and practice
Review of significant changes in accounting policy and practice
Review of audited financial statements
Review of interim reports
Review of entire annual report
Review of summary financial reports
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Review of circulars issued in respect of takeovers, defence of takeovers and
other major non-routine transactions
Review prior to issue of press statements and advertisements relating to financial
matters
	  Monitoring of compliance with statutory and Stock Exchange reporting
requirements
	  Discussion with auditors of their experience of carrying out the audit and any
problems arising
. .. Discussion of scope and timing of audit work
	  Discussion of the meaning and significance of the audited figures and notes
thereto
Review of company internal control systems
.. Review of factors that might impair, or be perceived to impair, auditor
independence
Review proposed audit fees
Approve the auditors
Nominate the auditors
Review internal audit objectives and plans
Discuss with internal auditors their findings and reports
Discuss with internal auditors their experience and problems in carrying out the
audit
Ascertain whether proper action has been taken on recommendations from
internal auditors
Evaluate the adequacy of the resourcing of the internal audit department
Review the organisation of the internal audit department
Rev ew the independence of the internal audit department
D scuss the relationship between internal and external auditors and the
co-ordinal on of their audit work
I nqu re nto illegal, questionable or unethical activities
XV
	  Initiate special investigations into any matter within audit committee terms of
reference
Review significant transactions outside normal company business
Compare company financial statements with those of other companies in same
industry, looking at format and disclosure
18. The following attributes of audit committee members have been suggested as
those which may affect the effectiveness of audit committee operation. Please rank
them in order of importance (1 = most important to audit committee effectiveness)
No.
... knowledge of finance, accounting and auditing
... knowledge of company's business areas
... ability to devote necessary time
... experience at board level across range of businesses and functions
... independence from management
... personal qualities of integrity and sound judgement
... full understanding of purposes & responsibilities of audit committee
19. The following factors have been suggested as influencing the effectiveness of
audit committee operation. Please rank them in order of importance (1=most
important in influencing audit committee effectiveness)
No.
... attributes of members
... selection of members
... continuity of membership
... ready access to external auditors
... ready access to internal auditors
... ready access to all levels of management
... prompt answering of queries
... written statement of objectives and responsibilities
... availability of relevant information
Please add any further factors which you believe to be important in influencing the
effectiveness of audit committee operation
Thank you for your assistance in completing this questionnaire. Please return it to:
Laura F Spira, School of Business, Oxford Brookes University, Wheatley, Oxford
OX33 1HX
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Questionnaire for Internal Auditors
The objective of this questionnaire is to explore your views on the factors
influencing the effectiveness of audit committee operations. Please answer the
questions as indicated and add any further information which you consider relevant.
1. Do you attend Audit Committee meetings?
Always...
By invitation only....
Seldom
Never....
2. Outside audit committee meetings, have you met with:
the Audit Committee chair? YES/NO
Audit committee members? YES/NO
3. Do you provide information to the Audit Committee (please tick as appropriate)
routinely? 	
on your own initiative?
in response to AC requests? 	
4. Does the audit committee review the work of the internal audit department?
YES/NO
If YES, has this review resulted in
a) any change in your pattern of work? YES/NO
b) any change in the resourcing of the department? YES/NO
If YES, please give details:
a).
b) 	
5. Does the audit committee ask the internal audit department to undertake specific
projects? YES/NO
If YS, please give details:
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6. Has the existence of the audit committee affected the communication and
collaboration between your department and the company's external auditors in any
way? YES/NO
If YES, please give details:
7. Has the audit committee ever made recommendations to the main board on the
basis of initiatives from the internal audit department? YES/NO
If YES, please give details:
8. Is your workload significantly increased through preparing reports for the audit
committee? YES/NO
9. Do you think that the existence of an audit committee in your company has
enhanced the status of the internal audit function? YES/NO
If YES, please give details:
10. In your opinion, what are the main characteristics of an effective audit
committee?
Thank you for your assistance in completing this questionnaire. Please return it to:
Laura F Spira, School of Business, Oxford Brookes University, Wheatley, Oxford
OX33 1HX
xvi i i

